BRITAIN'S WAR MACHINE IN IRELAND

by MAURICE BURKE

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

Father Maurice Burke, SMA, a well-known figure in American Irish Republican support groups, is a rare mixture of academician and activist. Born in Waterford, he attended St. Stephen's National School, St. Patrick's College (Waterford) and the Colleges of the Society of African Missions. He was ordained in 1952 at Newry Cathedral, and completed his formal education at National University of Ireland in Cork, from which he received a Bachelor of Science Degree.

In 1955, Fr. Burke went to Nigeria where he initially served as a professor in a teacher training college in the northern part of that country. He founded and was the first principal of St. Joseph's College, Vom, the first Catholic high school in Plateau Province, Nigeria. It is a tribute to Fr. Burke that the alumni of St. Joseph's include many high government officials, doctors and lawyers. Father's last two years in Nigeria were spent on the staff of a seminary in Ibadan, and as acting chaplain to the Nigerian Federal Army.

Father Burke came to the United States in 1968 and since that time has served at Our Lady Help of Christians Church in Staten Island. He has become a citizen of this country.

A life-long student of Irish history and culture, Father Burke became active in many Irish organizations.

He has written numerous articles and pamphlets and has authored Decade of Deceit, Decade of Terror, and contributed to The Year of the Irish Hunger Strike – An American Tribute.

There are few people anywhere who have either the knowledge or the insight of Father Maurice Burke concerning Ireland.

In this book and in many other publications he has brought together facts and analyses which are essential to anyone who wishes to understand what is going on in Ireland. The British version of events there, presented by a massive propaganda machine, is misleading and gross. Unfortunately, people in the United States, Canada, and Europe accepted the British version for many years. Until recently, there was little hope that journalists, clergy and others would accept that in Ireland there is a tyranny at work which has halted the creation of a democracy for generations. They are more willing to accept this now, because the evil effects of British rule in Ireland are becoming more open and undeniable.

Torture, false imprisonment, degradation, flogging, exile – all these and much more have been used by the British in Ireland. Britain is among the 60 countries which use torture as a normal means of getting information.

The tyranny must cease.

And democratic people everywhere must make up their minds – are they in favor of democracy in our modern world or are they not? If they are in favor, then they must work for it, and they must allow those who suffer under a tyranny to decide for themselves what are the best means of dealing with the tyranny. It is unworthy of good people, and an insult to good Irish people, to issue a series of condemnations and then contribute nothing else to the solution of one of the last problems of aristocratic, undemocratic rule in Europe.

Some of the accounts of British rule in Ireland are so horrifying that many people take refuge from them by pretending they could not be true – the British government could not do such things, therefore they did not happen. The argument should be quite different: The British government did do all these things, therefore it must be judged unfit to rule in Ireland. The account of events in Ireland given by Father Maurice Burke should enrage everyone who has the love of democracy in his or her mind.

For those of us who try to temper anger with compassion, the question is not whether the British government should be made to leave Ireland, but rather how and by what means. People in Ireland like people everywhere would choose non-military means if they could. But every peaceful means of redressing injustice has been tried and has failed. The latest pretence at a solution, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, is failing now. Everything must fail unless it is a real solution, the removal of the British government from the Irish scene. It is that government and not the Irish people who dictate what the means shall be.

For anyone who wonders why there is rage in Ireland and why this rage turns people to military struggles, a large part of the answer lies in the following pages. It would be well for the reader to remember the words of an Irish democrat which could be the words of oppressed people everywhere: it is immoral to put fear into the hearts of the innocent; it is virtuous to strike terror into the heart of a tyrant.

As to why priests or other clergy would be involved in putting forward political views, the answer is simple. The removal of tyranny which afflicts God's people is a moral duty, a duty of conscience. And the first means of fulfilling that duty is to tell the truth.

That is what this book sets out to do.

FATHER DESMOND WILSON
Belfast
Author, Educator

1 The Dying Empire

IN A FOREWORD TO *LAND OPERATIONS, VOLUME III, Counter-Revolutionary Operations,* a British Army training manual, we find:

> Between the end of World War II and 1 January 1969, Britain's forces have had to undertake a wide variety of military commitments, and only in Europe, after the formation of NATO, has there been any real stability. Fifty-three of these commitments have been of the counter-revolutionary type, with only Korea and the short Suez campaign falling outside this category.

Some of these campaigns were embarked on to prevent left-wing governments coming into power; in others the object was to prevent nationalists assuming the reins of government in former colonial territories. Britain and America were both interested in building up western defenses against any threat from Warsaw Pact nations. America, however, was not prepared to accept the prewar colonial system, which allowed "the British and Dutch to dictate the prices at which it could buy its tin and rubber." Self-government could not be postponed indefinitely and the only way to protect British interests was to hand over the reins of government to individuals sympathetic to Britain. Militant nationalists had to be eliminated.

The *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* defines counter-insurgency: "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversion insurgency." Psychological warfare has grown in importance, and Britain's Brigadier C. P. R. Palmer has argued that "Britain's ability to defend itself may depend more on public opinion as influenced by the media than its strength in terms of soldiers and military hardware."

Psyops training is now given at the National Defence College in Latimer. Those trained there are used in "turning over" captured insurgents, in "smear" operations and in the propaganda effort to capture the "hearts and minds" of the general population for the establishment. Psyops personnel edited and rewrote the versions of the Grivas' diaries which were published in the press during the war against EOKA (Cyprus). Although Grivas had led an anti-communist group in the 1939–45 Greek Civil War, "no effort," Charles Foley, a former editor of the *Times* of Cyprus, has written, "was spared by the Secretariat to win over the foreign press with titillating stories. Sometimes, for the benefit of American correspondents, 'captured documents' which they were not allowed to see confirmed that EOKA was modelled on communist lines and that an increasing number of young Communists were joining it."

The "turning-over" of captured insurgents had a two-fold purpose. They were used as spies to get information and in "pseudo gangs" that carried out operations designed to discredit the insurgents. Similar covert operations were carried out by an elite British Army unit, the Special Air Services (SAS). Details of SAS activities and the names of members are protected by a "D" notice—unauthorized publication is a violation of Britain's Official Secrets laws. Some of the pseudo gangs in Kenya were led by SAS officers. There, for propaganda purposes, British colonial settlers were murdered in "ritual" killings for which the Mau-Mau were blamed.

A good intelligence network is of the utmost importance in counter-insurgency campaigns. Most police forces in the British colonies were modelled on the Royal Irish Constabulary and, unlike their counterparts in Britain, were semi-military forces. The Special Branches were responsible for identifying potential trouble-makers, and targets for surveillance ranged from witch doctors to trade unionists. All government employees were expected to

help in the gathering of information.

Bloch and Fitzgerald, in *British Intelligence and Covert Action*, quote a colonial civil servant involved with security in Zanzibar: "If a militant nationalist was injured and had to go to hospital, the orderlies and his doctor would watch and take note of those who came to visit him." Paid informers were also used and captured insurgents tortured. Britain had to negotiate a "friendly settlement" following an investigation by the European Commission of Human Rights into charges of torture brought against British personnel in Cyprus.

SAS personnel were used for military reconnaissance and, when necessary, served as Military Intelligence Officers attached to the Special Branches of local police forces. In emergency conditions the Special Branches were enlarged and reorganized under the supervision of officials from MI5, which was responsible for counter-intelligence in the United Kingdom and colonial territories. Joint emergency committees were established to ensure effective coordination of intelligence work at local levels. A security committee in each colony was responsible for the exchange of political and security intelligence between army, police and administration and for the coordination of all intelligence activities.

Data collected by British intelligence operatives overseas were made available to the Information Research Department (IRD), a propaganda agency established by the Foreign Office in 1947 to combat communism and anti-imperialism. Slanted position papers were circulated by IRD to politically reliable journalists, some of them freelancers paid by IRD, who would use them without naming their source of origin. In some campaigns individual reporters were given oral briefings and their "exclusive" stories would then be distributed, via IRD developed channels, for overseas consumption.

According to Bloch and Fitzgerald, several British

newspapers gave permission to IRD to reprint and distribute to foreign newspapers articles from their papers. Deals were made with some news agencies. An arrangement with the *Observer's* Foreign News Service enabled IRD to distribute news articles cheaply, and Reuters was forced, by financial problems, to use the Arab News Agency, which had been set up by IRD, as its sole representative in the Middle East. The Near and Far East News (NAFEN) and NAFEN (Asia) Ltd. were also IRD creations, as were International News Rights and Royalties (INRAR), World Feature Services (WFS) and Africa Feature Services (AFS).

Ampersand Ltd. was used by IRD to publish books written, on commission, by academics who may not have been aware of the IRD link. In 1977 IRD went out of business but many of its functions and key staff members were taken over by the newly-created Overseas Information Department.

The law proved a useful tool in combating insurgency and was used for information gathering as well as for disposing of troublesome nationalists. Each colony had a Societies Ordinance on its statute books that required societies to register local branches and give the names of all office holders. The activities of political parties out of favor with the administration could be curtailed by refusing or withdrawing registration for failure to meet all the legal requirements. Political rallies also were illegal if prior permission had not been granted. All such meetings were attended by the local police who were advised in confidential circulars on the section of particular ordinances to use against politicians making typical 'nationalist' statements.

Kenneth Kaunda served a two-month prison sentence with hard labor for possession of a banned publication, *Africa and the Colonial World*, a magazine published by the Movement for Colonial Freedom. After the raid on his home, the police statement charged that "red pamphlets"

had been found. Jomo Kenyatta was imprisoned after a controversial trial and even after completing his prison sentence was kept out of circulation by being detained in a remote region. When push came to shove in Kenya, 90,000 nationalists were incarcerated in special internment camps.

British administrations showed relatively little interest in developing educational systems in the colonies until the wind of change blew over Africa in the post-war era. The missionaries had been active in this field, and their schools gave colonial administrations a foundation on which to build. While grammar and high school courses in the colonies were soon available, the need for high school graduates to go overseas for university or technical education was used to further British interests.

Promising candidates were offered scholarships in British institutions by supposedly independent educational charities but which were in fact government-sponsored. The recipients were kept under surveillance in Britain and their suitability for leadership assessed. The Colonial Office informed the colonial administration when an African "who was worth taking care of" was returning.

The Capricorn Africa Society (CAS) was an early effort to influence political development in the colonies. Founded in 1949, it tried to bring liberal white settlers and Africans together, a policy which had the discreet backing of the colonial administration. A *Daily Express* article (June 29, 1953) summarized the political objectives:

> . . . a federal citizenship with three population groupings. For the predominantly African regions such as Uganda and Barotseland, there would be crown states guided by federal officials. In the mixed territories, such as Kenya and the Rhodesias, there would be open areas where non-Europeans would have restricted property ownership, but would be eligible for political rights by test of education. In the third group would be Afri-

> can development areas. The objective is the emergence of an African middle class and increasing self-administration.

As this, in the words of a colonial governor, was merely "apartheid in sugar icing," the society made little headway among Africans. It eventually concentrated its efforts in the educational sphere with the object of training an African elite committed to the "ideals" of the society.

The colonial administration was less discreet in Kenya where the Kikuyu were the most nationalist as well as the largest tribe. Unlike other tribes, they were denied land grants in their traditional areas. The war in Kenya, in which 10,000 Africans were killed, was followed by a state of emergency during which the government "actively encouraged the smaller tribal groups to organize into district political organizations, while denying the largely urban Kikuyu the same opportunity."[1]

Some tribes—the Luo, Embu, Meru, Kamba and Kisii—aligned themselves with the Kikuyu in the Kenyan African National Union. Following 1957 elections, two white civil servants drew up new constituencies in preparation for elections to a Legislative Council. The result was "a case of fine election rigging against the tribes . . . supporting the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) . . . The disproportions were most starkly illustrated by the allocation of two seats to the Masai tribe and four to the Kikuyu, with respective populations of 60,000 and one million. The Luo, Kenya's other large tribe and powerbase of radical Oginga Odinga, were only given three seats, one more than the Masai."[2]

A multi-racial party, the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), was formed with government encouragement and backing to contest elections in 1960, and the administration has been charged with promoting registration in KADU areas. In 1963 elections, British officials tried to bring about the defeat of KANU candidates. Government

funds—from intelligence sources—were channelled to anti-KANU candidates via non-political foundations.

When KANU won at the polls, the administration tried to form a pre-independence coalition composed of KANU moderates and KADU. "At the final Lancaster House conference before independence the British government, realizing that there was little chance of stopping KANU, decided that its interests were best served by supporting them, and so abandoned KADU."[3] As the Reverend Canon Charles Gray-Stack of the Church of Ireland (Anglican communion) has remarked: "You can always trust the English for one thing. Sooner or later, they will let their friends down."

Brigadier Frank Kitson, having served in Malaya, Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus, was one of Britain's most experienced counter-insurgency officers. In 1969 he was at Oxford University writing an army training manual—*Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping*. In the spring of the following year, he was serving as Army Commander in the Belfast area.

> It is surely no coincidence that Brigadier Kitson should have at this time been put in charge of Belfast, especially as he was only a brigadier and not a full general, and was therefore the youngest man in the British Army to hold a command position. The most junior officer in a command position in the Army and given the toughest assignment. There is therefore a strong probability that Kitson was given his command for the purpose of putting into practice the policies he had advocated in his book.[4]

REFERENCES:

1. Bloch and Fitzgerald, *British Intelligence and Covert Action*, p. 144.
2. Ibid., p. 145
3. Ibid., p. 150.
4. Dillon and Lehane, *Political Murder in Northern Ireland*, p. 311.

2 The Fruit of Experience

PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF GUERRILLA WARfare, we have, according to Kitson in *Low Intensity Operations*, a "preparatory period" and a "non-violent phase." In the preparatory period the government is aware of a potential threat but is unable to take direct action against the subversives because "in a so-called free country it is regarded as the opposite of freedom to restrict the spread of a political idea."

A supreme council could be set up secretly, however, without danger of political repercussions, to ensure unified direction and control of the political, economic, psychological and military means to be used later against the subversives. This council would be under the chairmanship of the civil authority. The military and police would be represented as well as other interests, and the council "would be served by officials, the most important of whom would probably be an officer of the intelligence organization."

Committees composed of members representing the military, police, and so on, should, as soon as possible, be set up at every level. The supreme council would have responsibility for general policy: when and to what extent should force be used; whether the law is to be applied impartially or used "as a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public."

The army has a role even before troops are formally committed. In peacetime the intelligence organization in a country is geared to collecting political information; how-

ever, when troops are employed, the army will need "operational" intelligence. Sometimes a new organization has to be set up to cater to this, but in Britain, army personnel are used to expand the existing system, based on the police Special Branch, so that army requirements are met.

Besides expanding the existing intelligence service, there will be a need to set up a psychological operations organization. This body will prepare "assessments and appreciations" for the supreme council, produce propaganda material in line with government policy and be responsible for disseminating the material produced.

Trained army psyops personnel will be needed for this work because of the unlikelihood of there being any similar organization operating in normal times. Army personnel might also be used in helping the government "build up its control of the population and frustrate the enemy's efforts at doing so" in projects designed to eliminate the sources of grievance. "The sort of jobs which can be undertaken range from teaching to the setting up of clinics, advising on simple construction works and working on agricultural projects." These have the added advantage of putting the army in contact with the people.

Subversive movements may use "political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches and propaganda" to gain their objectives before resorting to armed force. They are particularly vulnerable during this nonviolent phase when the population is being organized to produce support.

> In practical terms the most promising line of approach lies in separating the mass of those engaged in the campaign from the leadership by the judicious promise of concessions, at the same time imposing a period of calm by the use of government forces backed up by statements to the effect that most of the concessions can only be implemented once the life of the country returns to normal.

> Although with an eye to world opinion and to the need to retain the allegiance of the people, no more force than is necessary for containing the situation should be used, conditions can be made reasonably uncomfortable for the population as a whole, in order to provide an incentive for a return to normal life and to act as a deterrent toward a resumption of the campaign.[1]

A problem arises concerning "the extent to which the soldiers should be allowed to, and indeed encouraged to mix with the people, especially when off duty" because of exposure to possible indoctrination. This danger would rule out mixing were it not necessary to use every individual soldier in the work of gathering information about the situation.

> In the early stages of a non-violent campaign, when demonstrations and riots are rife, information is much easier to obtain than it is once conditions become more settled. At this time the real leaders are likely to be around, possibly even negotiating with government forces as they become committed to action: at this time, too, members of the population who are frightened by the unexpected tumult may talk freely in return for nothing more substantial than a bit of reassurance.[2]

When subversives resort to guerrilla tactics in the violent phases of insurgency, the problem for government forces consists largely of finding them. "It then becomes a comparatively simple matter to dispose of them." Information gathered by agents, informers or by interrogating prisoners must be developed into "contact" information. Responsibility for this work falls on regular military units, but in some campaigns special units were formed "to develop information by using special skills and equipment or by exploiting the characteristics of special people such as captured insurgents."

Kitson recommended the setting up of a unit

> . . . which could carry out the two separate functions of setting up or reinforcing the intelligence organization and of providing men trained in operations designed to develop information by special means . . . the element designed to set up or reinforce the intelligence organization would consist of a number of officers available to move at short notice when needed. These men would be majors or captains and they would be backed by a number of other ranks to act as drivers and clerks. . . .
>
> The provision of men trained in operations designed to develop information by special means produces a different problem because the teams which actually operate on the ground are bound to consist mainly of local people such as surrendered or captured insurgents. . . . The actual organization of this cadre must be geared to the fact that once deployed, the men in it will be used to direct indigenous teams rather than to operate themselves. On this assumption it should be in a position to provide a number of cells, each consisting of an officer and one or two training sergeants. Ideally there should be enough cells available so that one can go to each district.[3]

In an earlier chapter Kitson, using a Mao Tse Tung analogy, compared insurgents to fish and the general population to the water in which the fish swim. Allowance was made for the possibility of special methods failing to root out the insurgents. "Conceivably," he wrote, "it might be necessary to kill the fish by polluting the water."

