

ALTERNATIVE WHITE PAPER ON IRELAND

Troops Out Movement 15p

BRITISH SOLUTION



THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTION

Presented to Parliament by
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
by Command of Her Majesty
July 1972

After the Anglo-Irish War 1920-21, control of 26 counties was reluctantly ceded to the IRISH GOVERNMENT, but in deference to a MINORITY UNIONIST group round Belfast, a separate Administration was set up for SIX of the NINE counties of ULSTER, but supreme overall authority was retained by the then BRITISH IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. The myth of geographic and ethnic unity with Britain was fostered only to deceive the uninformed. It is revealing to hear the refutation of this absurdity from the lips of no fewer than three contemporary British Prime Ministers

Asquith — Hansard vol. xxxix col. 787

"You can no more split Ireland into two parts than you can split England or Scotland into parts. Ireland is a nation; not two nations, but one nation. There are few cases in history, and, as a student of history in a humble way, I myself know none, of a nationality at once so distinct, so persistent, and so assimilative as the Irish."

Ramsay MacDonald — Hansard vol. xlix col. 938

"The first question is: Is Ulster to deny the rights of the rest of Ireland to self-Government? We say, 'No, emphatically not.' Arising out of that, and a somewhat narrower question, is this: Is Ulster going to deny the right of Ireland ever to speak and act and govern itself as a UNITED NATIONALITY? We say, 'No, emphatically not.'"

Lloyd George — Hansard vol. cxxvii col. 1322

"If you asked the people of Ireland what plan they would accept, by an emphatic majority they would say — 'We want independence and an Irish Republic.' There is absolutely no doubt about that. THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF IRELAND, NOW BY A CLEAR MAJORITY, HAVE DECLARED IN FAVOUR OF INDEPENDENCE."

"... So far as Ireland itself and Irish affairs are concerned, the Labour Party is unequivocally prepared to allow Ireland to assume whatever form of self-determination the great mass of the Irish people desire, with whatever constitution, under whatever designation and with whatever arrangements for local autonomy, and thereby allow Ireland to face its own difficulties in its own way."

— Passage from Labour Commission report on Ireland presented at the Labour Party Special Conference on December 29th, 1921, at Central Hall, Westminster.

"Put" issued by the Literature Committee of the Troops Out Movement. Membership, actual or potential, of T.O.M. does not necessarily mean agreement with all the points or views expressed in this pamphlet.

Troops Out Movement Alternative White Paper on Ireland

1. Introduction

1 About four and a half million people live in Ireland. The Irish are a divided people; approximately three million live in the Republic of Ireland, and one-and-a-half million live in Northern Ireland. Two separate states on one island with such a tiny population might seem an anachronism. Indeed, until 1920 Ireland was ruled by Britain as a single country. The justification for the Partition of Ireland which is most frequently put forward — that two separate states enable the Protestants and Catholics on the island to exercise their separate aspirations — is not tenable, as this document will show. In particular, this justification cannot account for the fact that the conflict exists within Northern Ireland.

2 For the past fifty-four years, successive British Governments have pursued a policy of maintaining Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. In that time, many hundreds of people have been killed in the north of Ireland. To quote the latest White Paper (July 1974):

"In the past five years over 1,000 people — men, women and children; soldiers, policemen and civilians — have died by violent means. There has been great continuous and widespread suffering and destruction".¹

Throughout this whole period there has been no stability in the north of Ireland and the situation has come to be known in Britain as "The Irish Problem".

3 It is the view of the Troops Out Movement that the fundamental cause of these troubles lies in the repeated attempts by British Governments to impose British solutions on the Irish people. As the White Paper itself points out, since 1969 Northern Ireland has experienced four different patterns of government: devolution of powers to Parliament (Stormont) and the Government of N. Ireland until March 1972; Direct Rule from Westminster until January 1974; and now the replacement of the Executive by a small Cabinet of British Ministers.

4 This in itself is a frank admission of a colossal failure — a failure which is compounded by the large numbers of troops which have had to be used in the attempt to enforce the various "solutions" which accompanied the different patterns of government. Again to quote the White Paper:

"In August 1969 there were only 2,500 (troops) stationed in Northern Ireland. This figure rose to 22,500 by the end of July 1972 and has never been fewer than 14,500 since that time."²

During that time the Army has resorted to the interment of hundreds of men, women and children without trial; to the smothering of whole ghettos with CS gas; to the widespread use of rubber bullets and lead bullets (as on Bloody Sunday); and to the torture of political prisoners.

5 The failure of all past attempts to solve the crisis in the framework of Northern Ireland, despite such draconian methods, has not deterred the British Government from attempting another solution:

"... the Government proposes to introduce legislation for the election of a Constitutional Convention to consider what provision for the government of Northern Ireland would be likely to command the most widespread acceptance throughout the community there."³

6 We think it extremely unlikely that the Convention will succeed where three successive British Governments, two Northern Ireland administrations and many thousands of British troops have failed. In the remainder of this paper we will explain the reasons which we believe to lie behind this inevitable failure — in particular, the failure of Sunningdale and the "power-sharing" Executive. In our view, the only just and sensible course now, as it has always been, is an immediate British withdrawal from Ireland to allow the right of self-determination to the Irish people as a whole.

1. Government White Paper: The Northern Ireland Constitution, July 1974. Part 1, section 1.

2. Ibid. Part 1, section 3.

3. Ibid. Part 7, section 50.

2. The Problem

7 All attempts at solving the crisis in the North of Ireland in these past five years have had one factor in common — they accepted as beyond question the existing Northern Ireland state as the framework for the solution. That this is the basis for British policy was confirmed by the decision of the then Conservative Government to conduct a poll of the Northern Ireland electorate in March 1973 on the question of the Border. In our view, the question of the Partition of Ireland is one for the whole Irish people — and not for less than one-third of that people. The result of the Poll — in favour of the Border — was a foregone conclusion; but it did enable the Government to maintain that the policy was fundamentally democratic, which was the real purpose of the Poll.

8 What we question is whether democracy, and therefore peace and reconciliation is at all possible within the framework of Northern Ireland.

9 The essence of democracy in any nation is the right of the People as a whole to freely determine how they are to be governed. The fact that Ireland was a national unit was never questioned by any British Government until, in the second decade of the twentieth century, Britain decided in her own interests to partition Ireland.

10 Since 1886, successive Liberal Governments had been committed to introducing a measure of Home Rule for Ireland. This was opposed by the Tory Party, which supported the majority of industrialists in North East Ulster, who were aware that an all-Ireland Home

Rule government would erect tariff barriers against British goods in order to stimulate domestic industrialisation in Ireland. North East Ulster — in particular, the area around Belfast — had reached a higher level of industrial development than the remainder of Ireland. Tariff barriers would have cut off industrialists in the North East from its main market and source of raw materials. Consequently these overwhelmingly Protestant economic interests founded the Unionist Party to oppose Home Rule.

11 In 1912, the Liberal Prime Minister, Asquith, dependent for his majority at Westminster on eighty-two Irish Nationalist votes, introduced the third Home Rule Bill. The House of Lords used their power to postpone its application for two years. The Unionist leaders mobilised to stop it; in alliance with the British Tory Party they organised a mass right-wing movement to resist Home Rule. This was possible because the majority of Protestants in Ulster have always been conscious that they are the descendants of original British planters who were settled on land taken from the native (Catholic) Irish. This consciousness has been reinforced by the economically marginal, but socially important privileges in the field of jobs, housing etc., which have been enjoyed by all sections of the Protestant community. These originated as a reward for the long service Ulster Protestants have in the past rendered to the Crown in maintaining the British domination of Ireland.

12 The opposition to Home Rule by the Unionists soon became an armed opposition, with the foundation of the Ulster Volunteer Force as the military

wing of the Orange Order. Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Unionists, promised, with the support of the leaders of the British Conservative Party, to go to war to stop Home Rule and, if they failed, to set up an independent Ulster Parliament.

13 The final blow to Home Rule came with the Curragh Mutiny in 1914, when British Army Officers in Ireland refused to move north to deal with the armed Unionist rebellion. In 1917, Lloyd George abandoned the Government's previous policy, and adopted the expedient of partition. From then on, until 1918, extensive efforts were made by the British Government to persuade the Irish to accept some form of partition, but all efforts failed. Finally, in the 1918 General Election — the first since the Easter Rising of 1916 — the Irish People gave a decisive verdict in favour of Independence and against Partition. They elected 75 Sinn Féin members out of a total 103 parliamentary seats in Ireland. In January 1919, the Sinn Féin M.P.s constituted an independent "Constituent Assembly of the Irish Nation" — Dail Eireann — and asserted the right of the Irish People to national self-determination. This resulted in a war of independence against the British Armed forces.