REFERENCES:

1. Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping,* p. 87.
2. Ibid., pp. 91—2.
3. Ibid., pp. 191ff.

3 Kitson's Plan for Ireland

KITSON DEVOTED A CHAPTER OF HIS TRAINING manual to peacekeeping, the role government spokespersons claim the British Army is playing in Ireland. He didn't list Ireland, however, when giving examples of armies acting in that capacity and it is obvious that he viewed the situation there as one of insurgency. All his counter-insurgency suggestions and recommendations can, in fact, be shown to have been implemented in Ireland.

Coordination committees made up of representatives of the military, police and civil authorities should, he had written, be set up at all levels in the preparatory period. The existence of a supreme council can be seen in the appointment, by May 1968, of Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Freeland to head the army in northeast Ireland. His previous experience included duty in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania when these countries were in "the first throes of independence." He took up his new command in July 1969—the month before the army was formally sent in to deal with the situation.

The existence of this supreme council can be seen also in other appointments and policy decisions that served to transfer executive authority from Stormont to London. On August 22, 1969, J. Oliver Wright, deputy undersecretary of state in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was assigned to the office of northeast Ireland's Prime Minister. The same day, A. S. Baker, assistant secretary at the Home Affairs Office, was assigned to the office of Stormont's

Home Affairs minister.

On August 19, 1969, the decision was made in London to give Freeland, as army commander, control of the 8,400-strong B Special Constabulary and those members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) assigned to riot duty. The refusal of Prime Minister Faulkner later to cede complete responsibility for law and order to Westminster led to the imposition of direct rule in March 1972.

The northeast Ireland cabinet is generally said to have introduced internment without trial in August 1971. The decision, however, was made at a meeting in Defense Minister Carrington's office in London on August 5, 1971, and formally approved at a British Cabinet meeting later that evening.

The top level coordinating body in northeast Ireland is the Joint Security Committee. "The membership as of January 1971 included the Prime Minister; two of his senior Unionist Cabinet colleagues, Brian Faulkner and William Long; the General Officer commanding the British Army in Northern Ireland, Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Freeland; the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Graeme Shillington; and the United Kingdom government's representative in Northern Ireland, Ronald Burroughs. Others with relevant responsibilities are asked to attend the Committee to discuss particular problems concerning them."[1]

The civil authority was not represented on the lower level committees set up in 1969. The government, Kitson noted,

> may not wish to acknowledge the seriousness of the situation in the early stages to the extent of setting up emergency committees which cut across normal local authority let alone institute a single commander system for running operations. This might make for difficulties in coordinating the activities of the military and police, especially in a country like the United Kingdom where the official

> local government leader would be the part-time elected chairman of the Council concerned who might be totally unable, unsuitable or unwilling to act as the chairman of an operational committee. . . . For these reasons military commanders must be prepared to make ad hoc arrangements which might include the setting up of committees consisting of military and police officers only, such as the County Security Committees established in Northern Ireland during the latter part of 1969.[2]

The RUC in August 1969 was a demoralized force unaccepted in nationalist areas. It had also been infiltrated by Orange paramilitaries, groups which at that time posed a greater threat to British interests than nationalists. For these reasons the RUC could not be used to get the operational intelligence needed by the army. The immediate need was met by posting officers and NCOs selected from D squadron of the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment to Ireland to supplement the work of other intelligence agents.

The SAS, as its historian Tony Geraghty admits in *Who Dares Wins*, were engaged in the gathering, control and analysis of information "ever since the breakdown of law and order in Northern Ireland in that fateful week of August 1969." In 1971, the year war was declared on the IRA, a psychological warfare unit called the Information Policy Cell was set up at army headquarters in Lisburn. Later, as a 1976 Ministry of Defence statement revealed, civil servants from the Northern Ireland Office were given training in psychological techniques at the Joint Warfare Establishment in Latimer.

On August 19, 1969, the Downing Street Declaration contained the "judicious promise of concessions" designed to appease the minority and make them less likely to support militant insurgents. As Kitson himself noted, however, "Northern Ireland affords another good example at the time of writing, because certain sections of the Unionist majority are trying to prevent their own govern-

ment from giving concessions to the Nationalist minority. . . . If the breathing space is lost, it may not be possible to restore the situation without a much more lavish use of force."[3]

The army was welcomed by the minority population and the acceptance of soldiers in nationalist ghettos was availed of to assemble information about the community. David Barzilay notes: "The foot patrols in the streets not only tried to build up an intelligence picture but endeavoured to get inside the minds of the residents in the Catholic area of Ballymacarrett."[4] The honeymoon ended in June 1970 when greater force was directed not against those opposing the government's reform program but against the minority.

Kitson, the acknowledged counter-insurgency expert, had been posted to Ireland in the spring of 1970. There was then no hard core of subversives trying to gain control of the population. *Sunday Times* reporters wrote about a meeting between former IRA men and British Army officers: "It was all very amicable." The British asked about, and were told, what weapons had been used to defend "St. Comgall's School when the Protestants swept into Divis Street" and where they had been obtained![5]

The appointment of Kitson to Ireland suggests that the British were then preparing for guerrilla warfare. Kitson had recommended the setting up of a special unit to deal with guerrilla tactics, and Dillon and Lehane argue that the Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) or mobile patrols that the army admits to using correspond to the unit Kitson had recommended:

> In the context of the Ulster situation, the diagram can be interpreted quite easily to see the cells under the responsibility of the Special Methods Group as the MRF squads, composed of various members of different regiments, brought together for that specific purpose in Ulster. The other

> group, headed Organization, and composed of more senior officers and various drivers and clerks, would seem to be the SAS, which is not operational, but supervisory.[6]

Both nationalists and loyalists in Ulster have charged these mobile patrols with responsibility for many of the so-called sectarian assassinations. Britain, as in Africa, is willing to promote "tribal" differences in Ulster in furtherance of British interests.

REFERENCES:

1. Rose, *Governing Without Consensus,* p. 171.
2. Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations,* p. 92.
3. Ibid., p. 88.
4. Barzilay, *The British Army in Ulster, vol. 1,* p. 225.
5. *Northern Irland: A Report on the Conflict,* by the London Sunday Times Insight Team, p. 153.
6. Dillon and Lehane, *Political Murder in Northern Ireland,* pp. 317—8.

4 The British Army

BRITAIN HAS ALWAYS MAINTAINED A GARRISON in northeast Ireland, and some 2,400 soldiers were stationed there in January 1969. They were used to guard key installations in April following a series of explosions carried out by "loyalists" to create anti-IRA hysteria. In July, troops were put on stand-by in riot areas and reinforcements were sent from Britain. On August 14 they moved into Derry and the following day into Belfast.

A soldier who served in Ireland reported:

> I was in the Parachute Regiment . . . and when we went over to Ireland in the last part of 1969, early 1970 . . . we were wholeheartedly welcomed in Catholic areas. With the general election of 1970 coming up we had our tour extended, and the Labour Government was ousted and the Conservatives won control. And as soon as the Labour Government ceded government, plans had obviously already been drawn up, because no sooner had the Conservatives taken over, our roles were reversed in patrolling. And hell of almighty riots took place and that was the start of the hatred of the British Army.[1]

The new "tough" army policy in Catholic areas, designed, to use Kitson's words, "to provide an incentive for a return to normal life," served only to increase support for militant nationalists. There was no Provisional Irish Republican Army in August 1969. The "movement grew from fewer than a hundred activists in May–June (1970) to nearly 800 by December."[2] Although at the time they were

acting only defensively, war was declared on the Provisional IRA in February 1971.

While foot patrols were engaged in information gathering throughout the honeymoon period, the main function of the army was to maintain law and order, especially in areas where the RUC could not operate. From 1971–76 the emphasis was on information.

> Its operations were designed primarily to facilitate the collection of intelligence on IRA activity in the main centres of Catholic population and thus to enable IRA activists to be arrested and put behind bars. . . . The basis of this system was the creation and maintenance of as complete a dossier as was practicable on all inhabitants of suspect areas so that those who were thought to have become involved in IRA activities could be quickly identified and detained. The principal mechanisms were regular house searches and head counts, frequent arrest and 'screening' of those who might be likely to become involved, and the interrogation in depth of selected suspects.[3]

Beginning 1972 the newly created special units were provoking feuds between the Provisionals and the Official IRA, using "turned around" insurgents to identify former comrades so that they could be assassinated, and inflaming sectarian passions by carrying out random killings in Catholic and Protestant areas.

The policy from 1976 on was dictated by the need to give the appearance of normalcy to what was in fact a war situation. Political prisoners in any part of the United Kingdom were embarrassing—those interned without trial from August 1971 to February 1976 had been given special category status in 1972. They were now "criminalized" by processing them through Diplock Courts, which were set up to use the law "as a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public." The process of "normalization" was pursued also by reducing the number of

regular soldiers while giving the police—the RUC—an increased role in the maintenance of law and order.

The total number of armed personnel, however, as the figures show, was not reduced. The Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR), a locally recruited force under army control, was expanded and the RUC itself was a paramilitary armed force.

	RUC	RUC Reserve*	UDR	British Army*	Total
1969	3,044	8,100	— —	2,400	13,544
1970	3,809	625	3,869	8,100	16,403
1972	4,256	1,909	9,102	20,300	35,567
1974	4,563	3,860	7,900	16,000	32,323
1976	5,255	4,697	7,800	14,900	32,652
1978	5,789	4,689	8,010	13,400	32,978
1980	6,935	4,752	7,500	12,100	31,287
1982	7,500	4,900	7,150	12,500	32,050

* The 1969 figure for RUC Reserve is the number of B Specials. This body was disbanded in 1969 and replaced by the UDR. The 1969 figure for the British Army is the figure for January 1969 given by Barzilay.[4] The remaining figures are taken from *An anti-imperialist's Guide to the Irish War*.[5]

Regular British Army units receive special training in Germany and England before going to northeast Ireland. "Before you go you do three months non-stop training for it, then you do a four month tour in the North, and when you come back you do a further one month de-brief."[6]

In England part of the training is given at a barracks in Lydd, Kent.

> Within the barracks there is a mock town consisting of several streets, alleyways and generally resembling any ordinary working class district. Practical training is given in riot control, house searching, interrogation techniques, sniper positioning, setting up secret observation posts, etc., etc. The

> training is so realistic that every day people were injured. . . .
>
> Training also covers intelligence and interrogation. In one exercise, on Dartmoor, you are captured and interrogated. It's very tough and realistic. You are beaten up, sometimes quite badly, and they give you the roughest treatment they can actually give you short of putting you in hospital—though that has been known. They believe that you've got to know exactly what you've got to dish out and the best way to know is by receiving it yourself. You learn how to do these things by being a victim.[7]

Despite training, low morale has been a problem for the army since the start of the war in Ireland. "In 1974, the last year for which figures are available, 137 soldiers deserted, 2,000 went absent without leave, and 1,800 bought themselves out within six months of joining."[8] The gap is filled by recruiting advertisements aimed at the many school-leavers in the ranks of Britain's unemployed. In 1976, according to the May 2, 1977, edition of *Hansard*, £26,000,000 was spent on recruitment and the average cost per recruit – 40,243 in 1976–was £654.

A sample of the final briefing before going to the north is given by A. F. N. Clarke, a former paratroop officer, in *Contact*; "If you can see them, you can shoot them. Just remember, you are still bound by the conditions of the yellow card. That means whatever happens, they always shoot first. Whether they actually do or not, nobody will ever know. Get my meaning?"[9]

The yellow card, according to a Welsh officer, has been so watered down that "any active soldier with his wits about him can use the yellow card to defend firing his rifle at a Catholic in virtually any situation."[10] Regular ammunition is "doctored": "Toms sitting in their overcrowded rooms putting more powder into baton rounds to give them more poke; some insert pins and razor blades

into the rubber rounds. Buckshee rounds have had the heads filed down for a dum-dum effect, naughty, naughty, but who's to know when there are so many spare rounds of ammunition floating about?"[11]

The "buckshee" ammunition comes in useful when reporting: "A check is made on each man's magazine, which have been filled to the correct amount he should have in if he only fired a few rounds as we are claiming."[12]

Readers of Clarke's *Contact* are made aware that, with certain exceptions, the soldiers on occasion use rough methods in Protestant areas. Generally, however, the Catholics are the ones singled out for special attention. This selectivity is not new to the British Army. Kitson notes that "when the regular army was first raised in the seventeenth century, 'Suppression of the Irish' was coupled with 'Defense of the Protestant Religion' as one of the two main reasons for its existence."[13]

The *Sunday World* (Nov. 9, 1980) carried the front page headline: "Army Plays While Pope Burns." The band of the First Battalion, the Prince of Wales Own Regiment of Yorkshire, the report read, serenaded a cheering crowd waiting for the bonfire-night ritual burning of the papal effigy in Lewes, Sussex, England. Despite protests from Labour MPs at Westminster, a spokesman for the British Army "refused to give an assurance that army bands would not take part in similar events in the future."

This anti-Catholic attitude is present in the top officers of Britain's modern army, according to former soldiers writing in *British Soldiers Speak Out on Ireland*:

> The Army chiefs support the Protestant/Unionist sector of the Northern Ireland population and see the enemy as the Republicans/Catholics, especially those in working class areas and they want to ensure that the ordinary soldiers will have the same attitude. . . .
>
> Senior officers see their job as subduing the

> Catholic population, not necessarily because they are anti-Catholic (indeed I suppose some of them are Catholics themselves), but because this is the way to keep the peace.[14]

Brian Ashton, who served in Ireland, testified that the training he received created the impression that the Catholic minority was in fact the violent section in northeast Ireland: "We were told to become a funeral march, a Protestant funeral march, and the rest of the troops were told to be Catholics and attack us, and steal the coffin, and we were led to believe this was common practice, and this sort of thing created in people's minds an idea of what the Catholics were like."[15]

"One must understand the average soldier in an infantry battalion who is sent to Ireland. The large majority of them do not realise that they are there to carry out a peacekeeping role; they think that the Catholic community is the enemy and should be treated as such."[16]

At one time Catholics in the army with relatives in the south were not considered for duty in the north:

> One of the first things I remember is when the present troubles first began, and British troops were sent over to Northern Ireland. I was placed on a standby list ready to fly there from Germany at 72 hours notice. Then, without reason, I was taken off this list, and upon enquiring why was told that due to my parents coming from the South of Ireland and myself being a Catholic, it would be better if I was not sent.[17]

The training given is reflected in different ways. Ian Phillips: "I was sent to the North the day after my 18th birthday. At this time the Protestant paramilitaries were at the peak of their sectarian assassination and bombing campaign. Nevertheless all our activity was directed against the Republicans. Local Catholic pubs were being bombed frequently, and yet in the week following four attacks not one Protestant suspect was brought in. But all the time we

were picking up Catholics."[18]

On the same page Phillips writes about the treatment Catholics can expect: "I was stationed in Tactical HQ as an orderly for a period. Anyone arrested and all suspects were brought in there for screening. My room where I slept was right next door to the interrogation room and every night you'd hear people coming in and getting roughed up, their heads being banged against the walls, screaming and everything. . . . There wasn't a day went by when you didn't witness some incident of brutality, whether it was someone getting dragged through the corridor by his hair or some woman smashed in the gob by the biggest guy in our unit once, just for screaming.

"They *do shoot* innocent people. They *do smash up homes* at 4 o'clock in the morning, simply because they are bored with the foot patrol, or they just want to pass the time. And last but not least, *they do terrorize* the Catholic community *because* they are methodically brainwashed with propaganda of all types, before they do their four-month duty over there, into believing that all Catholics are Provos. I am Church of England, by the way."[19]

"To date, 12 soldiers have been charged by the Royal Ulster Constabulary with the murder of Catholics. Eleven were acquitted, and the twelfth freed on appeal. When you remember that the RUC is extremely reluctant to charge anyone with the murder of a Catholic, and would not charge a soldier unless the evidence was really incontrovertible, it is not difficult to see that these 12 cases are merely the tip of the iceberg. That all 12 should be freed, when any Catholic suspected of violence against a Protestant is convicted at the drop of a hat, merely serves to inflame public opinion further." [20]

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5 The Special Air Services

THE MEMORANDUM THAT LED TO THE formation of the SAS was drafted by second lieutenant David Stirling while recuperating in a Cairo hospital in 1941. It was prompted by what he saw as the need for specially trained small groups to carry out sabotage operations and reconnaissance work behind enemy lines.

"Strategic operations demand," Stirling wrote later, "for the achievement of success, a total exploitation of surprise and guile. Accordingly, a bedrock principle of the Regiment was its organization into modules or subunits of four men. . . . In the SAS each of the four men was trained to a high general level of proficiency in the whole range of the SAS capability and, additionally, each man was trained to have at least one special expertise according to his aptitude. In carrying out an operation—often in pitch-dark—each SAS man in each module was exercising his own individual perception and judgement at full stretch."[1]

General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, accepted the plan and the first operation of the new unit, then called L Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade, dates back to November 17, 1941. The name chosen was itself a propaganda exercise. There was no such brigade, but the British General Staff wanted the Germans to believe that there was.

SAS units were used successfully for the remainder of World War 2 in the North Africa campaign and in Europe.

By D Day there were 43 units in France training and supplying the Maquis, carrying out sabotage operations and pinpointing targets for RAF bombing missions. In the immediate post-war period they were used to crush the Greek communist maquis, ELAS, and in a counter-insurgency operation against Kurdish nationalists. The British SAS was disbanded in 1945 but other squadrons, which included Rhodesians, Australians, French and Belgians, "maintained their SAS identity, including the regimental emblem of a winged dagger with the motto 'Who Dares Wins.' "[2]

The need to preserve the expertise developed in the World War to meet the situation in British colonies led to the reformation of the 21st SAS Regiment as a territorial volunteer unit of the British Army in 1947, the 22nd SAS Regiment in the early 1950s, and the 23rd SAS Regiment, Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve, in 1959.