14 In the midst of this war — in 1920 — Britain partitioned Ireland, and established the separate state of Northern Ireland. This was clearly a totally undemocratic act, being against the express will of the overwhelming majority of the Irish People. The war of independence, and against partition, continued until mid-1921, when six Irish leaders signed a compromise document giving 26 Counties of Ireland dominion status, and partitioning Ulster. On their return from London, both the Republican Government and the Republican Army split, leading to a bitter civil war which was eventually won by pro-Treaty forces, more than a year later.

15 In this way, the state of Northern Ireland was created by force. It had no basis in law, and in its foundation the British Government showed no regard for democracy. This was to be reflected in the internal structure and administration of the new state.



Black and Tans, 1920


ULSTER



Northern Ireland
Area 5,000 sq.miles
Pop. 1,500,000

Irish Republic
Area 27,000 sq.miles
Pop. 3million

The division of Ireland into two separate states was imposed by England under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. No Irish person from any part of Ireland voted for this Statute. Northern Ireland has never existed before as an entity in history or politics or economics; containing six of the nine counties of Ulster, it was a completely artificial state. The idea was to keep as large an area as possible, but with a safe Unionist majority.



In four and a half Counties, taken as a block (Derry, Tyrone, Fermanagh, Armagh and South Down), out of the six Counties there was, and still is, a Nationalist Majority, which is only outvoted by the numerical strength of the Unionist Concentrated in Belfast, Antrim and North Down.

Northern Ireland
Division of Pop.

	Total
Unionist%	60
Nationalist%	40

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Area 5,000 sq.miles
Pop.1,500,000


Irish Republic
Area 27,000 sq.miles
Pop.3million

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Northern Ireland
Division of Pop.



Black and Tans, 1920



The B Specials marching towards Bogside in Derry

3. Democracy in the 6 Counties 1920-1968

16 The six Ulster counties, which had long been part of the historic nine-county province of Ulster, had never before existed as a political entity. They now made up the new Northern Ireland state, which had no natural boundaries or internal unity. The Unionists had a majority only in an unbroken area smaller than two counties. Of the one-and-a-quarter million people of the six counties at the time of Partition, more than half were concentrated in the city of Belfast, in County Antrim and the northern half of County Down. In this area there were 552,000 Unionists and 149,000 Nationalists. In the four and a half remaining counties, there were 281,000 Nationalists and 268,000 Unionists.

17 Thus although the people of the largest area of the state, if given the choice, would have declared for unity with the rest of Ireland, they would always be outvoted by the numerical strength of the Unionists in the other one-and-a-half counties (which on their own would be a totally unviable state).

18 It is the need to maintain this precarious situation which explains the notoriously undemocratic nature of the state in Northern Ireland — with its gerrymandering i.e. fixing of electoral boundaries to produce a desired result, discriminating against the Catholic population, and its police-state apparatus

for enforcing "law-and-order".

19 If gerrymandering had been impossible, most of the towns outside the one-and-a-half counties in which the Unionists had a massive majority would have elected anti-Unionist local authorities. In order to prevent this, Derry, for example, was divided into three wards, each electing eight councillors. In North Ward there were 4,380 Unionists and 3,173 anti-Unionists; in Waterside Ward there were 4,420 Unionists and 2,804 anti-Unionists; while in the third ward, South Ward, there were only 1,474 Unionists and 14,125 anti-Unionists. Thus, although in Derry there were twice as many anti-Unionists as Unionists, the anti-Unionists elected only eight councillors while the Unionists elected sixteen.

20 In this way, a pattern of discrimination against Catholics laid down by the Stormont Government was reinforced by the local authorities. The discrimination, particularly in housing and jobs, preserved the relatively privileged status of the Protestant working class. It was part of the 'Orange Ideology' which through the Orange Lodges tied the Protestant working people to the Protestant middle and upper classes. They were united by two main aspirations — the maintenance of the Union with Britain, and the maintenance of Protestant domination over Catholics, the "Ascendancy".

21 With more than one-third of the population continuously alienated from the state, Northern Ireland could only take the form of a prison state. It was, effectively, a police state disguised as a parliamentary democracy. The Special Powers Act⁴ gave the police sweeping powers of arrest and detention, powers which were admired by the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Vorster. Internment without trial was used as a sanction against the Catholic population as a whole whenever there was any sign of rebellion against their condition. The Royal Ulster Constabulary was an armed elite force, composed, as the Hunt Report of 1969 confirms, almost entirely of Protestants. In 1920, the armed wing of the Orange Order — the Ulster Volunteer Force — was constituted by Westminster as a Special Constabulary. As the 'B' Specials, it was to be the spearhead of all the major armed Protestant attacks on the Catholic ghettos, from 1920 until 1969 when it was disbanded.

22 It is therefore our view that there has been, in more than fifty-four years, no democracy in the north of Ireland.

⁴ The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, (Northern Ireland) 1922; renewed annually until 1933, when it was made permanent.

4. Origins of the Crisis

23 The immediate roots of the present crisis go back to the early 1960's. By then the economic priorities of British and Irish capitalists had changed. In the North, the traditional industries were in decline, and new industries financed and controlled from outside (mainly from Britain)⁵ took up the slack. Meanwhile Southern Irish industries had grown behind their protective tariff barriers to the point where the small size of their home base was limiting their further development. The tariff barriers were therefore progressively removed. Southern Ireland grew to become Britain's third largest market and it was clear that Britain's interests no longer lay exclusively in the North.

24 There was thus a convergence of economic interests between the dominant forces in Britain and the South of Ireland, which was particularly marked by the decision of both Britain and the Republic to apply for entry to the EEC. The changed circumstances called for what would virtually be a new Union between Southern Ireland and Britain, but this could never be guaranteed while

discrimination against northern Catholics continued; there was a permanent danger that Southern Irish opinion would react against the new "Union".

25 Britain therefore proceeded, from the early sixties, to put pressure on the Unionist Government at Stormont to modify the discrimination against the Catholic population, and thus remove the obstacle to British-Irish relations.

26 This arrangement was, however, to be resisted in the North. The fragile unity of the monolithic Unionist bloc — made up of the Protestant working class, middle and upper classes — depended on its ability to maintain the economically marginal, but politically significant privileges to Protestant workers. If it failed to do this, it was feared that Protestant working class voters would no longer vote for the Unionist Party. Terence O'Neill, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1963 to 1969, has confirmed in his recent autobiography that he well understood the dangers to the Unionist Party which were posed



RUC firing CS gas

by the British pressure for reforms in Northern Ireland. Within the Northern Ireland cabinet, William Craig (until December 1968 the Minister in charge of the Police) vigorously opposed any move towards reform — basing himself on the Protestant working class. O'Neill attempted to resolve these conflicts by promising reforms during visits to London, while doing virtually nothing to implement reform in Northern Ireland. This was a strategy which depended, however, on the passivity of the Catholic population in the north of Ireland.



RUC stopping a Civil Rights March, January 1969

27 For more than fifty years, the minority in the 6 Counties had accepted second-class citizenship with only occasional outbursts of rebellion. Theirs was a passivity produced by the hopelessness of the situation; it had existed long before the foundation of the Northern Ireland state. Once hope was given, however, the passivity vanished. The introduction of social welfare benefits and new industry, with employment policies which were less sectarian than previously, helped to increase the expectations and self-confidence of the Catholic population. Moreover, O'Neill's speeches in London about the desirability of reform did serve to legitimise their grievances and increase the strength of Catholic feeling. Other factors, such as the world youth radicalisation of the late sixties, and the increase in higher education for Catholics as a result of the overflow into Northern Ireland of the 1944 Butler Education Act in Britain, also played a part. As a result of these factors, 1968 saw the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement onto the streets of Northern Ireland in a series of non-violent protest marches.

28 The first Civil Rights demonstration, a march from Coalisland to Dungannon to protest about discrimination in public housing, took place on August 14th 1968. It was ignored by the Press in Britain. The next, in Derry on October 5th, was answered with the traditional violence of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. RUC baton-charges, which were described by Sir Arthur Young (later Chief Constable of the RUC) as "each man taking out his baton and using it to thump the nearest member of the public", were launched against the demonstrators. The purpose of the attack, to drive the Catholics into the ghettos and into passivity, completely failed. Instead it won the Civil Rights Movement the




The RUC exhausted and demoralised support of almost every Catholic in the North, mass support in the South and broad sympathy overseas.