The purpose of the SAS, as given in *Land Operations Manual Vol. III, Counter-Revolutionary Operations,* is:

a) the collection of information on the location and movement of insurgent forces;
b) ambush and harassment of insurgents;
c) infiltration of sabotage, assassination and demolition parties into insurgent-held areas;
d) border surveillance;
e) limited community relations;
f) liaison with and organization, training and control of friendly guerrilla forces operating against the common enemy.

SAS personnel were, until recently, recruited only from other army regiments and unlike other soldiers, are "within reason" allowed their own choice of weapons. They are unique also in having a Director as well as a Commanding Officer. The Director is an ex officio member of Britain's top Defence Intelligence Committee and is one of the relatively few individuals with direct access to the of-

fice of the Prime Minister.

Since being reformed in 1947, SAS units have been used in 32 war areas. They have been described as "the military arm of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service" and, by a former soldier who saw them in action in the Middle East, as "the coolest and most frightening body of professional killers I have ever seen."

Potential SAS personnel are first put through a rigid selection process and those successful then go through a "14-week period of continuation training with several weeks general training, three weeks combat survival, and four weeks special parachute training."[3] Barzilay notes that the "exact qualities of an SAS man and the sort of training he has to go through is kept a close secret by the Ministry of Defence," but he describes the end product: "They have become experts with portable radar sets. . . . Their other technical expertise is extensive: they are skilled in infrared detection devices, sound monitors, HF radio communications and, to a degree, bombs and explosives. In normal circumstances, an SAS team is made up of four men, including men skilled as medics and radio operators. All the roles are of course interchangeable."

Recruits who complete the training program are put on probation for one year and then serve a three year term in one of the SAS regiments. They may return to their former regiment after three years if their contract is not renewed. Some, on completing their service, are recruited by one of Britain's intelligence agencies, while others enlist with mercenary-linked security firms.

At least one of these, according to Bloch and Fitzgerald, operates with the approval of the British government and is availed of "to tackle really important military objectives which couldn't be tackled officially because of questions in the House of Commons." Prior to Rhodesia achieving independence, many British Army SAS joined the Rhodesian Special Air Service which, 13 years after Ian

Smith's unilateral declaration of independence, was still affiliated to the unit based in Britain.

Although SAS units were not formally committed to the war in Ireland until January 1976, SAS personnel were, as noted earlier, assigned there in August 1969. They were ideally suited to set up and direct Kitson's Military Reconnaissance Force cells, which were modeled on their own four-man units and had the same general objectives. Some, as Faligot has noted in *Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland*, "were detached to regular units, on patrol, to screen nationalist ghettos; others were dispatched to all nerve centers of the counter-insurgency machine."

The full range of British Army and SAS "dirty tricks" will be detailed below. They included, as one conscience-stricken SAS man revealed in a Dublin press conference on October 23, 1971, setting off explosions for which the IRA was blamed. These acts show that Britain is not engaged in peacekeeping in Ireland. British governments are not interested in any settlement that does not entail a continued British presence on Irish soil.

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


YOUNG LIBERALS
LIBERAL
EX-SOLDIERS AGAINST THE
BRITAIN IN IRELAND
TIME TO GO

6 The RUC and UDR

IN 1836, BY THE CONSTABULARY (IRELAND) ACT, the British government created the police force that was to serve as a model for similar bodies in all British colonies. Called, since 1867, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), it was designed to suppress political discontent as well as maintain law and order. For this reason, unlike the police on the British mainland, it was throughout its existence an armed paramilitary force.

In the Irish War of Independence, which began January 1919, the Irish Republican Army concentrated on armed personnel of the British government and many of the casualties were Irishmen serving in the RIC. By 1920 it was a demoralized force: many members had resigned and new recruits could not be found in the south. There the problem was solved by recruiting in Britain from the ranks of unemployed former servicemen to form what became known as the Black and Tans.

In the north a Special Constabulary was created, made up of "well-disposed" persons, which would operate only in the six counties. "The Government of Ireland Act had not yet been passed. This was the first government measure which treated the six counties as a separate unit. It was prejudging both the establishment and the area of the Northern state."[1]

At first only two classes of Specials were set up: A Specials, a full-time, uniformed paid force, and a part-time fully armed force called B Specials. In November 1921 a secret instruction was sent to all County Inspectors of the

RIC announcing the government's intention to form C Specials: "They will not of necessity be utilised for local defence, but may be drafted to any theatres of operations within the Six Counties. . . . The most suitable class for this force are ex-soldiers who possess already the necessary military training and knowledge of arms." While both A and B Specials were fully armed, the C Specials were all eligible for gun licenses and it would seem they were set up as a means for arming loyalists.

The British government's decision to recruit "well-disposed" persons as Special Constables in Ulster was described by the London *Daily News* as the most outrageous thing ever done in Ireland: "A citizen of Belfast who is 'well-disposed' to the British government is almost from the nature of the case an Orangeman. . . . These are the very people who have been looting Catholic shops and driving Catholic women and children from their homes" (September 15, 1920).

Most members of the Specials belonged also to the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a private army formed by the Ulster Unionist Council in 1913 to fight Home Rule. The command structure of the B Specials was patterned on that of the Ulster Volunteers, and Orange Halls were used extensively for drill sessions. Throughout their existence they remained an exclusively Protestant force. Following the settling of the boundary question in 1925, the A and C Specials were disbanded. The B Specials, commanded by the Inspector General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, were retained.

The RUC was established in 1922 to replace the RIC, which was being phased out following the 1921 treaty which led to the partition of Ireland. As originally conceived, the RUC was to be a 3,000-man force made up of 1,000 A Specials and 2,000 former members of the RIC, of whom 1,000 were to be Catholic. Fewer than 550 Catholics joined and the remaining "Catholic" places were filled by

former Specials for whom entrance standards had to be lowered.

The presence of so many UVF members gave the new body a strong "Orange" flavor. This and the appointments of Charles Wickham and Richard Dawson Bates to the posts of Inspector General RUC and Minister of Home Affairs, the office which controlled the RUC, explain the reluctance of Catholics to join the newly created force.

Wickham, then Divisional Commissioner of the RIC, had sent the secret instruction about the Specials to all County Inspectors to ensure that they would "be constituted from a reliable section of the population." Bates circulated a minute dated August 11, 1922, allowing members of the RUC to join the Orange Order. A special lodge was formed, the Sir Robert Peel Loyal Orange Lodge, and Bates attended the first annual meeting in April 1923.

Unlike police forces in England, which were organized on a local basis, the RUC was set up under a single command that had responsibility throughout the newly created state. Like the body it replaced, it also had the distinction of being the only armed police force in the United Kingdom.

Although the Government of Ireland Act (1920) prohibited authorities in Belfast from raising or controlling any form of military force, Major General Solly Flood was appointed military adviser to the RUC in 1922. A special Reserve or Commando force, trained by the British Army and equipped by the War Office, was set up within the RUC in 1950. At first limited to 150 men, this unit was more than 500 strong in 1958 when the equipment at its disposal included British Army Ferret cars, Bren guns, anti-tank guns, mortars and grenades.

Home Affairs Minister William Craig called on this force to help stop a civil rights march in 1968, and it was also involved in the attack on Derry's Bogside in April 1969. (To the surprise, seemingly, of the British Ministry of

Defence, the RUC had CN gas and gas projectors in 1969. CN, unlike CS, was "a gas as defined and forbidden by the Geneva Convention."[2]

Catholic representation in the RUC, 17.8% in 1924, had fallen to 12% by 1961 and to 4% by 1975. Even these figures were too high for some Unionists and Wickham, in 1924, had to claim that some were necessary in order to get information about nationalist areas: "It is quite useless to expect to obtain any information from the R.C. areas unless there are R.C. Police and R.C. Detectives. The efficiency of the Force suffers at present from a lack of R.C. Police."[3]

A contributing factor to the decline of Catholic representation was the association of the RUC with the Special Powers Act, which, besides giving the Ministry of Home Affairs the right to intern indefinitely without trial, gave the RUC the power to search without a warrant and to arrest anyone suspected of doing anything illegal. The definition of illegality was rather wide. Section 2(4) of the Special Powers Act contained the clause:

> If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of peace or the maintenance of order in Northern Ireland, and not specifically provided for in the regulations, he shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the regulations.

C. Desmond Greaves gives the example of a man who was given a one-year prison sentence with hard labor because a copy of Dorothy Macardle's *The Irish Republic* was found in his home. "A police officer testified that in his opinion the book was an objectionable publication 'calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of peace or the maintenance of order.' "[4]

A 1936 report of the National Council for Civil Liberties commented on the partisan role of the RUC vis-à-vis the Orange Order and the nationalist community and

found it difficult to justify the continuance of the B Specials. No action, however, was taken. Open collusion between the RUC, B Specials and Orange mobs attacking civil rights marchers and Catholic ghettoes in 1969, shown via television around the world, forced the British government to appoint a Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Hunt to inquire into the structure of the security forces in northeast Ireland.

The Hunt Report, published October 10, 1969, recommended:

- The RUC should be "relieved of all duties of a military nature" and reconstituted as an unarmed force controlled by a Police Authority "representative of the community as a whole."
- The B Specials should be replaced by an unarmed force acting as a police auxiliary, and another body formed, limited to 4,000 men and controlled by the British Army Commander, for use in emergency situations.
- An independent Public Prosecutor should be appointed to decide whether or not indictments would be brought against citizens, a function then being performed by the police.

While the Committee urged that a special effort be made to recruit Catholics, surprisingly, no recommendation was made suggesting that the RUC be reorganized on a local basis and the central control colonial system was retained. Sir Arthur Young of the City of London Police arrived in October 1969 to supervise the implementation of the Hunt recommendations. Shortly afterwards, the RUC was disarmed and the B Specials disbanded.

Young's efforts to gain acceptance for the "new" RUC were hampered by his inability to prosecute the policemen who had murdered a Samuel Devenney in Derry. A Police Authority was set up in 1970 but most of its members were associated with the pre-1969 establishment and it was not, as had been recommended, independent and "representa-

tive of the community as a whole." No Public Prosecutor was appointed until 1972 and when that post was established, under the 1970 Police Act, the first holder was just another political appointee. Sir Arthur Young left in November 1970. In 1971 the RUC was rearmed.

Young was succeeded as Chief Constable by his Deputy, Sir Graham Shillington, who at one time had served as RUC Commissioner in Belfast. His appointment, as noted by Flackes in *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory*, "was welcomed by Unionists" and "his term of office was marked by close collaboration of RUC and army in joint patrols."[5]

In 1973 preparations for "normalization" began with the setting up of Diplock Courts, juryless courts in which specially selected judges, operating under special rules of evidence, were empowered to convict solely on the basis of confessions signed by suspects while in police custody. That year also saw James Flanagan appointed the first Catholic ever to head the RUC. His newly appointed Deputy Chief Constable, however, was an Englishman, Kenneth Newman, who was given responsibility for reorganizing the police in preparation for "normalization."

Among other innovations, Newman created four regional crime squads and made Castlereagh a specialist, full-time central interrogation center where crime squad members carried out most of the interrogations.

By 1976 everything was ready for the new policy. Chief Constable James Flanagan was retired with a knighthood and replaced by Newman. Harry Baillie and Jack Hermon, long-time members of the RUC, became, respectively, Senior Deputy Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable. The policy of the new team was soon seen.

Newman assumed office on May 1st. On July 26th he issued a new directive marked 'Secret' to all Divisional Commanders that made an important distinction between an 'interview' and an 'interrogation.' "The directive stipu-

lated that the Judges Rules, the suspect's main safeguard from abuse during his detention in police custody, applied to an 'interview'; it clearly implied, however, that the Judges Rules did *not* apply to an interrogation."[6]

In *The Castlereagh File,* Denis Faul and Raymond Murray, two prison chaplains, give details of ill-treatment of suspects by the RUC in 1976 and 1977. Amnesty International in June 1978 declared that "maltreatment of suspected terrorists by the RUC has taken place with sufficient frequency to warrant the establishment of a public inquiry to investigate it." Newman claimed that allegations of brutality were part of a propaganda campaign and that such injuries as existed were self-inflicted.

The Bennett Report (March 16, 1979) noted: "Our own examination of medical evidence reveals cases in which injuries, whatever their precise cause, were not self-inflicted and were sustained in police custody." On March 18, 1981, the International League for Human Rights called for the immediate revision of emergency laws for the interrogation of suspects and urged that disciplinary action be taken against police officers who extract confessions. Peter Taylor in *Beating the Terrorists?* charges that both the British Prime Minister and the Attorney General were aware of what was going on in the "statement factories."

While Newman was Chief Constable, the RUC would appear to have been prepared for taking on a military role. "By 1978, it was claimed that the situation had arrived where the regular army and UDR could take a background role in most areas. The RUC has been equipped to operate more effectively on its own as an anti-terrorist force. Many of its landrovers have been given steel protection, and by 1978 some 2,000 RUC men had been trained in the use of the M1 carbine."[7]

Newman was replaced as Chief Constable in 1979 by John Hermon. The new Chief Constable introduced RUC undercover squads and these squads adopted the 'shoot to

kill' policy which, according to Boyle et al., had been developed by the army in 1978.[8] The *Irish Press* of December 14, 1982, commented on an accusation made by Senator Mallon, stating: "Six of the 17 violent deaths in Armagh have been caused by the RUC, which seems to add substance to Senator Mallon's allegation. It is not the sort of statistic one associates with a normal police force. The point of course is that the RUC is not and never was 'a normal police force,' and the Northern state itself was never a 'normal' society either."

While the B Specials were disbanded, as recommended by the Hunt Report, they were not disarmed. Most joined one of eight gun clubs and were allowed to keep their weapons. In 1971 "there were about 60,000 'firearms certificates' in private and largely Loyalist hands under a British act. In addition, under a provincial act, former members of the B Specials and their friends held about 22,000 'firearms permits.' "[9]

The B Specials were replaced by two newly created bodies, a police reserve, controlled by the RUC Chief Constable, and the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR). The UDR, which became operational on April 1, 1970, soon became the largest regiment in the British Army.

Despite public statements to the contrary, the UDR was never meant to be a nonsectarian force. High ranking B Specials were informed, even before the White Paper plans were published in October 1969, that there would be virtually automatic transfer of Special Constabulary applicants to the new force.

On November 18, 1969, in response to a question, the Stormont Minister for Home Affairs revealed that application forms for the Police Reserve and UDR had been sent to former B Specials. At the farewell ceremony for the Special Constabulary, the army GOC, Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Freeland, joined Prime Minister Chichester-Clark in urging those present to enlist in the UDR.

A relatively successful effort was made to recruit Catholics, but their percentage representation, 20 in April 1970, had fallen to 2 by 1979. They began resigning early in 1971 and in much greater numbers in the period immediately following the introduction of internment in August of that year.

> An important factor in the decline of Catholic support for the UDR has been, over the years, the use of the regiment by loyalist paramilitary groups as a base for training and operations. There is not, and never has been, an automatic bar on dual membership. Indeed, the first Commander of the Ulster Defense Regiment, Brigadier Denis Omerod, went on television in October 1972 to say that as far as he was concerned, the UDR was open to members of the UDA. A few months later, in January 1973, the Conservative Under Secretary for the Army, Peter Balker, stated in Parliament that there is no obligation on a UDR member to tell us if he belongs to the UDA or not, since this is not an illegal organization.[10]

By 1980 the UDR had 11 battalions—2,500 full time soldiers and 5,000 part-timers. These figures include approximately 700 Greenfinches—women soldiers—who do not carry arms. All are paid at regular British Army rates. "The regiment maintains a round-the-clock presence at more than 40 bases and carries out security operations 24 hours a day throughout the province. . . . Eventually the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Defense Regiment should take over the security of the Province and the British Army could then return to mainland Britain—with the exception of those units normally stationed at bases throughout the province as elsewhere in the United Kingdom."[11]

O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, in *Northern Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil War*, refer to the payment received by UDR personnel and comment that it provides "a

significant source of alternative income and jobs for Protestants in times of high unemployment." Despite this, recruitment to the UDR presents a problem, and there is obviously a large turnover. By 1980, when the strength of the regiment was 7,500, Barzilay noted that "21,000 men and women have served in the UDR since its formation."

He gives many reasons for the low morale that seems to prevail, among them the old uniform supplied and the type of rifle issued. Other contributing factors: by 1980, 102 members had been killed and 190 wounded, and the reputation of the regiment had suffered because so many of its soldiers had been charged with serious crimes. The situation became so bad that the authorities resorted to the tactic of having any member charged with a serious offense resign from the regiment before appearing in court.

Throughout the years of its existence, many UDR personnel remained active in loyalist paramilitary organizations and were merely using the regiment for training purposes and as a source of weapons. One of the loyalists killed in a gun-battle with the army on the Shankill Road in September 1972, for example, turned out to be a member of the UDR.

More than 500 weapons are known to have been stolen from UDR armouries in circumstances indicating inside knowledge and assistance and, as *Hibernia* pointed out on March 29, 1979, UDR mobile patrols have been relieved of their weapons with "remarkable ease" when operating in loyalist areas: "Some of those guns recovered since are known to have been used in murders and attacks on Catholics."

Ian Paisley claimed that, if necessary, northern security members would turn on the British government and appeared confident that loyalist infiltration of the RUC and UDR was such that a majority of the membership thought as he did (*Sunday Independent*, February 8, 1981). The following June, Peter Robinson, deputy leader of Pais-

ley's Democratic Unionist Party, called for a search of the Short Strand area of Belfast. "Immediately afterwards the whole place was sealed off, a curfew was imposed, and the UDR search began" (*Irish Times* columnist, August 26, 1981).

By 1975, Jack Holland noted in *Too Long A Sacrifice*, "over 80 serving or former members of the regiment were convicted of serious terrorist offenses, including many murders of Catholics."[12] Despite efforts to hide UDR-connected crimes, the number had risen to 250 by 1981. One of the notorious "Shankill Butchers," described in court as an unemployed laborer, was in fact a member of the regiment. UDR men were also involved in the Miami Showband massacre in 1976.