29 Over the next few months, the demonstrations continued and so did the repression. Terence O'Neill was trapped between the continuing pressure for reform from the British Government in London, and the contradictory pressures from within the Unionist Party. In April 1969, following the second battle of the Bogside, he resigned and was replaced by Chichester-Clark, who continued O'Neill's policy of minor reform coupled with a campaign of repression of the Catholic minority. It was this which led, in August 1969, to the massive RUC attack on the Catholic area of Derry which became the third, and best known, battle of the Bogside.

30 The battle lasted for more than two days. The Bogside had secured the heights of Rossville flats at the beginning of the battle and from there — immune to the CS gas which blanketed the densely populated and low-lying Bogside area — they beat back the crack elements of the RUC. The police were forced out of the Bogside, and the British Government agreed to a request from the Northern Ireland administration for British troops to replace the exhausted, demoralised and defeated police in Derry. By the end of August 1969 the British Army was once again in Ireland in force.

5. See Northern Ireland Office Green Paper: Finance and the Economy, HMSO, 1974, Appendix A.



5. British 'Solutions' 1970-1974

31 The intervention of the British Army in August 1969 was a tacit admission by the British Government that the policy of internal reform through the Unionist administration had failed. With the RUC defeated, only the British Army could maintain the existence of the Northern Ireland state.

32 British policy in the period since the intervention of the Army can be divided into four phases. The first phase — containment of the continuing rebellion of the Catholic ghettos — brought the Army into increasing conflict with the Catholic population. During the battles of the Bogside in 1969, and in the attempted pogrom against the Catholics living in the Falls Road district of Belfast shortly afterwards, the Irish Republican Army had been effectively reborn, to serve as a local


defence force against future Protestant attacks. By July 1970, the second phase of British policy had begun, as the Army attempted to eliminate the IRA. This rapidly escalated into a fierce guerrilla war.

33 This phase was to continue until March 1972. It included the re-introduction of internment without trial, and the torture of political prisoners (as documented in the Minority Report of Lord Gardiner to the Government in March 1972).⁶ The result of these policies was a mass civil resistance campaign by the Catholic population, with whole areas of the main towns barricaded off and run by the people themselves. The no-go areas effectively opted out of the Northern state; rent and rates were refused, and the British Army and the RUC were not allowed to pass the barricades.

34 Towards the end of 1971, the civil resistance campaign found expression in a series of mass demonstrations, which the Army was given the task of stopping. On the afternoon of Sunday 30 January 1972, the Paratroop Regiment opened fire on a crowd of 20,000 peaceful and unarmed demonstrators in the Bogside. Fourteen were killed and ten wounded. In the wake of what became known as "Bloody Sunday", Catholic resistance strengthened, and having failed to defeat the population by the use of force, the then Conservative Government was forced to make concessions. A major switch in policy was promised, and in March the Stormont Parliament was abolished and Direct rule introduced.

35 This was the third major phase of British policy. Its effect was to provoke strong opposition from the mass of Loyalists, who until then had been content to watch the Army do what had traditionally been undertaken by the RUC and 'B' Specials. In the summer of 1972, the British Army and the Provisional IRA arranged what was to be a short-lived truce, and a group of Provisional Leaders were flown to London for negotiations with the Government. Unable to obtain terms for a surrender from the Provisionals, and under very strong pressure from Unionist politicians, the Government ordered the barricades around the "no-go areas" to be cleared, and in "Operation Motorman" the Catholic areas were forcibly occupied by the British Army.


36 This opened the final phase which led to the Sunningdale agreement. In the Catholic areas this period was marked by a drastic increase in military repression — with constant house-to-house searches, and the repeated arrest and interrogation of young people living in those areas. But it was also marked by offers of concessions to the Catholic middle class, through the Social Democratic and Labour Party, which was offered a part in a new "power-sharing" government in Northern Ireland.



A British Army snatch squad in action



One of the 14 unarmed civilians shot dead by Paratroopers on Bloody Sunday



British Troops ready for night patrol in Belfast

37 The groundwork for this new British strategy was agreed at the Sunningdale conference in December 1973, where representatives of the British and Dublin governments, together with the Unionist Party, Alliance Party and SDLP, met to work out a basis for the proposed new administration. An agreement seemed likely; in the new Northern Ireland Assembly created by the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, elections in June 1973 under proportional representation had achieved a majority for the combined forces of the section of the Unionist Party led by Brian Faulkner, and the SDLP. Both groups were committed to some form of "power-sharing" between elected representatives of both Catholic and Protestant communities. The Loyalists in the Unionist Party who were opposed to "power-sharing" were in a minority.

38 In our view, the Sunningdale agreement was based on a series of illusions. For the Faulkner Unionists had not campaigned

for election on the basis of sharing power with the Catholic SDLP, and certainly not on the basis of a Council of Ireland. Furthermore, the disagreements within the Unionist Party were not superficial; Direct Rule had caused a deep division in the party between those whose priority was to maintain the Union with Britain, and those who wished to preserve the Protestant Ascendancy, even if it meant breaking the link with Britain. The SDLP, while winning the overwhelming majority of Catholic votes, by no means enjoyed political dominance within the Catholic areas. The Catholic community showed itself to be quite capable of giving its votes to the SDLP, while giving the Provisional IRA the degree of support necessary to allow it to continue the guerrilla warfare.


39 It was the February 1974 General Election in Britain which began the series of events which was eventually to lead to the collapse of Sunningdale. For the Conservative Party, the election was a set-back; for the Sunningdale

agreement it was a disaster. An overwhelming majority of the Protestants voted for the anti-Sunningdale candidates of the United Ulster Unionist Council. Of all the M.P.'s at Westminster from constituencies in the north of Ireland, the leader of the SDLP, Gerry Fitt, was the sole representative of pro-Sunningdale forces. It was now impossible for the British Government to maintain that a majority of even the Northern Ireland population supported this British "solution" to the Irish Problem.

6. The extent of internment and the cruelty of the tortures used in the 'interrogation' of internees are fully documented in *The New Technology of Repression* (British Society for Social Responsibility in Science), 1974. Also in *'The Guineapigs'* (Penguin Special 40p.) by John McGuffin.

"...H.M Government will secure a guaranteed permanent role... for the Catholics..."

R. MAUDLING



Since 1945 the Army has taken part in 36 'Little Wars'. Most of these actions were called counter-insurgency campaigns. Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden are well-known examples of this type of confrontation, where the soldiers were used, with increasing sophistication, to suppress the struggles of the peoples of British colonies towards independence and self-determination. During these campaigns the mass-media was utilised to win acceptance from the British population for the use of the Army for this role, usually portraying the soldiers as a peace-keeping force and generally distorting the real reason for their presence.

In the early part of last year Mr Roy Mason, the Minister of Defence, described army casualty figures in Ireland as 'horrific'. Nearly 3,000 killed and injured up to the end of 1973.

Since then casualties have continued to mount, resulting in a dramatic down-turn in the level of recruitment and re-enlistment (the main source of NCOs). That the level of discontent within the army is rising is indicated by the ever increasing desertion rate.

Widespread demoralisation has set in within the army; the ordinary soldier does not want to be sent back to Ireland. On these pages are just some of the soldiers who have lost their lives in Ireland since 1969.



6. The Ulster Workers' Council Stoppage

40 Following their victory in the February General Election, the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) began campaigning in earnest against Sunningdale. The agreement was eventually to collapse in May following the two week long work stoppage called by the Ulster Workers' Council which resulted on May 28th in the resignation of the Unionist Party Ministers in the Northern Ireland "power-sharing" Executive. The stoppage has come to be known as the "UWC strike".

41 The British Government had begun to implement the 1973 Northern Ireland Constitution Act at the end of June of that year, with the election of the new Assembly. By January 1st 1974, the new Executive was in office, committed to the implementation of the Sunningdale agreement, which included a Council of Ireland. This was to be a non-legislative body which was to be responsible for co-ordinating some aspects of economic and "security" relations between the north and south of Ireland. With the Executive in power, the Government was anxious to move towards a speedy final ratification of the Agreement, but following the General Election and the clear signs of anti-Sunningdale feeling among the Loyalists, it became obvious that

ratification would require major concessions, particularly in relation to The Council of Ireland, in order to win support away from the anti-Sunningdale Loyalists to the Faulkner Unionists in the Executive. Press commentators were confident that the concessions would be sufficient to strengthen Faulkner's support among Protestants, and that they would satisfy Westminster, Dublin and the three Executive Parties, so that ratification would take place.