Hibernia (June 29, 1978) revealed the responsibility of the 5th Battalion UDR for a series of murders, bombings and armed robberies between 1975 and 1976. "While events like these are dramatic enough to capture the headlines, it is the almost continuous procession of UDR men through the courts on a variety of less serious but equally sectarian offenses that is as damning."[13]

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9. McClung Lee, *Terrorism in Northern Ireland*, p. 176.
10. *Voices For Withdrawal*, p. 42.
11. Barzilay, *The British Army in Ulster, vol. 4*, p. 152.
12. Holland, *Too Long A Sacrifice*, p. 200.
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7 The Intelligence Network

"THE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK," BARZILAY noted, "starts with the ordinary soldier on the ground looking for wanted terrorists, and stolen vehicles, and it goes up through a complex system which involves the Royal Military Police, intelligence officers who are attached to every battalion serving in Ulster, to Army intelligence and the SAS, to police intelligence and Special Branch, and then intelligence agencies like MI6."[1]

MI6 is normally concerned only with foreign intelligence but became involved with MI5 in the north through its operations in the south of Ireland, a "foreign" country. While all members of the RUC have a role to play in information-gathering, the "bronze" section of the Special Patrol Group, which operates in plainclothes, is engaged mainly in surveillance duties.

The immediate object of intelligence-gathering was the compilation of as complete a dossier as possible on the Catholic population of northeast Ireland so that potential as well as actual republican activists could be readily identified. At first an elaborate filing system was used, but later the data collected were stored in computers.

Soldiers on patrol and at checkpoints have access to the computers by radio, and the system is linked also to ports of entry to Britain and to the main crossing points along the border with the Republic of Ireland. While complete details of the computer system in use remain classified, Barzilay writes that there are two main computers,

one for people and the other for vehicles. Army technicians "have written software computer programmes, to carry out the cross-referencing, indexing and filing which is necessary for intelligence operations."[2]

Much information is gleaned by careful study of local newspapers, and particular attention is paid to papers published by republican organizations. Photos are taken of demonstrators, those participating in civil rights marches, and so on. Army helicopters are equipped with a television camera and infra-red cameras for use in poor light. High quality pictures can be transmitted back to base and there photographed. Army observation posts are equipped with television cameras that monitor vehicular traffic. Number plates are videotaped for computer recording later.

The army, according to Bloch and Fitzgerald, "took over the top floor of Churchill House, the Belfast telephone headquarters. An elaborate system of monitor consoles, switching gear for allocating taps, and banks of multi-tracked tape recorders was installed. Meanwhile, a three-man Post Office team wired up selected lines to tapping relays, positioning the taps to minimise the likelihood of removal by other engineers."[3]

While these means undoubtedly yielded a lot of information, most of the data in the computer banks came from house searches, information made available by social service agencies, vehicle checkpoints, "screenings" and interrogations.

Numerically, 75% of the households in northeast Ireland, 301,566, were subjected to a search by security personnel in the period 1971–78. These were actually forms of census-taking where data about the residents and details of each house—layout, furnishing, color of paint or wallpaper—were all noted. Facts published by the Central Citizens Defence Committee in *The Black Paper* make clear that the searches were embarked on to gather information

and not, as alleged, to find arms and explosives.

In 1973, the year *The Black Paper* was published, 74,566 homes were searched. At the time of publication, some 3,300 homes had been searched that year, 3,000 in Catholic and 300 in Protestant areas. While 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 10,000 pounds of explosives and 375 firearms were found in Catholic homes, 50,000 rounds, 15,000 pounds of explosives and 325 firearms were confiscated from Protestant homes. "The searches of Protestant homes over all this period have consistently been 10 times more productive than those in Catholic homes, but the pattern of searches has not changed." Occupants are confined to one room when searches are being conducted and electronic listening devices are known to have been hidden in selected houses during searches.

The British Society for Social Responsibility in Science commented in *The New Technology of Repression: Lessons from Ireland*: "Before delivering any services, the Welfare State (whether the Department of Health and Social Security or the local personal Social Services) requires information from people. There are precious few limits on who has access to this information and for what ends: Information gathered by social workers, believing they are helping their clients, can be used to bring together information about particular communities or about the people within them."[4]

The detective interrogating Dominic Liddy in May 1973 had information about his father's medical condition. By threatening to have Liddy's father detained in Long Kesh, he blackmailed Liddy into signing incriminating statements. In November 1977 interrogators used information about a miscarriage a woman from the Short Strand area of Belfast had suffered six months earlier to pressure her into confessing that she was a member of an illegal organization.

There are two kinds of vehicle checkpoints—perma-

nent ones and those in place for only a short time. Details of cars and passengers are noted and each vehicle has its own reference in the vehicle computer. Those operating the checkpoints are in radio contact with central control and, besides getting the registered owner of the car being checked, may also be given special instructions. In 1978, 793,542 vehicles were searched; 750,683 in 1979 and 850,296 in 1980.[5] The use of computers facilitates the analysis of all information, and movement patterns of cars and passengers are readily discerned.

Barzilay credits the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers with perfecting techniques for the "screening" of civilians.[6] Under emergency legislation, soldiers have the right to arrest and detain suspects for up to four hours. "They have used this power to stop, detain and question people against whom they clearly had no suspicion in order to collect detailed information on the population."[7] While no figures are available, screening took place on a large scale and, like data collected at vehicle checkpoints, the information gathered was stored and analyzed by computer.

Section 11 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act empowers the RUC to arrest anyone suspected of terrorist offenses and, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, they may be detained for up to seven days. In practice they are interrogated and are not allowed to see an attorney.

Between September 1 and August 31, 1978, 2,970 persons were detained for more than four hours, but only 35% subsequently charged. Between January 1 and October 30, 1980, 3,868 were detained and only 11% were later charged.

> The evidence is therefore unequivocal. The powers of arrest and interrogation are being primarily used by the police to collect information on individuals and communities rather than to charge and prosecute. Policing in Northern Ireland has therefore

> moved from a retroactive form, where those suspected of illegal activities are arrested and processed through the courts on evidence obtained after the event, to a pre-emptive form, where large sections of those communities which are perceived as being a distinct threat to the existing status quo are regularly and systematically monitored and surveilled.[8]

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8 Pseudo Gangs

THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF PSEUDO GANGS IS to convert available information into "contact" information that will enable security personnel to arrest or "eliminate" the enemy. They are used also to carry out operations that will redound to the discredit of enemy activists. Roger Faligot in *Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland* adds a third reason: "In 1972, they contributed towards the stimulation of a real psychosis of 'a war of religion,' whose image was intensified by propaganda organs and some of the British media."[1]

Four kinds of pseudo gangs have been identified in northeast Ireland:

- Kitson's Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) units, later renamed 'Special Duties Teams';
- Mixed gangs made up of security personnel and "turned around" insurgents;
- Paramilitary groups carrying out operations that have been inspired by security personnel who have infiltrated their ranks;
- Paramilitary organizations actually controlled by security personnel.

The involvement of women in MRF operations was revealed in October 1972 when the Provisional IRA put an end to a bogus business enterprise, the Four Square Laundry company. It had been operated by a couple posing as brother and sister and was an ideal cover for their real work. The large van gave them access to nationalist neighborhoods and was big enough to conceal hidden opera-

tives. Suspects could be photographed. The laundry collected was cleaned on contract by another firm but not before the various items were analyzed for traces of gun oil, explosives, and so on. By comparing items such as shirt sizes on current laundry lists with earlier lists from the same household, the presence of a visitor who might be "on the run" could be discerned. Casual conversation with the people while doing their rounds could also yield useful information.

Different forms of blackmail were used to "turn around" insurgents. Kennedy Lindsay notes in *Ambush at Tully-West* that blackmail has always loomed large in intelligence work and goes on to give details of two brothels and a massage parlor set up in the Malone Road and Antrim Road districts of Belfast.

> A London vice king was brought in to make the arrangements. The girls were required to take the Official Secrets oath. They were young and presentable and paid £500 per week. Conversations with clients were tape-recorded, and remote-controlled 35-millimeter Olympus cameras took photographs in the bedrooms. In August 1972 the Provisional IRA discovered what was happening and fired shots into one of the buildings. The establishments were closed immediately and some time later the main details appeared in the Dublin press.[2]

Tony Geraghty, the SAS historian, gives an example of former IRA volunteers aiding the MRF in his *Who Dares Wins*:

> Ten proven IRA activists, including one who was a recently demobilized soldier of the Royal Irish Rangers, were arrested and given the choice between long terms of imprisonment or undercover work for the British Army. They opted to join the British . . . Their guardians were ten volunteers for plainclothes duty from the British Army . . . Initially, the task of the first MRFs was

> to drive round Belfast's republican districts to identify erstwhile comrades in the IRA who were then placed under surveillance or arrest.[3]

City branches of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) were particularly vulnerable to infiltration by security personnel. Albert Walker Baker, who had served with the 22nd SAS Regiment in the Persian Gulf, was planted in a unit of the Belfast UDA after finishing his tour of duty there. He later confessed that in 1972–73 he was personally involved in sectarian assassinations.

A spokesman for the Derry UDA, in a statement published in the February 22, 1981 *Irish Times*, claimed that one of its leading members was an officer in British Military Intelligence. For years he had passed on a steady stream of information including details of alleged republican activists as possible targets for assassination. One of the UDA members convicted of the murder of John Turnly, a Protestant member of the Irish Independence Party who was active in the H-Block campaign, confessed that at the time he was working with the SAS.

Shay O'Brien, a Catholic, deserted his wife in 1973 and moved to Bangor in 1974 where his life "revolved around the circle of friends of his girlfriend at various loyalist paramilitary clubs." One of O'Brien's brothers was a member of the Official IRA and another was associated with the Irish Republican Socialist Party.

At Bangor, O'Brien was contacted by a British Intelligence officer who was the leader of the Bangor Red Hand Commandos. He knew all about O'Brien's background. O'Brien was told to go back to Turf Lodge and establish contact with a group that later came to be known as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). There he helped fuel a feud between the Officials and the INLA by passing on information given him about Official IRA arms dumps. Suspicion was aroused, however, and "he sealed his own fate on the day that, at the instigation of his 'case officers,'

he submitted a detailed account of Ian Paisley's movements to the IRA."[4]

An example of a loyalist group controlled by British intelligence is given by Faligot: "The UVF leader, Jim Hanna, was in permanent contact with two Military Intelligence officers attached to the 39th Brigade, Capts. Anthony Box and Anthony Ling, as well as Lt. Alan Holmer, who tried to have him promoted within the UVF hierarchy. The irresistible ascension of 'their man' was facilitated by the arrest of some other activists."

The Ulster Freedom Fighters was another loyalist group controlled by the British. Kennedy Lindsay writes:

> A strong belief exists in Ulster that British intelligence was responsible for the emergence of the secret Ulster Freedom Fighters in the late summer of 1973. It is said that initially it consisted of a small number of ex-convicts brought together and controlled by British intelligence. These, in turn, recruited and controlled others who believed that they were members of a genuine loyalist secret organization.[6]

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3. Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins*, pp. 186–7.
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

9 Dirty Tricks

THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF ALL ARMY RANKS vis-à-vis Protestants and Catholics in northeast Ireland has been noted already in Chapter 4. Relations between army personnel and different elements in the loyalist community, however, have not been uniformly good. There is evidence of friction between the army and members of the RUC, especially in the period 1969–76. In the honeymoon phase, when loyalists were resisting the granting of reforms designed to placate nationalists, life was made "uncomfortable" for residents of loyalist areas. Even when the army was "hounding the locals without mercy" one loyalist group was exempt from harassment: "Stand for long moments staring up at the UDA HQ, which we are not allowed to touch but would dearly love to."[1]

Loyalist paramilitary leaders, however, have also been targeted for assassination: some persisted in carrying out militant operations when the establishment wanted to pursue talks with Provisional leaders; others were killed because they had opened up lines of communication with republicans. Unionist politicians have not all the same degree of loyalty to the Crown. Ian Paisley, for example, was prepared to "end allegiance if the Prince weds a Catholic," and through the years has been openly critical of British policy. At least one attempt was made to set him up for assassination and he was also subjected to a smear campaign. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that complaints about "dirty tricks" have come from both communities in

occupied Ireland.

That army personnel deliberately set off bombs to discredit the IRA was attested to by a member of an army bomb squad who became sickened by the activities in which he was involved. David Seaman called a press conference in Dublin on October 23, 1971, and confessed that the SAS had exploded random bombs in the north for which the IRA had been blamed.

A London *Sunday Times* reporter, David Blundy, in a March 13, 1977 article gave a general summary of dirty tricks operations carried out by British personnel: setting off "IRA" bombs, planting ammunition on suspects, using nonstandard weaponry to shoot at civilians, carrying out "sectarian" assassinations, and discrediting politicians deemed hostile to government policy. Kennedy Lindsay charged:

> In the months that preceded the general election to the short-lived Northern Ireland Assembly set up by Whitelaw, a number of explosions occurred in church and other emotive buildings in quiet parts of the country with no terrorist problem. As the police privately noted at the time, most of them showed substantial expertise and one in particular was carried out with the skill to be found only among persons such as highly trained army saboteurs."[2]

The Provisional IRA charged British Army personnel with responsibility for the bombing of the Abercorn restaurant on March 4, 1972, and the bombing of McGurk's Bar on December 4, 1971. Two women were killed in the Abercorn bombing and 136 people injured. Fifteen people were killed in the McGurk's Bar explosion and 17 injured. While a loyalist was convicted for the McGurk explosion in 1977, plastic explosives, available only to the army in 1971, were used. Civilian lives were endangered also when the British began using electronic devices to trigger bombs

being prepared in nationalist areas. Four IRA volunteers were killed in one such incident on March 11, 1972.

While some SAS/MRF explosions were designed to discredit the IRA and others were intended to inflame sectarian passions, a number of incidents in loyalist areas were politically motivated. Four explosions shortly before the May 1977 United Ulster Action Council general strike were followed by a telephoned warning about a bomb in Lisburn Orange Hall.

A bomb was found. Enoch Powell, who supported the position taken by the Northern Ireland Office on the strike, had been the principal speaker and the presumption was that the bomb had been placed by Unionists who were opposed to the stand he had taken. The overall effect was to increase support among unionist rank and file for the government's position.

In June 1977, Ian Paisley charged that there was evidence of irregularities in Northern Ireland Housing Executive contracts. Four days later the relevant files were destroyed in a mysterious fire. The office housing the records was in a building that "was one of the most closely protected in Ulster and the staff employed in it had been doubly vetted for security."[3]

The Provisional IRA, since assuming an offensive role in February 1971, had consistently given advance warnings whenever bombs were placed that could endanger civilians. On occasion warnings have been deliberately ignored for propaganda purposes. Nine people were killed and some 130 injured on "Bloody Friday," July 21, 1972, by bombs for which the Provisionals accepted responsibility. The British claimed that no warnings had been given, but this was challenged in a July 30, 1972, London *Sunday Times* article by Peter Pringle entitled "Mystery of Bloody Friday's Lost Warnings."

"The Public Protection Agency," Pringle wrote, "set up by Mr. Whitelaw at the beginning of this month to re-

ceive calls about sectarian intimidation, confirmed last week that they had received warnings of the two explosions. . . . The PPA says the calls were immediately passed on to the Security Forces. But the Army is adamant that it received no warning." The *Irish News*, a Belfast newspaper, in a July 29 report, stated that the Samaritans and the PPA confirmed that they had received advance warnings and had passed them on to the army.

The PPA had given one hour and 13 minutes warning to the army about one bomb, 30 minutes warning about the other. At the inquest on the victims, a bus depot manager testified that he too had received and passed on a warning about one of the explosions to the British Army 30 minutes before the blast. "But while the civilians in the area were not alerted, the BBC were informed for on the spot coverage of the explosions and aftermath."[4]

While all assassinations or attempted assassinations carried out by security personnel in Ireland were, in the broad sense, politically motivated, they can be classified under different headings:

- killings associated with the "elimination" of persons identified as members of insurgent groups;
- "sectarian" assassinations;
- individuals targeted to prevent disclosure of "dirty tricks" operations;
- killings associated with specific "political" goals.

Freedom Struggle, published by the Provisional IRA, contains a Roll of Honour listing its members who were killed up to July 1973. It distinguishes between those "killed in action" and those "shot by British Army." Thirty-five volunteers were listed as "shot by British Army." Evidence of the 'shoot-to-kill' policy and of the fact that mistakes were made was given by a member of a 1972 MRF team:

> We were instructed in the use of the Russian AK47 assault rifle, Armalite, and a Thompson sub-

> machine gun. All these weapons are favored by the Provos. I will leave to your imagination why Brigadier Kitson thought this was necessary, as these weapons are not standard issue for the British Army. . . . One day in April 1972 I was on plainclothes surveillance duties with two other soldiers. We drove along Whiterock Road, Upper Falls. We had a death list with names and photos, with the orders 'Shoot on sight.' One of the soldiers saw ———, a man on the list, and another whose name I forget. We swerved our car in front of them . . . and leapt out, drawing our pistols, and opened fire. They tried to run down an alley. We ran . . . after them and the patrol commander gave the order 'Bullets.' I scored several hits myself, both men were severely wounded. We radioed for a uniformed patrol. When it turned up, their commander said to ours, 'You stupid bastards, you've shot the wrong fuckers.' The army issued a press statement alleging that the men had shot at us and that the army had a pistol to prove it. This was a lie. Both men were brothers on their way to work, innocent men going about their lawful business.[5]

Later the army was less secretive about the 'shoot-to-kill' policy and Boyle et al. note that "the army appear to have developed a policy of laying ambushes for suspected terrorists with a view to shooting dead those who did not immediately give themselves up."[6] Three of the 10 victims named by Boyle et al. were "admitted by the army to have been shot in error."

The *Irish Press* commented editorially on December 14, 1982, under the headline "License to kill" on accusations that both the RUC and the UDR had also adopted the shoot-to-kill policy. They "seem to have been able to choose and hit targets at will without fear of either due process of law or interference from their superiors."

The year 1972 saw the first of what came to be called "sectarian assassinations," random killings of Protestants

or Catholics apparently for the simple reason that they were Protestants or Catholics. While not all such murders were carried out by security personnel, their involvement in some was noted the year they started.

Seán MacStiofáin commented: "During the summer and autumn of 1972, plainclothes squads were clearly established as being involved in shootings or killings in Ballymurphy, Andersonstown, Leeson Street, New Lodge and the Falls Road. Their cars were often given away by the speed with which they were passed through British checkpoints."[7]

In *The Triangle of Death*, which deals with sectarian assassinations in the Dungannon-Moy-Portadown area, Faul and Murray comment that many of the assassinations were characterized by withdrawal of roadblocks beforehand and absence of prolonged or urgently pursued police or army investigations afterwards.

One incident, where MRF involvement had to be admitted, was politically significant because of the date on which it occurred—June 22, 1972. That was also the day the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau issued a statement saying that the Provisional IRA would suspend offensive operations from midnight, June 26, 1972, provided that a public reciprocal response was forthcoming "from the Armed Forces of the British Crown." The Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, announced immediately that "Her Majesty's forces will obviously reciprocate."

The incident occurred at a bus terminal on the Glen Road, Andersontown, and three taxi drivers were wounded. wounded.

> The three taxi men were cut down by machine-gun fire from a passing civilian car. Shortly afterwards, the Northern Ireland army press office issued the statement: *'About eighteen shots have been fired in an incident in which security forces were not involved. When a patrol of the Second Field Regiment, the Royal Artillery, arrived at the scene, they found nothing. Our*

> *men were not involved in this shooting at all.'* Unknown to the army press office, the RUC had stopped the car from which the shots had come at a roadside vehicle search a short distance from the scene. They found two soldiers in civilian clothes in it and a Thompson sub-machine gun.[8]

The number of sectarian assassinations carried out has always increased when the Provisional IRA declared a ceasefire. (Dillon and Lehane give the title "The IRA call a truce—the Protestant extremists declare war: 26 June–9 July" to Chapter 5 of *Political Murder in Northern Ireland.*)

While the prevailing policy in 1972 does not seem to have favored a ceasefire, the British were anxious to prolong a 1975 truce because they were then finalizing arrangements for "normalization." The increased assassination rate in 1975 was due to members of the Ulster Defence Association who did not appreciate the finer points of British deviousness. They saw a truce as threatening their interests and they continued to act as they had been allowed to before the truce.

Jack Holland credits the UDA with murdering 440 people between 1972 and 1977.[9] These figures account for 72% of civilian "sectarian" deaths for the period. The British government, however, refused to declare the UDA an illegal organization even after spokespersons had publicly accepted responsibility for assassinations.

SAS member David Seaman, who called a press conference in Dublin in October 1971 to expose his regiment's illegal activities, made the mistake of going back across the border into northeast Ireland. His body was found the following January in a Co. Armagh ditch.

William Black, a part-time member of the UDR, was lucky to survive an assassination attempt. In August 1972 he caught three men stealing a van parked near his home. Although he believed at first that they were IRA members preparing another car bomb, they turned out to be

plainclothes British soldiers. The police told him to forget about it and when he refused, he and his family were subject to an ordeal which culminated in January 1974 with his attempted assassination.

At least one of the soldiers who shot Black was a member of the SAS. To explain the presence of security personnel in his Tully-West home, stolen articles had been planted in an adjacent shed. Kennedy Lindsay gives full details of the Black case and other incidents in his *Ambush at Tully-West*.

Loyalists and republicans have been murdered by security personnel for political reasons. Jim Hanna, through whom the British controlled the Ulster Volunteer Force, was found shot dead in a car on Mansfield Road, Belfast, on April 1, 1974. He had made the mistake of negotiating with leaders of the Official IRA.

Tommy Herron and Ernie Elliott, high ranking officers in the UDA, were likewise eliminated after establishing links with republican organizations. Charges of SAS involvement were made following the assassinations of Miriam Daly and Ronnie Bunting, both nationalists, in 1980. Bunting was a leader in the H-Block campaign; Miriam Daly was "a woman of considerable personal prestige and social standing and whom an Irish republican terrorist organization regarded as its intellectual patron."

In *Justice in Northern Ireland* Hadden and Hillyard, commenting on the failure of official inquiries, write: "Finally, and perhaps most important, was the fact that no action was taken to deal with those cases in which the various reports found security forces or individual soldiers or policemen to have been seriously at fault. . . . It is widely agreed that in these cases the actions by the security forces constituted the criminal offense of assault or manslaughter, if not murder."

Reviewing cases where security personnel were brought to court, they summarized: "It is clear from our

study of reported cases that most convictions have been for minor off-duty offenses, such as public house brawls. The more serious charge of unlawful violence by soldiers on duty or by those conducting interrogations have almost without exception proved unsuccessful."[9]

In *Ten Years On in Northern Ireland*, Boyle et al. reported a "100% acquittal rate in cases against members of the security forces" and go on to comment that this "can be explained only in terms of a different approach by the prosecuting authorities or the courts to such cases." The case of Andrew Beattie helps illustrate the fact that the courts too could be used when necessary for "dirty tricks."

Beattie, a member of the UDA, was a delegate to the Constitutional Stoppage Central Coordinating Committee, which held daily sessions during the general strike organized by the Ulster Workers Council in May 1974. He was from Rathcoole, Co. Antrim. At first the British government intended to arrest the leaders of the strike, but all the preparations made had to be cancelled when the authorities refused to cooperate. Notice of cancellation of the arrest orders failed to reach the Rathcoole district and Beattie, with others, was arrested on May 25.

> The cancellation of the plan for the mass arrest of strike leaders across Ulster doomed the Northern Ireland Executive to a speedy demise. The Irish republican SDLP and other groups which had had members in it turned on the Wilson government with the utmost ferocity for being weak, cowardly and treacherous. Outside Northern Ireland, political forces in the Irish Republic and the Irish lobby in Wilson's own Labor Party were little less restrained. Suddenly, the loyalist outcry over the arrests in the Rathcoole district was the government's best friend. It was not weak, cowardly or treacherous, it told its assailants and for proof pointed to the arrests and the fact that it was not releasing any of the men.[10]

To stifle dissent in Unionist ranks, serious charges had to be brought against Beattie. He was charged eventually with presiding over a meeting of UDA officers which planned an incident that resulted in the deaths of a 16-year-old boy and an 18-year-old girl in February 1974. The only witness against Beattie was "an anonymous Special Branch detective who claimed to be reporting evidence of a paid, anonymous informer." Although four other UDA officers arrested with Beattie were named as attending the meeting, they had already been released after appearing before a Diplock tribunal.

The prosecution witness was challenged to explain why he had failed to pass on the information he had given the court to the police who were investigating the murders. He claimed he had done so orally and was unable to explain why he had not put it in writing. Other irregularities were noted and the defense

> reserved one particularly effective item of information to the end of the cross-examination. He turned to the Special Branch detective behind the screen and asked whether the prosecution knew that a man was awaiting trial in Crumlin Road Prison, Belfast, because the murder weapon used at Abbey Meat Packers, Ltd. [where the incident occurred] had been found in his house. The reply was 'No.' He then gave that man's name and address.[11]

Linday notes in a footnote that the police discovered that the gun had been used in eight murders besides the two with which Beattie had been charged.[12] The man in whose house the gun was found "was eliminated from suspicion of having been involved in the killings," and no one except those in the Beattie case has been charged with any of the murders for which the gun had been used. "This is a near incredible statistic if the persons responsible were ordinary terrorists."

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10. Lindsay, *Ambush at Tully-West*, p. 128.
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10 Psyops

THE GOVERNMENT, KITSON WROTE, MUST "promote its own cause and undermine that of the enemy by disseminating its view of the situation, and this involves a carefully planned and coordinated campaign of what for want of a better word must regrettably be called psychological operations."[1]

By 1976 the government had 20 representatives in Belfast for press relations, the army at least 40 press officers with a staff of more than 100, while the RUC had 12 full-time press officers. The army, Robert Fisk noted in *The Point of No Return*, "employed a complex system of press officers at headquarters, brigade and unit level in Northern Ireland. Ostensibly their job was to give factual information on events to newspapermen, but several were employed in a slightly more sophisticated capacity, being expected to 'leak' information, sometime true and sometimes false, which might assist the Army's struggle in Ulster."

To promote the government's "cause" in Ireland, soldiers engaged in a colonial war were portrayed as peacekeepers and the "troubles" as rooted in religion, with Catholics and Protestants refusing to live together in peace. To counteract the well-documented history of vicious anti-Catholic discrimination practiced by successive Unionist governments, Protestant intransigence was made "understandable" by portraying the south of Ireland as a sectarian state.

Reports of the war in Ireland soon contained stock

phrases referring to the "Catholic" IRA who were trying to unite the six counties with the "overwhelmingly Roman Catholic Republic of Ireland." Republican militants were depicted as terrorists engaged in random killings. Because they were in fact adhering to a military code of ethics and giving advance warnings when civilians were endangered, SAS/MRF units were used to carry out "IRA" terrorist acts and, as noted above, advance warnings from republican activists were, on occasion, ignored. Although intelligence reports described the Provisional IRA as committed to the traditional aim of Irish nationalism without links to any foreign power, the propaganda machine portrayed them as Marxists trying to impose a Cuban-style dictatorship on Ireland.

The deaths of Majella O'Hare and John Boyle illustrate the work of army press officers. O'Hare, a 12-year-old girl, was killed on August 14, 1976. The first report issued by the army claimed that she had been hit when a gunman fired on an army patrol. There was no gunman, and later it transpired that she had been shot by a member of the Third Parachute Regiment.

John Boyle, a 16-year-old killed July 11, 1978, was first said to be one of three caught carrying bombs who ran off when challenged. The second army statement claimed that he had lifted an Armalite from an arms cache under surveillance and, when challenged, had "swung round in a firing position." Boyle had in fact discovered the cache earlier and his father had reported the find to the RUC. Forensic evidence showed that he had not handled any of the weapons, and the pathologist's report showed that he had been shot from behind.

Groups and individuals have been subjected to smear campaigns by psyops personnel. An old anti-IRA smear was resurrected in 1972 when *Red Terror and Green*, by Richard Dawson, first published in 1920, was reprinted as a paperback. It attempted to show that the Bolsheviks

were behind those fighting for Irish independence in 1920. The 1972 edition carried the message on the back cover: "Half a century ago Richard Dawson, one of the leading authorities on the Irish problem, wrote this masterly summary of Ireland and her problems. What is amazing is how little has changed in those fifty years. How the old hatreds, the religious bitterness, the violence and the killing—all still remain."

John McGuffin gives examples in *Internment* of efforts to link the IRA with sex scandals and using children to carry out dangerous operations:

> Independent Television's Network's second item on 23 August 1972 was a story about three tiny girls, aged eight, who had been used by the unscrupulous IRA to push a pram containing a huge bomb towards a military post at the back of the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast. The 'chivalrous soldiers were shocked and refused to fire, even at the risk of their own lives.' The entire story was subsequently admitted by the British Army Press Office to be totally untrue. But ITN carried no denial. Similarly, the same week saw the *London Evening News* and *The Sun*, both unobtainable in Ireland, carrying lead stories about IRA gunmen bestially raping young girls at gunpoint in the Markets area of Belfast. Gruesome details were given to titillate jaded English palates.[2]

Having made the mistake of naming the area in which the alleged incident had taken place, the army, when Irish newspapers took up the story, had the RUC issue a statement admitting that the story was completely false.

More in keeping with the aim of depicting the IRA as Marxist was a *Daily Mirror* story on October 23, 1971, under the headline "Red assassin shot dead in Ulster." A Czechoslovakian carrying a Russian-made Kalashnikov AK47 rifle, according to the story, had been shot by a British patrol. Challenged to give the date and place where

he had been shot, the army had to admit that the report was just "a bit of fantasy going around for the past year."

Shortly before the Bennett Report into RUC interrogations was published, Dr. Robert Irwin, a police surgeon, was the object of a smear campaign. He had stated that he had seen personally between 150 and 160 suspects with injuries that he believed could not have been self-inflicted. His wife, a story in the *Daily Telegraph* stated, had been raped in 1976 and Dr. Irwin was said to harbor a grudge against the RUC. The *Telegraph* and other newspapers exposed the story for what it was—a deliberate attempt to cast doubts on Dr. Irwin's credibility.

Ian Paisley, a long-time critic of British government policy, was also subjected to a smear campaign. Officials from the Northern Ireland Office, Unionist politicians and RUC personnel had blocked for almost 10 years an investigation of a homosexual ring associated with the Kincora Home for young boys in East Belfast. Attempts were made to link Paisley with the scandal in 1982 by charging that he knew of the involvement of one of the officials at the Home but had done nothing about it.

Paisley said the individual had been named by an accuser who refused to accompany Paisley when he wished to bring accused and accuser together. He denied knowing that the accused person was working in a home for young boys. The overall intent of the smear was achieved—Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party lost support in the Belfast area.

Britain's ability in the field of psychological warfare depends on the government's power to control or influence the media. This power was noted in a *New York Times* Special by James Feron which reported on July 3, 1982, on the difficulties journalists had in reporting the Falklands/Malvinas war. "The difficulties," Feron wrote, "began with a dispute over the selection of correspondents and grew worse as major difficulties developed over censor-

ship and related matters. It has extended to non-British journalists, still unable to visit the islands."

Feron contrasted the British policy with that followed by America in Vietnam. Quoting a British reporter, he summarized the American policy as "to let it all hang out—the press could go anywhere and see anything, and it did. . . . That's an amazing system for a British reporter because the view of our people is, 'If you're not with us, you're against us.' " The British Defence Ministry, Feron's informant went on, "was out to provide facilities under fairly close supervision and it expected people to be part of the team."

All British journalists and editors are restricted by the 'D' notice, the normal method of censorship in peacetime Britain. Tony Bunyan in *The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain* gives the background of the Official Secrets Acts in a chapter devoted to "The Political Uses of Law."

The earliest 1889 Act was amended by bills passed in 1911, 1920 and 1939. "Together the three Acts . . . provide governments with a formidable and all-embracing net with which to catch spies, civil servants, the press and the citizen in the field of official secrecy. . . . By this means information is so restricted as to guarantee an ill-informed parliament, press and people on the central issues of the day. The Acts also represent a formidable weapon should internal conflict arise within Britain, and the laws could be used effectively against political opponents of all kinds."

In *The British Media and Ireland*, reputable British journalists write on the difficulties they face in trying to report the war in Ireland objectively. Television programs have been banned, and reporters who try to do their job run the risk of being branded as terrorist dupes or terrorist sympathizers.

Details of news creation and media manipulation are given:

> Three years ago, a Foreign Office official seconded to the Northern Ireland Office chaired a seminar for Belfast editors and reporters. They were asked not to state in future the religion of the (mostly Catholic) victims of sectarian assassinations. It suited the NIO strategists at the time for such killings to be presented as part of a mindless campaign of random violence conducted by enemies of the state. The police in Northern Ireland supported the NIO's view, and as they are the main source of news about killings there, very few newspapers now carry this relevant detail.

The Peace People, the movement founded by Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams, was the subject of a two-page article in which the movement was described as "a staggering example of news creation. . . . Reporters came under pressure from their editors to flatter the peace people, and many were not too happy about it. . . . Several claimed their papers had fiddled and exaggerated rally attendances. Some came into conflict with editorial staff. Two 'pop' press journalists had specific reports rejected because they were not effusive enough."

Chris Dunkley, in an article covering both independent television and the BBC, notes that if "you suggest to a broadcasting executive that perhaps television has been evading its duty in Northern Ireland, his standard response is to claim that the British public is tired of Ireland and its troubles, wants to see the boys brought home, and is sick of hearing about the place from television; all this pronounced with a straight face as though television's own timorous retreat into the stark repetitiveness of the laundry list system has had nothing to do with inducing such weariness in the public."

The BBC, it should be remembered, is financed and controlled by a Crown corporation and its director-general is appointed by the government. The power of such a political appointee was demonstrated in 1974 by Sir Charles Cur-

ren: "Since 1971 no interview with a member of the I.R.A. has been allowed without my express permission; no interviews are planned with members of the I.R.A."

Referring to general news coverage of the war in Ireland, Curren stated: "Careful consideration is given by the broadcasting authorities to any news material that mentions the activities of the Provisional I.R.A."[3]

The government does not always have to exert pressure to get its viewpoint across. Some editors are anti-republican and act on their own.

> Mary Holland was commissioned to write a feature for the *Observer* colour supplement to mark the tenth anniversary of the unrest in Derry. The supplement, published separately and well in advance of the main newspaper, arrived on editor-in-chief Conor Cruise O'Brien's desk. The article, "Mary of Derry, and Ten Years of Troubles," immediately excited his attention and—despite the fact that the magazine with the article featured on the cover had already been printed—he demanded extensive changes. . . . The magazine was pulped at untold cost and the new article, with O'Brien-inspired changes but without Mary Holland's approval, eventually appeared.[4]

Staff members of *Republican News*, the only regular newspaper outlet available to publish the truth about events in northeast Ireland, have been subjected to a campaign of harassment and intimidation. The editor, subeditor, printer and other workers have been arrested and interrogated. The photo library, collected over a six year period, and office equipment valued at £5,000 were confiscated in a December 1977 raid and impounded.

Drivers for the paper have been stopped and delayed, and young paper-sellers have had their papers taken from them by soldiers. Despite the harassment, the staff maintained production schedules. On February 21, 1979, charges of conspiracy and IRA membership against those

held during raids on the office of *Republican News* were withdrawn for lack of evidence.

The cooperation of most newspapers and television channels in Britain with the government explains why the British public is relatively uninformed about events in Ireland. British governments have also been successful in promoting their view of the Irish war in foreign countries.