42 It was at this time that the Provisional IRA launched a major new offensive — their most sophisticated and successful since the summer of 1972. Stimulated by these military successes, and angered by the continuing burden of internment and the British Army occupation of their areas, the Catholic population had once more taken to the streets in a series of militant demonstrations.

43 For the Loyalist political parties and paramilitary groups opposed to "power-sharing" and Sunningdale, this period was critical. Policies pursued by the British Government since the suspension of the old Stormont Parliament in 1972 had caused the formerly monoethnic Unionist

alliance to disintegrate. Now, with the "power-sharing" Executive apparently firmly in power, and under pressure of the renewed IRA offensive, there were indications of further divisions among the Loyalist groups. If the concessions succeeded in regaining Protestant support for the Executive — enabling it to stay in office for a full term — it would have effectively meant the end of Loyalist attempts to defeat Sunningdale. It was clear that if they were to be successful, the anti-Sunningdale Loyalists had to regain the initiative.

44 On Thursday 2 May a bomb exploded at the 'Rose and Crown' public house in Belfast, killing six people; this was followed by a spate of sectarian murders, and in six days ten Catholics had been killed. This campaign of sectarian assassination was to reach its peak on 17th May, when car-bombs exploded amongst crowds of workers walking home through the centre of Dublin. Twenty-eight people were killed, and 137 injured.

45 William Craig, ex-Stormont Minister for Home Affairs, interviewed on R.T.E. (Southern Irish



National Front HQ in East Belfast. The NF have already formed extensive links among Loyalists

State radio) on 12 May, said that the Loyalist assassination campaign, although "unfortunate", was "understandable" and "excusable". It had become clear, by this time, that only a drastic increase in sectarian tension could generate the necessary energy within the Protestant community to defeat Sunningdale.

46 The Ulster Workers' Council "strike" was first announced in the following advertisement in the Belfast Newsletter on Tuesday 14 May:

"The Ulster Workers' Council gives notice that if Brian Faulkner and his colleagues vote in the Assembly on Tuesday 14th to support Sunningdale, then there will be a general stoppage. Workers' dependants are advised, in such an event, to apply for supplementary benefit immediately. Advice centres will be available in all areas after 6 p.m."

47 Although the UWC was initially unknown, its few publicly-known leaders had previously been members of the Loyalist Association of Workers (L.A.W.). This organisation had become discredited after leading a series of sectarian strikes in February 1973, which attracted little support, and were called off following Army action during which a Protestant fireman was killed. These strikes had a largely demoralising effect on the Protestant working class.

48 The new organisation made no attempt to emulate L.A.W.'s mass membership amongst Protestant workers. Instead it concentrated on building up

clandestine support in one or two key sectors of the economy, and was aided in this by the sectarian structure of employment in the north of Ireland, which gives Protestants the more highly paid, skilled jobs in such key industries. It rapidly recruited a core of members in the electricity generation industry, and these were to be its most powerful weapon.

49 The leadership of the "strike" did not, in fact, rest in the hands of the UWC. The stoppage was run by a Co-ordinating Committee on which the UWC had only two representatives. Most of the other Protestant political and paramilitary organisations were represented on the same basis: these included the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Red Hand Commando, the Ulster Defence Association, Down Orange Welfare, the Democratic Unionist Party — represented by Ian Paisley — and William Craig from the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party. The Co-ordinating Committee spanned the whole spectrum of Orangism — working class, middle class, farmer, landowner and businessmen. It ensured that the anti-Sunningdale Unionist politicians were not outflanked.

50 On Tuesday 14 May, the Assembly, confronted with a Loyalist motion rejecting Sunningdale, successfully amended it to welcome speedy ratification of the Agreement, and on Wednesday 15 May, the stoppage began.

51 As could be expected, the biggest immediate impact was on the electricity supply, and this was a key element in forcing a wider shut-down, although it is probably impossible to disentangle the effects of the electricity cuts and spontaneous support for the strike in those first days. But some other facts throw light on what was happening.