A number of factors have contributed to this. Except in times when events were considered particularly newsworthy, as during the hunger strikes, for example, most foreign correspondents covered the Irish scene from London. There they would naturally be dependent on British-based sources for their coverage of the Irish scene. The Paris daily *Liberation* was represented in Belfast in 1978 by Alain Frilet. He was arrested by British troops in April of that year and the Union National des Syndicats de Journalists condemned the pressures to which he had been subjected by the authorities.

Reuters, a British-based agency, has a history of cooperation with the government in wartime and has also what has been described as a quasi-monopoly on Irish news: "In 1979, it was estimated that Reuters was sending one and a half million words a day to 155 countries, while the U.S. agency, UPI, telexed only 90 countries."[5]

The monitoring operations of the BBC are financed by the Foreign Office and a grant from the Treasury. BBC External Services are also funded by the Foreign Office. This outlet gives the British government access to media throughout the world: "By 1942, the BBC transmitted 78 daily news bulletins over 150 hours in 40 different languages."[6] Television stations in America have relied almost exclusively on footage supplied by British TV networks when reporting the Irish scene.

An area of particular concern for both the British and Irish Republicans is the United States, for there the moral pressure of an informed American public could be the

greatest single factor conducive toward a just peace in Ireland. An article in the September 1983 *Fortnight*, a Belfast-based "Review for Northern Ireland," reports on the coverage given the Irish war in the United States and the general conclusion is given in the opening paragraph. While most "observers would give the republicans and their supporters a significant lead," the British, in one area at least, have scored a victory. "America's prestige press—the *New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post* and *Christian Science Monitor*—and other major U.S. newspapers, as shown by a study of their editorials for 1971–1981, are generally very supportive of British policy in Northern Ireland."

"Every British initiative up to 1981," the survey showed, "has been favorably received by American editorial writers and most often Westminster's role is portrayed as the honest broker ever tried by the inflexible Irish." Elspeth Flynn, described as "press officer for the British Information Services, a New York-based counter-propaganda body," is quoted confirming this aspect of the survey's conclusions: "Any sort of initiative we suggest is pretty well assured of favorable coverage."

The general view of the Irish is given in the second paragraph:

> Ulster's Protestants, however, are most often viewed as a bigoted and intransigent lot who have thwarted every attempt by the 'reasonable' British to effect a compromise. Catholics, on the other hand, are considered to be reasonable and moderate—with the exception of the IRA—in seeking eventual unification of Ireland, and are supported in that goal by all editorial writers.
>
> Condemnation of the IRA's Irish-American supporters is also frequent and harsh. The *Boston Globe* in July 1972 said that money sent to the IRA was used 'so that Irishmen could kill Irishmen.' While the efforts of the so-called 'Four Horsemen'—Tip

> O'Neill, Hugh Carey, Patrick Moynihan and Edward Kennedy—were welcomed, the *Chicago Tribune* warned that many Irish-American politicians were using the Northern Ireland situation to 'bolster themselves politically.'

Seán Cronin, Washington-based correspondent for the *Irish Times*, is quoted blaming official U.S. attitudes on the fact that "editorial writers live in an 'ivory tower': They go to Ireland and get very little independent material." Elspeth Flynn blames the local press for the success Irish-Americans have had in getting the Irish viewpoint across: "It's no use trying to educate them. Like Irish-American politicians who can't afford to lose their votes, the local press can't afford to lose their readers."

The distortions and inaccuracies of the coverage given the situation in Ireland by the 'prestige' press were highlighted in 1982 by the work of a media watch group set up by the Irish American Unity Conference. Material documenting problems in coverage of the Irish scene by the *New York Times* and CBS, the television network, was forwarded to Project Censored and resulted in the situation in Ireland being nominated as one of the "best censored" stories of 1982.

The same group filed complaints with the National News Council, which has offices at One Lincoln Plaza, New York. The *New York Times*, according to one complaint, had omitted portions of a quote attributed to Garret FitzGerald, Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland. The *Times* repeated the incomplete quote on two other occasions after the omission had been brought to the attention of the editor. The Council found that the omission gave an inaccurate picture and that it was unfair not to set the record straight.

Another complaint against the *Times* was made charging an inaccurate statement in a November 6, 1982, report on the acquittal of five men charged with smuggling guns

to the IRA. The Council found that while the *Times* report could not be termed inaccurate, it was misleading. The Council also noted that it "is particularly questionable for a newspaper to put a staff member's byline on such (AP report) a rewrite."

A complaint was also filed against NBC for stating that the IRA used kidnaping as a tactic to raise money (Roger Mudd, Nightly News, February 9, 1983). While the Council commended NBC News for broadcasting a correction, it noted that it was not until the News Council had intervened (May 13) that the network acknowledged the error and had not broadcast the correction until May 24.

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5. Faligot, *Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland*, p. 75.
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*publisher

11 South of the Border

BRITAIN HAS A LONG HISTORY OF INTELLIgence activities in Ireland and currently both MI5 and MI6 are involved there. At one time Ireland was the preserve of MI5, which is responsible for counter-intelligence in Britain and the colonies. MI6 came on the scene when the Free State became a Republic and left the Commonwealth in 1949.

The importance of the south of Ireland for British intelligence was underlined by the appointment of Christopher Ewart-Biggs as ambassador to Ireland in 1976. He had had a long career with the Secret Service, and prior to his Dublin post had been "head of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign Office's Department. . . . This particular post involved liaison between the Foreign Office and the SIS."[1] According to the IRA, who assassinated him shortly after he took up his new appointment, he had been sent to coordinate intelligence activities in Ireland.

The first British agent exposed as such during the current "troubles" was an individual calling himself Capt. Peter Markham-Randall. He was apprehended in November 1969 and had been sent to Ireland to ascertain "the extent to which the Dublin government was prepared to go in supplying arms to Northern Ireland Nationalists."[2]

Another MI6 agent, John Wyman, was apprehended in December 1972. Charged with him was Patrick Crinnion, who was then the chief confidential clerk in C3, the

headquarters of the Special Branch of the Irish police. At the time of his arrest, Crinnion had 10 documents from police files on the IRA hidden under the carpet of his car. Another MI6 agent, Andrew James Johnstone, was also sought by the Irish police at the time but escaped the police net. "Significantly, the SIS Chief of Station in Dublin, John Williams, as 'Counsellor to the Embassy' was seconded the same year to the Northern Ireland Office."[3]

British Army personnel have also operated south of the border between the occupied six counties and the rest of Ireland. Garret FitzGerald, in replying to a question posed by the opposition defense spokesman, told the Irish parliament that there had been 304 incursions by British soldiers into the Republic between January 1973 and May 1976.

The question was prompted by the arrest of eight members of the SAS by Irish police in the first week of May 1976. When arrested they were in civilian clothes and armed with submachine guns, pistols, a Browning pump action shotgun, knives and daggers. Each one had a custom-fitted steel-tipped glove. Maps in their possession had houses in the south of Ireland 'targeted.'

Seán McKenna was kidnapped on another such incursion on March 12, 1976, taken across the border, intimidated into signing a confession and incarcerated in Long Kesh.[4] He was one of the 10 who participated in the first (1980) hunger strike.

The Littlejohn brothers operated as a pseudo gang for the British in the south of Ireland. Two former criminals, they were signed up for the Irish operation by Lord Carrington, then Defense Minister, and Geoffrey Johnson-Smith, a Cabinet aide to Prime Minister Heath. They were ordered to carry out bank robberies and other illegal activities—including petrol bombing of police stations—in the south in order to discredit the IRA.

Both were apprehended in October 1972 and the

British government was compelled to admit that they were, as they claimed, British agents. Kenneth Littlejohn, following their capture, threatened to reveal the names of British personnel involved in the Dublin 1972 bomb explosions in which two people were killed and more than 100 injured. The day before the bombs exploded, Nov. 30, 1972, the Irish parliament was considering an amendment to the Special Offenses Against the State Act and the speculation was that it would be defeated. The amendment passed in the anti-IRA hysteria arising from the explosions. Albert Walker Baker, a former SAS member, also linked British intelligence with the Dublin explosions.

Michael Cunningham in *Monaghan: County of Intrigue* claims that the British succeeded in infiltrating Radio Telefís Éireann, the government-owned Irish television and radio network.

> As early as 25th February 1970, the pro-British elements within the [RTE] Authority had pulled off a massive propaganda coup with the appointment of a former British Army officer to host the new talk show for housewives, "Here and Now." The man appointed was none other than ex-Captain Liam Nolan, who had, I understand, done his initial broadcasting as a member of the British Army. From its inception the programme was used as a base to attack that section of the Northern Catholic population which resisted Captain Nolan's former army. One of Nolan's favorite allies in this campaign was the New Ulster Movement. This group of pro-British, wealthy and articulate collaborators were given ample opportunity to air their views.
>
> The success of the British propaganda on the "Here and Now" show prompted the British and their allies in RTE—many of whom were members of the British trade union known as the 'National' Union of Journalists—to get a man for RTE in Belfast who would do a similar job on Northern news and politics. The man chosen was Liam Hourican, a native of Roscommon, in the South of Ireland.

Magill, Ireland's current affairs magazine, did a feature article on Liam Nolan in its May 1981 issue, which noted some items of interest in the light of Michael Cunningham's accusation. At one time Nolan worked in the accounts department of the BBC and then "did two years national service and did some broadcasting while in Hong Kong."

One caller who phoned about his RTE show was "disgusted with Nolan's West Brit attitude, always reading bits from English papers, a dead giveaway." Liam Hourican was the author of a "Church–State Debate Arises in Ireland" article that appeared in the *New York Times* on April 11, 1976. This contained a number of inaccuracies to support a claim of excessive political influence by Catholic bishops in the south.

Hourican was mentioned in the course of an article in the August 1981 issue of *Magill* dealing with the hunger strike:

> The next initiative attempted was to advise the Irish ambassador to the United States, Seán Donlon, to brief President Ronald Reagan on the situation and hand him a letter from the Taoiseach asking him to intervene with the British for the purpose of pressuring them to deal directly with the prisoners. A basic error was made in relation to this initiative by the new Government press secretary, Liam Hourican, in releasing details of this initiative to the political correspondents of the Irish papers. The publicity attached to the venture detracted from its effectiveness.

Irish governments have also helped in making Irish radio and television serve British propaganda interests. Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, passed when Jack Lynch of Fianna Fáil was Prime Minister, was designed to exclude spokespersons for Irish republicans from RTE facilities. Since 1973, when a coalition government assumed office, spokespersons for Sinn Féin, a legal political party,

have been denied access to Irish radio and television.

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4. Faul and Murray, *SAS Terrorism—The Assassin's Glove*, p. 6.

12 The Reasons Why

BRITISH RULERS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONscious of Ireland and of the possibility that it could be used as a base for an attack on Britain from the west. Britain's enemies on the European mainland were also aware of Ireland's strategic importance, and thus we find Spain and France willing to help Irish insurgents militarily in the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Britain failed to crush Irish nationalists in the second decade of the twentieth century. The problem was solved by partitioning Ireland. This gave Britain a base in Ireland by creating a six-county statelet for a loyalist minority. The policy of neutrality followed by the Free State in World War 2 made Britain even more determined to maintain a foothold in Ireland. This determination is seen in the 1949 memorandum to the British Cabinet:

> Now that Éire will shortly cease to owe any allegiance to the Crown, it has become a matter of first-class strategic importance to this country that the North should continue to form part of His Majesty's dominions. So far as can be foreseen, it will never be to Great Britain's advantage that Northern Ireland should form part of a territory outside His Majesty's jurisdiction. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Great Britain would ever be able to agree to this even if the people of Northern Ireland desired it. There should therefore be no political difficulty, as circumstances now are, in giving a binding assurance that Northern Ireland shall never be excluded from the United Kingdom with-

out her full and free consent.[1]

The strategic importance of Ireland has increased with the passing years because the Backfire Bomber gives the Soviet Union the ability of launching an attack on Europe from the west. Minutes are vital in the event of a nuclear war if a counter-attack is to be launched. In a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact nations, America will need landing and fuel bases in Ireland for getting American troops as quickly as possible to any European battlefield.

The U.S. Navy had a radio facility in Derry up to 1977 which has since been expanded and developed by the British to monitor Soviet aircraft and ships in the eastern Atlantic. Duncan Campbell in the March 8, 1981, *Sunday Tribune* reported that sonar detectors linked to Brawdy, a U.S. facility in Wales, were secretly planted in the seabed off the west coast of Ireland in the 1970s. Here we see why U.S. officials turn a blind eye to British transgressions in Ireland and act to support British efforts to maintain a presence there.

Official policy dictates that Ireland must first join the western alliance before being reunited. "However the human rights element in making decisions affecting bilateral relations must be balanced against U.S. economic, security and other interests."[2]

Another factor underlying British determination to maintain a presence on Irish soil is the fear that a failure to do so will lead to increased demands for independence by Scottish and Welsh nationalists. After Roman legions left Britain in 442, Ireland, and to a lesser extent Scotland and Wales, retained a Celtic culture. They constitute the greater part of what is called the Celtic fringe of the British Isles.

A class-structured society emerged in England and we had what McClung Lee calls "the internal colonial exploitation of the ethnically different. . . . English elites long tried to create a state culturally expedient for themselves

with the lower classes divided against themselves by ethnic differences."[3]

Britons of Celtic origin and others could rise to positions of power, but only by becoming anglicized. It was possible for Disraeli, for example, to become Prime Minister only because his father, a Jew, had had him baptized in an Anglican church. Immigration of non-whites from former colonial territories added a new dimension to inter-ethnic tensions in Britain. Kitson, after noting that the army would hardly be involved in Ireland after 1975, goes on to warn: "Even so there are other potential trouble spots within the United Kingdom which might involve the army in operations of a sort against political extremists who are prepared to resort to a considerable degree of violence to achieve their ends."[4]

The powerbrokers in modern Britain act principally through the Conservative Party and are not without influence in army and intelligence services. Official government policy can, if necessary, be ignored. A Home Rule Bill in 1911 would have safeguarded British strategic interests in Ireland but it was sabotaged in the interests of the Conservative Party. Those behind the effort enlisted the aid of personnel in the War Office. The fruit of this was seen in the Curragh Mutiny, when officers stated they would "prefer to accept dismissal if ordered north."

The refusal of the army in 1974 to carry out the orders of Labor Prime Minister Wilson led to the collapse of the power-sharing Executive. Wilson, Prime Minister in Labor governments 1964–70 and 1974–76, charges in his autobiography *The Governance of Britain*, that MI5 operatives had tried to undermine his administration.

Wilson did not send any troops to Rhodesia when Ian Smith, contrary to the will of the majority there, made a unilateral declaration of independence. Throughout the years of official estrangement between the Smith regime and Westminster, Britain's SAS maintained friendly con-

tacts with their Rhodesian counterparts.

The General Assembly of the UN has unanimously forbidden the export of resources from Namibia. South Africa, in defiance of UN decisions, has refused to grant Namibia independence. Rio Tinto, a uranium mining company, continued despite the ban to export large quantities of uranium to a British company. Lord Carrington resigned from the board of directors of Rio Tinto in 1979 to become British Foreign Secretary. His place on the board was taken by the Queen's private secretary.

Every year since 1929 the Celtic fringe countries have had the highest rates of unemployment in the United Kingdom, with northeast Ireland in top place since 1938. The resulting competition for jobs in these areas gives entrepreneurs a labor force with lower salary scales and fewer work stoppages than other areas in the United Kingdom. From 1956 to 1973 for example, the increase in wage costs per unit of output in northeast Ireland was 69%, compared with 88% in the United Kingdom and 186% in Germany.

The overall effect of these figures is to show that northeast Ireland remains a place where profits can be reaped by those with money to invest. Even if the total subvention from Westminster exceeds the revenue flowing from northeast Ireland, grants, and so on, are paid for by the taxpayers, and the middle and lower classes pay more than their fair share of any such burden.

C. Desmond Greaves has some interesting findings in *The Irish Crisis* in a chapter on the effects of partition on the economy of northeast Ireland. At first glance, he agrees, "Northern Ireland cannot pay its way unless the English government meets its total trade deficit by means of a subsidy," but, "there is more to it than this."

Residents of northeast Ireland, he found, invested £200 million in the imperial system via banks and another £200 million through private investors. The first £200 million represents the savings of working- and middle-class people

for which they would receive a low rate of interest while at the same time, control of this capital was exercised outside Ireland.

To offset the £400 million channelled abroad, he found (in 1950) only £83 million of imperial and foreign investment in the six counties, most of which would earn a distinctly higher rate of interest than that earned by northern income abroad. On top of investment capital leaving the six counties, account must be taken also of ground rents paid to landlords outside Ireland as well as earnings from chain stores and other British-based businesses that also leave the country.

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3. Lee, *Terrorism in Northern Ireland*, p. 24.
4. Ibid., p. 24.

Appendix I: Population Control

THE 1920 GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT WAS an example *par excellence* of gerrymandering: the border was drawn so as to give control of the maximum area possible to a group deemed "loyal" to British interests. Loyalists were concentrated in two of the counties of the newly created statelet; Fermanagh, Tyrone and parts of Armagh, Derry and Down had nationalist majorities.

To ensure loyalist control throughout the six counties, nationalist areas had to be gerrymandered. Derry city, the classic example, was divided into three wards with the bulk of the nationalists in one, the South ward. There, in 1967, two-thirds of the population were able to elect 8 non-unionists to Derry city council. The 20-member council was controlled by the 12 unionists elected by the minority in the other two wards. In 1972 Catholics, although almost 40% of the population, had control of only 11 of the 68 local councils.

Control of local councils was used by unionists to ensure the continuation of the status quo. Catholics were not, for example, given a fair allocation of houses constructed by public funds. In Fermanagh, where they represented 55% of the population, they were allocated less than 36% of the council houses built in the period 1947–69. When they were assigned houses, they were located in areas where there was already a Catholic majority.

In Tyrone, a county with 73,395 Catholics and 60,521 Protestants, only 52 Catholics were employed in a 352-

strong labor force. Thirty of the Catholics were "district nurse midwives and reliefs" and 11 came under the category "county nursing officers and health visitors." All appointments to the 352 posts in the survey were made by local councils. "No Catholic has ever held the following posts in Co. Tyrone: county secretary, county librarian, county planning officer, county surveyor, county public health inspector, county education officer, county welfare officer, county solicitor, county medical officer of health."[1]

The anti-Catholic discrimination practiced by local authorities was followed also by the central government at Stormont. Only 20 of the 217 new firms that came to northeast Ireland between 1945-66 were located in nationalist areas, the areas with the highest rates of unemployment.

In 1973 a survey showed that 95% of the top civil service positions were held by Protestants, thus confirming the findings published in the June 1969 *Review of the International Commission of Jurists*:

> The rate of growth of the Catholic population is higher than that of the Protestant section of the population; accordingly, through the efflux of time, the Catholic population could become the majority. This basic factor accounts for much of the political and economic discrimination which has systematically and ruthlessly exercised by the Belfast Government since the 1920s. Discrimination in housing and in employment has been utilized in order to weaken economically the Catholic minority and to induce emigration.

The discriminatory practices of Belfast governments continued after Stormont was suspended and Westminster was responsible for six-county affairs. Early evidence showing lack of sincerity in fighting discrimination was provided when William Whitelaw, the Westminster-appointed Secretary of State, suppressed a report showing the disproportionate number of Protestants in senior civil service positions. This was particularly significant because

with the suspension of elected bodies, administrative power was largely in the hands of civil servants.

The Fair Employment Agency (FEA), set up in 1976, was a cosmetic exercise that contained within itself the seeds of failure. Andrew Pollak commented: "In the six years of its existence the FEA has yet to publish one investigation into inequality of job opportunity between Protestants and Catholics in any private firm or public body, and has not once used its considerable legal powers to compel an employer to promote job equality in his workforce."[2]

A more sinister aspect of direct rule from Westminster is the evidence showing a deliberate effort by British governments to create strategic districts in Belfast similar to the strategic hamlets set up in Malaysia and Vietnam. The intent was to give security personnel greater control over the "water" in which the "fish," the insurgents, swim.

When the British Army went into Belfast in August 1969, Catholics and Protestants, thanks to the housing policies practiced by unionist politicians, were living in areas largely, though not wholly, composed of people who were Catholic or Protestant. By 1973 the ghetto areas were no longer mixed but were exclusively Catholic or Protestant. While this can be explained in part by fear or intimidation, a government agency was the main culprit.

Secretary of State Whitelaw suppressed a report of the Community Relations Commission that showed that between August 1969 and February 1973, 60,000 people had been driven from their homes. It was described as "the largest fixed population movement anywhere in western Europe since World War II," and the report charged that government bodies, especially the Housing Executive, were responsible.

The Housing Executive, a centralized housing authority, had been set up as an essential feature of a social reform program. Most of those driven from their homes were Catholics, and those in the Belfast area aggravated the

problem of overcrowding in the Catholic homes in West Belfast. "In 1973 the Housing Executive started to plan a greenfield housing estate to relieve the housing crisis of West Belfast. It was to cater for Catholics only, 'regrettably,' and was to be situated at the southern tip of the existing belt of Catholic housing and adjacent to the Twinbrook estate—as Loyalists saw it, 'on Protestant land handed down through many generations.' "

Because of Protestant objections, the number of homes planned was first halved. "Seven years after Poleglass was proposed, not a single house had been produced." The new houses as planned, however, were designated for Catholics only and were to be built next to an existing "Catholic" housing estate.[3]

While the Housing Executive's plans for the Poleglass estate had to be cancelled because of loyalist opposition, a total of 29,878 houses were built by the Executive between January 1976 and February 1983.

> There is now some evidence to suggest that both the RUC and the Army are playing a significant role in the physical planning of Belfast. An article in the *Guardian* of the 13th March, 1982 claimed that the Belfast Development Office, to which the Housing Executive forwards all its proposed building plans for clearance, has representatives from the security forces. It was also suggested that the security forces have interfered with a number of planning decisions: they had insisted that a group of houses were removed from a planned development in the Ardoyne; asked for reinforced pavements in the new Poleglass estate to bear the weight of armoured vehicles; and recommended high 'security walls' in new developments in the Lower Falls and at Roden Street in West Belfast.
>
> It is claimed that new housing estates have been built with only two entrances and that factories, warehousing and motorways have been deliberately constructed to form barriers. The aim of these

> developments, it is suggested, is to prevent residents in Catholic areas from moving from one part of the city to another through safe areas and to force people out on to the main roads, which are more easily policed.
>
> If all these developments have occurred then the authorities would appear to be making strenuous attempts to confine the problem of violence within particular areas. In other words, they seem to be deliberately creating ghettos in which dissident populations may be easily contained.[4]

Faligot gives additional information that suggests that army plans for population control in the Belfast area date back to 1943: "Two projects showed the way by the mid-1970s. Firstly, the construction of a ring-road, composed of sections of the M1 and M2 motorways, that would surround the city center, running through, and breaking up working-class areas, both Catholic and Protestant. This scheme dated back to 1946, on the basis of an initial project elaborated by the Army in 1943. Besides fragmenting and isolating the ghettos from the city center, the introduction of a fast road enabled the security forces to intervene more rapidly."[5]

He quotes a French architect, Lelievre:

> Numerous key roads are now transformed into motorways and simultaneously re-elevated to permit added surveillance on the district thus dominated. Take, for instance, Suffolk Road, which is connected at right angles to Glen Road, which overhangs the Lenadoon area; this has been re-elevated and its direction altered, even though it was perfectly suitable to traffic in the past.
>
> South of the M1 Motorway this same surveillance is possible, as a new ring-road has been drawn eastward, leading to Kennedy Way. In this new district, peace lines have been charmingly replaced by cul-de-sac type urbanism which means that a group of homes may be easily controlled.

The extent to which the British Army is prepared to go in order to carry out surveillance of nationalist strongholds was revealed in an *Evening Press* (Dublin) report of August 18, 1976. According to the report, a defoliant code-named 'Agent Blue' had been sprayed over 100 acres of bracken in the Crossmaglen area of South Armagh. "It is a weed killer and is generally known as bramble, brushwood and nettle killer. It contains highly toxic dioxin, the chemical which caused the Seveso disaster, and a scientist with the Northern Ireland Ministry of Agriculture said today that if significant quantities of dioxin were present, it could have very dangerous side effects."

'Agent Blue' was 2,3,5-T trichlorophenol, which had been used in Vietnam both to expose insurgent military forts and to destroy crops. The SAS had called for its use in the South Armagh area because the local vegetation afforded too much shelter to the enemy and made tracking by helicopter difficult.

Faligot notes that Stephen Fletcher, a microbiologist attached to Liverpool University, was provisionally seconded to Royal Marine Commandos stationed in South Armagh in the autumn of 1976. He wonders if in this exercise of chemical counter-guerrilla warfare the Irish were "the guinea pigs in yet another experiment in new techniques of repression?"

To keep down a risen people the British Army has been forced to adopt a technique used by the Normans in the Ireland of the twelfth century. Forts have been set up at strategic points throughout the northeast to accommodate the army of occupation. Police barracks are being used in some areas; in others empty factories and old mills have been taken over. *HMS Maidstone* was used as a floating barracks before being converted into a prison ship. In Crossmaglen, which the British government claims is part of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's forces operate from what Clarke describes in words that might be applied to all of occupied Ireland:

> I see that when we get to the top of the hill in front of us we should be able to see straight across to the base. I don't know if the word base is a good description, it's more like a fortress, bristling with O.P.s, each with a machine-gun and plenty of am-

> munition, covered over with wire mesh so that mortar bombs or grenades don't penetrate. The whole thing is sandbagged and with super-thick walls to minimise the effect of any blast. An old provincial police station built to house a few local constables, it is now the home for over one hundred and thirty men in cramped conditions. The only life-line, the helicopters that fly in the food and patrols, and fly out with the rubbish and more patrols.[6]

Special observation posts have also been set up in ghetto areas that are manned by personnel from the nearest military base. Clarke writes about two such observation posts in Belfast:

> Hookey's in Fort Cross. I'm in Fort Knox. How come he's got the best one twice in a row? The platoon is now on O.P.s. The two this company has to look after are both on the Crumlin Road, both looking into the Ardoyne. In each Fort, there are two positions to man, connected to the control desk via the intercom system with a radio back-up. Each position has a pair of binoculars, panoramic photograph of the area with reference points marked on, and the all-powerful image-intensifying sight.[7]

For the people of occupied Ireland, Orwell's 1984 has already come.

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1. Corrigan, *Eye-Witness in Northern Ireland,* p. 31.
2. *Fortnight,* October 1982.
3. O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, *Northern Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil War,* p. 140.
4. Hillyard, "Law and Order." In *Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict,* p. 47.
5. Faligot, *Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland,* p. 122.
6. Clarke, *Contact,* p. 69.
7. Ibid., p. 21.

Appendix II: Counting the Cost

FROM JANUARY 1, 1969 TO JUNE 30, 1983, 2,304 people were killed in northeast Ireland and upwards of 24,000 were injured. Requests made to British Information Services throughout the years of violence for a breakdown by religious affiliation of those killed met with the reply: "Such statistics are not available."

An analysis by Michael McKeown of the first 2,000 fatalities suggests a possible explanation for the reluctance of British personnel to give the required information: "Of the 2,000 toll, 1,631 were Northern Ireland natives. Of these natives, even though one-third of the province's population is Green, 916 of the dead were local Roman Catholics and only 715 local Protestants."[1] For propaganda purposes, the British wanted to conceal the fact that more than 56% of all fatalities came from the minority group in the province.

Until recently, those wanting a detailed breakdown of those killed were dependent on individuals like Fr. Raymond Murray, who gave his figures in letters to the *Irish Times*. Official statistics are now available with the publication of the New Ireland Forum report, *The Cost of Violence from the Northern Ireland Crisis Since 1969*.

In the period ending June 1983, a total of 2,304 people were killed. Of these, 1,297 were civilians, 702 members of the security forces, 278 belonged to paramilitary organizations and 27 were listed as "unclassified." A majority of the civilians killed—773 or 59.59%—came from the minority Roman Catholic section of the population.

Republican paramilitaries were responsible for 1,264 of the 2,304 casualties, loyalists for 613, while the security forces accounted for 264. One hundred and sixty-three of those killed are listed as "unclassified." Included among the 163 are the 10 who died on hunger strike.

In a footnote to the Forum report we are told that "accidentally self-inflicted deaths (e.g., premature explosions) have been attributed to the agency initiating the action." When we read, therefore that republican paramilitaries were responsible for 1,264 casualties, we must remember that this figure includes 702 members of the security forces and at least 96 IRA Volunteers killed in premature explosions.* This would leave 466 civilian deaths attributed to republicans to be accounted for.

Fr. Raymond Murray, in a letter dated September 3, 1982 to the *Irish Times*, assigns 138 of this number to civilian victims of IRA explosions and 328 to civilians assassinated "by the IRA, etc." Many, if not most, of these civilian casualties must, however, be attributed to the security forces. Telephoned IRA bomb warnings have been deliberately ignored by the British, and "IRA" bombs have been set by British personnel for propaganda purposes. Protestants and Catholics have charged that many of the so-called "sectarian assassinations" were carried out by SAS, British Army MRF units or by "pseudo gangs" they controlled.**

The Provisional IRA is credited by loyalist sources with giving a warning whenever Volunteers place bombs that could endanger civilians. It also accepts responsibility

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* Figure given by Fr. Murray, *Irish Times*, September 13, 1982.

** For examples of ignored bomb warnings, British personnel setting off 'IRA' bombs and SAS/MRF responsibility for sectarian assassinations, see chapter 9.

for the activities of IRA personnel. The Forum report gives a breakdown of the 1,264 casualties attributed to republican paramilitaries. Fifteen casualties are attributed to the Official IRA, 49 to INLA, 844 to PIRA and 356 to "non-specific Republican groups." Perhaps the latter category should read "SAS/MRF units of British Army."

Magill, September 1980, gives the financial cost of the war in Ireland in a series of charts headed; "The figures show a depressingly upward trend for the British." The Westminster subvention to the north Ireland budget had to be increased each financial year since 1969–70, when it was £74,000,000, and reached a peak of £956,000,000 in 1979–80 (provisional estimate).

The total subvention for the period covered by the *Magill* figures was £5,128,000,000. British Army costs, excluding the UDR, went from £1.5 million in 1969–70 to £97,000,000 for 1979–80, the total cost for the period amounting to £501,300,000.

In the same period, £407,600,000 was expended on the RUC and at least £116,300,000 on the UDR. Compensation for personal injuries came to £54,334,270, while that for property damage amounted to £313,216,135.

Figures given in the New Ireland Forum report for the period 1969–83 do not give the total Westminster subvention to the north, but cover only expenditures on law and order, Army, RUC and amounts paid in damages. The total given for the period 1969–82 is £5,255,000,000. The total cost to the south (Dublin) for the same period is given as £1,019,000,000.

Figures given in *Magill* would not include the large amounts expended on intelligence personnel and the cost to British Information Services, and so on. A factor on the plus side for Britain is the opportunity the situation in Ireland gives for testing counter-insurgency innovations, ranging from protective clothing to devices used in defusing bombs. Many of these items have already been sold to police and military in other countries.

Perhaps the highest long-term cost of the war is the damage done to the institutions of state, not just in Ireland but also in mainland Britain. Emergency legislation has become so normalized that it is used in situations in no way connected with the war. The use of police and judiciary as "a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public" has eroded confidence in the judicial system and whatever respect there was for the police.

> In the rest of the United Kingdom, while neither the army nor a paramilitary police patrol the streets, the movement towards the new form of repressive apparatus is unmistakable. Over recent years in Britain, there has been an enormous growth in the technology of control, and the military capabilities of the police have been greatly expanded. Moreover, there have been moves to reform the criminal justice system along similar lines as the changes introduced into Northern Ireland in the early seventies.
>
> Trial by jury has been constantly questioned in recent years and the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure's recommendations in relation to police powers and rules of evidence were very similar to those of the Diplock Commission . Other state agencies are being mobilized to exercise greater informal control. And as in Northern Ireland, all these developments are taking place not in Parliament but in the offices of those responsible for law and order.[2]

REFERENCES AND NOTES:

1. Lee, *Terrorism In Northern Ireland,* p. 173.
2. Hillyard, "Law and Order" *In Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict,* p. 83.

Glossary

Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs: Set up by Congressman Mario Biaggi (D-N.Y.) for members of Congress with interest in Irish affairs.

Alliance Party: Formed in April 1970 with both Catholic and Protestant members with the general aim of reforming the northern state while maintaining the link with Britain. The most moderate of the Unionist parties.

Apprentice Boys: A Protestant fraternal organization with strong links to the Orange Order. Members hold an annual march on August 12 in Derry to commemorate the 13 Protestant apprentices who closed the gates of Derry in 1689 to prevent the entry of the forces of Catholic King James II. Riots following the 1969 Apprentice Boys march precipitated riots throughout northeast Ireland and led to the British government sending in the army to control the situation.

Blanket Protest: See Normalization Policy.

B Specials: A part-time Protestant militia, set up before Ireland was partitioned, to reinforce the Royal Irish Constabulary in what were to become the six counties cut off from the rest of Ireland. Retained after the partition of Ireland as an auxiliary force for the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It was throughout its existence an exclusively Protestant and bigoted force. Disbanded following publication of the Hunt Report in 1970.

Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland (CSJ): Group formed in 1964 to fight discrimination against Catholics in northeast Ireland. Its publicity campaign in Britain led to the formation of the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster (CDU) in 1965, which was supported by members of Parliament with Irish connections and others in the British Labor Party. CSJ was also the forerunner of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association.

Central Citizens' Defence Committee (CCDC): At first a co-

ordinating body for Catholic defense groups formed after the 1969 attacks on Catholic ghettos. Some of the defense committees were later absorbed by the Provisional IRA while the CCDC came under the control of a more conservative and anti-republican group.

Communist Party of Ireland (CPI): Formed as an all-Ireland Marxist group in 1933 but split into the Communist Party of Northern Ireland and the Irish Workers' Party during World War 2. Both branches of the party were reunited as the Communist Party of Ireland in 1970 with separate committees in north and south.

Criminalization: See Normalization Policy.

Cumann na mBan: Gaelic for the League or Society of Women. Formed in 1914 as the Irish Volunteers women's auxiliary.

D Notice: See Special Air Services.

Dáil Éireann: The Irish house of parliament. Members of the Dáil are known as Teachta Dála (abbreviated TD), Gaelic for parliamentary deputy.

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): Founded by Ian Paisley in 1971 and closely associated with the fundamentalist Free Presbyterian Church set up by Paisley in the 1950s. An extreme right-wing Unionist group supported mainly by working-class Protestants.

DI5 and DI6: See MI5 and MI6.

Diplock Courts: Special courts in which specially selected judges operating without juries and using special rules of evidence can "convict" and sentence those charged with politically motivated offenses. Introduced to implement a suggestion of Brigadier Frank Kitson that the law could be used as a "propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public."

Document 37: See Noraid.

Fenian Brotherhood: Group with branches in America and Ireland that organized the 1867 rising in Ireland. Survived as the Irish Republican Brotherhood, which organized the Easter Rebellion of 1916. The term "Fenian" sometimes used by Protestants in northeast Ireland to describe Catholics.

Fianna Fáil (FF): Gaelic for Soldiers of Destiny. Largest

political party in the south of Ireland. Formed by Éamon de Valera in 1926 when he split from Sinn Féin. Viewed as the most republican of the southern constitutional parties. Like these parties, Fianna Fáil seeks to end the partition of Ireland by peaceful means but differs from them in viewing the six county statelet as a failed political entity. FF is opposed to any form of devolved government there and maintains that Britain should withdraw its guarantee to the Unionists and prepare for eventual withdrawal at some time in the future.

Fine Gael (FG): Gaelic for the Irish Family. Formed in 1933 by a merger of Cumann na nGaedheal, the National Center Party, and the Blueshirts. Cumann na nGaedheal (Gaelic for the Irish League or Society) was formed in 1923 by pro-Treaty members of Sinn Féin. The National Center Party was a group with agricultural interests that came together in 1932 to oppose the economic war brought on by the decision of Fianna Fáil to withhold payment of land annuities to the British exchequer. The Blueshirts (originally named the Army Comrades Association, then renamed the National Guard) received the name Blueshirts when the National Guard adopted a blue uniform modelled on Mussolini's Blackshirts. The groups also used the Fascist salute. The leader of the Blueshirts, Col. O'Duffy, was the first president of Fine Gael, but he was forced to resign and the party has become the Irish conservative party. Has only been able to form a government when in coalition with other groups. Under Garret FitzGerald, a devolved government in the north of Ireland is seen as the first step toward a resolution of the problem of partition.

Free State: Name given to the 26 southern counties of Ireland until 1949 when Ireland left the Commonwealth and became the "Republic of Ireland."

Friends of Ireland: A Republican–Democrat group set up in Washington, D.C., March 16, 1981, following a visit by John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP). Its object is to "keep a close watching brief on the Northern issue." Associated with the "Four Horsemen": Senators Kennedy and Moynihan, Congressman Tip O'Neill and former Governor Hugh Carey of New York. Would appear to back policies of Hume's SDLP and apparently also brought pressure to bear on Ireland's Charles Haughey when he wanted to remove Ambassador Donlon from Washington.

Garda Siochána (or gardaí): Also called Civic Guards, the police in the south of Ireland.

H-Blocks: The cell blocks in Long Kesh Concentration Camp (also called the Maze Prison). Named H-Blocks because of their shape.

Hunt Report: Report issued October 10, 1969, by a committee headed by Lord Hunt that recommended sweeping changes in what proved to be a vain effort to reform the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police force the northeast Ireland.

Irish American Defense Fund: U.S.-based group formed to pay legal expenses and, when necessary, provide financial assistance to families of those charged in the U.S. with offenses connected with the Irish struggle for self-determination.

Irish Citizens Army: Founded by James Larkin in 1913 as a workers' defense force and fashioned by James Connolly into a revolutionary socialist force. The Plough and the Stars was the flag of the Irish Citizens Army, which took part with the Irish Volunteers in the 1916 Rising.

Irish Independence Party: Formed in 1977 with the aim of seeking a British withdrawal from northeast Ireland.

Irish Labor Party: Founded in 1912 by James Larkin and James Connolly as a trade unionists' party with membership limited to union members, a restriction removed in 1930 in an effort to widen its power base. Irish workers have, however, tended to give their support to Fianna Fáil. The Labor Party has formed coalition governments with Fine Gael since 1973.

Irish National Caucus: Set up as an umbrella group to lobby legislators on behalf of a united Ireland. Acting now for same aim but independently of other Irish organizations.

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): See Irish Republican Socialist Party.

Irish Northern Aid Committee: See Noraid.

Irish Republican Army (IRA): Name given to the guerrilla army that fought against the British in the War of Independence, 1919–21. After the signing of the treaty, the IRA split into two factions with the anti-treaty faction going underground and retaining the name IRA. In 1939–40 they carried out a bombing campaign in England and campaigns in the north in 1942–44 and 1956–62. The failure to gain popular support for the 1956–62

campaign led to a decision to give up the armed struggle, recognize the partition parliaments in Stormont and Dublin, and enter into an alliance with the Communist Party of Ireland. This departure from the traditional aims of the movement resulted in a split in 1970, with the dissenting minority forming the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The majority was called first the Official IRA. Both factions claimed the name Sinn Féin for the political groups associated with them, and we thus had Provisional Sinn Féin and Official Sinn Féin. Later the Officials dropped the title IRA and called themselves Sinn Féin The Workers Party. They have since renounced the name Sinn Féin and are now known simply as The Workers Party. (See also Sinn Féin.)

Irish Republican Brotherhood: See Fenian Brotherhood.

Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP): The lack of militancy in the Official IRA movement led to a split in late 1974 and the formation of the IRSP—known in the north as Irps. Followed a Marxist line politically while pursuing a militant role through the Irish National Liberation Army. Latter made its appearance in 1976 but while sharing the political philosophy of the IRSP, denied being its military wing.

Irish Volunteers: Formed in 1913 "to secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland." Later called the Irish Republican Army.

Loyalist: Term applied to individuals or groups favoring the retention of the link with the British Crown. Synonymous with Unionist.

MI5: Abbreviation for Military Intelligence 5, the branch of British intelligence that operates in the United Kingdom. Sometimes referred to as the Security Service. Now called DI5—for Defense Intelligence 5—instead of MI5.

MI6: Abbreviation for Military Intelligence 6, the branch of British intelligence that operates in foreign countries. Known also by the names Secret Service and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Now called DI6—for Defense Intelligence 6—instead of MI6.

Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF): Undercover British Army units set up on lines recommended by Brigadier Frank Kitson in *Low Intensity Operations*. Operational procedures similar to those of Special Air Service units, and the MRF units may

be composed of SAS personnel or acting under the control of SAS personnel. They are the "dirty tricks" units and are responsible for setting off "IRA" bombs, sectarian and political assassinations, kidnappings, and so on. Have operated in both areas of partitioned Ireland.

Nationalist: Term applied to individuals or groups in Ireland favoring a united Ireland. The term "Republican" is reserved for those nationalists who are prepared to take up arms if necessary in pursuit of a united Ireland. Those who condone only peaceful means are called constitutional nationalists.

National H-Block Armagh Committee: Umbrella group of national organizations that publicized world-wide the case for political status throughout the 1980–81 hunger strikes.

New Ireland Group: Started by John Robb in 1982 in an effort to give a new and independent approach to the problems caused by the partition of Ireland. Has advocated negotiated independence for northeast Ireland so that both north and south could work out new relationship with Britain and each other.

Noraid (Irish Northern Aid Committee): U.S.-based group formed to raise funds for the support of the families of republicans incarcerated in Ireland, England, Scotland or Wales and to publicize in America the facts about the situation in Ireland. Although political enemies charge that some of the funds raised go for the purchase of weapons, the Noraid case was upheld by Document 37, a secret intelligence estimate of IRA potential prepared by Britain's General Glover that was "acquired" and published by the press. Despite public claims by British officials to the contrary, the report showed that the Provisional IRA was spending more on prisoners' welfare than the total amount received in contributions from abroad.

Normalization Policy: Special Category status (i.e., political prisoner status) was granted to all convicted of politically motivated offenses in northeast Ireland in 1972. The presence of such prisoners proved embarrassing and it was deemed necessary to brand all Irish freedom fighters as criminals. The Diplock courts made it easy for the establishment to dispose of "unwanted members of the public." They were no longer "freedom fighters" but "convicted criminals." As part of the normalization process, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was also given a bigger role. The army was still there, but deliberately kept in the background as much as possible. When the RUC were sufficiently prepared,

the announcement was made that all convicted after March 1976 would be housed in the H-Blocks of Long Kesh and denied special category status. The first prisoner affected by the new rule, Kieran Nugent, refused to wear prison clothes or accept prison work assignments. He was locked naked in a cell and had to use a blanket to cover his nakedness. This was the start of the blanket protest, which became known as the dirty protest when Long Kesh authorities refused to allow those protesting to empty the chambers containing their body wastes into buckets up to then provided for that purpose. After enduring barbaric conditions for almost five years, a hunger strike was embarked on and ten young men died.

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA): Group modeled on the National Council for Civil Liberties (London) which was formed in northeast Ireland in 1967. Became a mass movement coordinating the activities of many groups in the civil rights campaign. Influenced by the Civil Rights marches in America. Received world-wide media attention when Civil Rights marchers were attacked by Orange mobs led by members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Northern Ireland Labor Party: Trade union-based party established 1924. Abandoned neutral position on partition in 1949 when it endorsed union with Britain. Enjoys very little support.

Northern Ireland Office: The British administrative center, located in Stormont Castle, from which the northeast has been governed since Stormont, the parliament of the six counties, was prorogued in March 1972.

Official Unionist Party: See Ulster Unionist Party.

Orange Order: Founded in 1795 in time of Catholic–Protestant land disputes to protect Protestant interests. Spread with official encouragement and through the years has remained an exclusively Protestant force dedicated to maintaining Protestant supremacy and the link with the Crown. Has been used by government officials to inflame sectarian passions. A columnist in *Fortnight*, September 9, 1985, compared the Order to the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S.

Peace People: Group formed in 1976 for the promotion of a peaceful solution. Attracted large crowds at first until it was perceived in nationalist areas as one-sided in its condemnation of violence. The rapid rise of the Peace People described by one reporter as "a staggering example of news creation" *(The British Media and Ireland)*.

and Ireland).

People's Democracy: A student-based organization launched in 1968 and active in the civil rights campaign. Influence has declined as it moved to the extreme left politically.

Red Hand Commandos: Loyalist sectarian paramilitary group that emerged in 1972 and was banned the following year.

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC): Set up in 1922 to replace the Royal Irish Constabulary as the official police force in the six counties. Never a police force in the accepted sense of the term, it has always been an armed paramilitary, predominantly Protestant force for the defense of Unionist interests.

Sinn Féin: Gaelic for "ourselves" although the two Irish words are often incorrectly translated as "ourselves alone." The name Sinn Féin was given to an umbrella organization formed in 1905 by Arthur Griffith with a policy designed to bring together constitutional and republican nationalists. The execution of the 1916 leaders turned many moderate nationalists into militants and they joined Sinn Féin, which the British had charged with responsibility for the rebellion. It became the political party with a republican philosophy. Twenty-seven elected Sinn Féin delegates were present at the first Dáil in January 1919. They ratified the Republic proclaimed in 1916 and decreed that the Irish Volunteers should be called the Irish Republican Army. The IRA, however, was acting independently of the Dáil and continued to do so even after the first Minister of Defence, Cathal Brugha, succeeded in getting many of them to take an oath of allegiance which mentioned "Dáil Éireann." The relationship between Sinn Féin and the IRA in modern Ireland is like that of 1919. Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, president of Sinn Féin, made that clear in a conversation with Hamilton Fish, a member of Congress on a fact-finding trip to Ireland in 1978: "The relationship is that those two organizations, and many other organizations, share the same objectives" (*Northern Ireland: A Role for the United States*, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee Print No. 23, p. 17). While the aim of Sinn Féin is to establish a 32-county democratic socialist republic, Marxists charge that the socialism of Sinn Féin is not really socialism, but an alternative to socialism that is derived from papal encyclicals (*Ireland: Divided Nation, Divided Class*, p. 90 ff).

Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP): Formed by Gerry Fitt, John Hume, Ivan Cooper, Paddy O'Hanlon, Austin

Currie, Paddy Devlin and Paddy Wilson in August 1970 with Fitt as party leader. Fitt and Wilson were members of the Republican Labor party although Fitt had always wanted to emphasize the social rather than the republican philosophy. Hume, Cooper and O'Hanlon had been independent MPs active in the civil rights campaign. Currie was a Nationalist MP and O'Hanlon a member of the Northern Ireland Labour Party. On the national question the SDLP adopted a policy of unity by consent of the majority in the northeast. It has been accused of opportunistic politics, opposing the state in 1971 but joining in the power-sharing 1974 Executive. Lost ground to Sinn Féin, which made inroads into SDLP strongholds to secure 40% of the nationalist vote. Surprisingly, considering its public backing by the Friends of Ireland in Congress, the SDLP is a member of the Socialist International and the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community.

Special Air Services (SAS): Unit of British Army set up during World War 2 for undercover operations. Used for plainclothes "dirty tricks" operations as described under Military Reconnaissance Force. Details of SAS operations and personnel subject to a D notice in Britain, which defines unauthorized publication as a violation of the Official Secrets Act.

Stormont: The six-county parliament.

Stripsearching: New procedures introduced into Armagh Women's Prison November 9, 1982, which contravened all guidelines associated with such searches in the U.S. Have been described as the moral equivalent of rape and are carried out simply to intimidate and degrade Irish female political prisoners.

Sunningdale Agreement: In November 1973 an announcement was made that some unionists, the Alliance Party and the SDLP had agreed to form a power-sharing executive. The parties involved met at Sunningdale with representatives of the London and Dublin governments in December 1973 to discuss the political framework within which the newly formed N.I. Executive would operate, as well as other items, which included the setting up of a Council of Ireland. The Executive, headed by Brian Faulkner, began to function on January 1, 1974, but was toppled when the British Army refused to take action against paramilitary groups intimidating workers during a strike called by the Ulster Workers' Council in May 1974.

Taoiseach: Head of government, i.e., prime minister, in the south of Ireland.

Ulster Constitution Defence Committee: See Ulster Protestant Volunteers.

Ulster Defence Association (UDA): Largest Protestant paramilitary organization. Started in 1969 as an umbrella organization linking a number of vigilante groups. Responsible for many sectarian assassinations but never banned. Used the name 'Ulster Freedom Fighters' as a term of convenience when claiming responsibility for assassinations, and this "fictional" organization has been banned. City branches of the UDA were particularly vulnerable to infiltration by SAS/MRF personnel who used the UDA to carry out political murders. Kennedy Lindsay, a loyalist, charges in *The British Intelligence Services in Action*, that the Ulster Freedom Fighters may have been controlled by the British (p. 150).

Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR): A locally recruited unit of the British Army formed in 1970 when the B Specials were disbanded. Mainly a Protestant force. Former B Specials were encouraged to join and membership in the UDA, etc., it was made clear, was no bar to joining. Composed of part-time as well as full-time members, many of whom have been involved in sectarian crimes. There is, one writer has commented, a remarkable structural resemblance to the Gurka Brigade in that they are led by Englanders while no "native" can rise above a certain rank.

Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF): See Ulster Defence Association.

Ulster Loyalist Association: Group active in the period 1969–72 calling for stronger security policies and opposed to any interference with the constitution of northeast Ireland.

Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party: Political party formed in 1981 and linked to the Ulster Defence Association.

Ulster Protestant Volunteers: A paramilitary body formed in 1966 by Ian Paisley "to uphold and maintain the Constitution of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom as long as the United Kingdom maintains a Protestant Monarchy and the terms of the Revolution Settlement." Linked with the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee formed at the same time. While committed to using "all lawful methods" to attain its aims, some of its members were involved in bombings which

led to Prime Minister O'Neill's fall from power. The Protestant Volunteers disappeared after 1969. Many of its members were also in the Ulster Volunteer Force.

Ulster Unionist Party: An Ulster Unionist Council was set up in 1905 to oppose Home Rule and this became the Ulster Unionist Party when Ireland was partitioned in 1921. The party maintained strong links with the Orange Order and with the British Conservative Party. It formed the government of northeast Ireland from 1921 until 1972 when Stormont was prorogued. Took the name "Official Unionist Party" to distinguish it from the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland formed by Brian Faulkner after the collapse of the power-sharing Executive (see Sunningdale Agreement).

Ulster Volunteer Force: Protestant militia formed in 1912 to oppose Home Rule and formed into a separate unit of the British Army—the 36th (Ulster) Division—during World War 1. Reformed in 1920 and engaged in attacks on Catholics 1920–23. A sectarian group using the same name emerged in 1965 and, although banned the following year, continued as an underground paramilitary organization. Controlled by British intelligence, which arranged to have its men rise rapidly within the UVF hierarchy by having other activists arrested.

Ulster Special Constabulary: Exclusively Protestant paramilitary forces organized by the British in 1920. The A Specials were full-time helpers of the Royal Irish Constabulary, the B Specials were part-timers, while the Cs were armed and could be quickly mobilized.

Ulster Workers' Council: Loyalist trade unionists who came together under UDA auspices in 1973 and organized the May 1974 strike that toppled the power-sharing Executive (see Sunningdale Agreement).

Ulster Vanguard: Umbrella organization initiated by William Craig early in 1972 to oppose direct rule from London, which was then only a possibility. Strongly supported by loyalist paramilitary groups, especially the Vanguard Service Corps with which it was linked. Accused of being a fascist movement—Craig was given the fascist salute at rallies. Craig changed the Vanguard from an umbrella group into a political party in 1973 and called it the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party. This lasted until 1978 when he resurrected Ulster Vanguard.

Unionist: Term applied to individuals or groups in favor of retaining the political link between the six northern counties of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Synonymous with loyalist.

Unionist Party of Northern Ireland: See Ulster Unionist Party.

United Ulster Unionist Coalition: Alliance formed by the Official Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Vanguard Party in 1974 to bring down the power-sharing Executive (see Sunningdale Agreement).

Vanguard Service Corps: See Ulster Vanguard.

Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party: See Ulster Vanguard.

Workers Party: See Irish Republican Army.

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Painting by John P. O'Brien
From His Ulster Collection

Father Maurice Burke is an inquiring and perceptive investigator for many years of the distressing struggle in Northern Ireland. Through frequent visits there and careful study of available records, he portrays *Britain's War Machine* with accuracy and vividness. Policy makers as well as all concerned with the Northern Ireland crisis need to read his analysis and recommendations.
Alfred McClung Lee, Retired Professor, City University of New York; former President, American Sociological Association; author of *Terrorism in Northern Ireland* (General Hall, 1983).

Although this book is a must for anyone interested in the Irish problem, its main treatment of the Six Counties, as caught up in a strict "military answer," is in no way provincial. For any reader alert to the "military-control" turn that this latter twentieth century is taking, it can provide a small map of recognition should a rigid-control and even neo-caste-system mentality make an unchallenged grab for the coming Twenty-First.

Ann P. Murphy, A.B., Boston College, M.Ed., Boston State College, is a retired Boston School Teacher. She has reviewed books on the current Irish political crisis for *The Boston Irish Echo, The Irish People*, New York, and *The Irish Edition*, Philadelphia.

Britain's War Machine should be in every library and university in the country as a reference for those wanting to learn more about the causes and effects of the present struggle for independence by the Irish people in this divided country. It would make a very interesting subject for discussion as a course in colleges.

Elizabeth Logue, President, New Jersey Region, Irish American Unity Conference

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