52 In Harland and Wolff's shipyard, a mass meeting was summoned by the UWC; of the 10,000 workforce, less than 1,000 attended. They were not asked to vote for or against the stoppage, but to indicate support for a demonstration. Just over 50 hands were raised in support. Some time later, men of the paramilitary UDA appeared and closed the yards down. On the second day of the strike, Thursday, this intimidation spread. In Mackies engineering factory, where 25% of the labour force had gone in to work, a group of armed and masked men ordered them out at gun-point. Similar incidents occurred at the Michelin factory in Newtonabbey and at Gallaghers tobacco factory.

53 Although this intimidation was important, it does not by itself explain why the stoppage eventually won overwhelming support from the Protestant working class. The crucial turning-point, in our view, was when it became clear that the British Army was not going to intervene against the stoppage.

54 The newspapers of 21 May record something of a counter-offensive by the British Government, with threats that the Army would prevent re-erection of the barricades, which, on the previous day, had prevented many workers from going to work. At the same time, Len Murray of the British TUC announced that he would take part in a return-to-work march to Harland and Wolff's shipyard, Army protection was promised for this and other back-to-work marches. In fact, the Army cleared only a few barricades on main roads, and these only with the agreement of the UWC. This gave the UWC increasing authority, which was reinforced when the Army failed to prevent Len Murray being pelted with

INTRODUCTION CARD.

MINISTRY OF LABOUR, NORTHERN IRELAND.

Order No. _____ Date _____ Class No. _____

ALFRED STREET _____

To: *H. G. STEVENSON*

In reply to your request for: *Ref. 101*

I am sending the bearer, M. *Ref. 101*

Please complete the space below and return this card to me as soon as possible, through the post, in the enclosed prepaid envelope.

H. G. STEVENSON Manager.

EMPLOYER'S REPLY.

Have you engaged the worker? *No*

Date worker is to start: _____

If the worker is not engaged please state overleaf the reason: _____

Please impress business stamp.

E.O. 18. _____

M. Ireland. _____

Signature: *H. G. Stevenson*

Date: *27/9* 1973

The reason for refusal of employment is given—RELIGION

C.1224 Wt. 544 P.1020 10.000 Op. 101 2/30 N.W.144
C.2036 Wt. 1273 1154 10.000 Op. 101 1/30 N.W.144



The UDA man a barricade that the Army refused to remove



Nationalist houses in Belfast, burnt out in the Orange pogrom of August 1969

rotten eggs and tomatoes as he took part in the first of the back-to-work marches, which were in any case a failure.

55 The British Army was not, however, completely passive. In Derry, for example, Catholics who were prevented from getting to work by Loyalist barricades near the Craigavon bridge, grouped together and moved in a body towards the barricades with the intention of going through. They were dispersed by the Army, using rubber bullets and CS gas.

56 At this point, the British Army was beginning to assert itself against both the Executive in Belfast and the British Government in London. The Army had no interest in becoming involved in a major conflict with Protestants. It was organised and trained, tactically and psychologically, for a war against the Catholic population, which it had been unable to win. Furthermore, to have added another burden — the Protestants — would have increased the already extremely serious demoralisation within the Army. That this view of the Army's role is substantially correct has been recently confirmed by an anonymous, serving subaltern, writing in the journal of the Monday Club, "Monday World" at the beginning of September.

57 Faced with the growing failure of the British Army to take effective action, the Executive began to demand some clear demonstration of British resistance to the strike. It was widely believed that the Prime

state and government in Northern Ireland has been to protect a sectarian distribution of employment in favour of the Protestant working class.

61 This situation is most clearly shown in Harland and Wolff's, where out of a total workforce of over 10,000 only 300-400 Catholics are employed, mostly in labouring jobs. In two of the largest engineering factories in Belfast, Mackies and Sirocco, there is almost no employment of Catholics, although one is in the heart of a Catholic area and the other is on the fringe of a Catholic area.

62 In general it is true to say that the higher-paid skilled labour in Northern Ireland is almost all Protestant, while Catholics are restricted to lower-paid jobs in the service industries, and to unskilled labouring jobs within heavy industry. In fact these changes have only made the Protestant working class more aware of the threat to its traditional privileged position — a threat which they felt, at this time, was embodied by Sunningdale, with its Council of Ireland, and particularly, the "power-sharing" Executive.

63 In short, the Sunningdale agreement collapsed because of opposition to it from both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Catholic working people were opposed to it because they saw in Sunningdale no end to internment, no end to the occupation of their areas by the British Army, no end to the conditions which breed anti-Catholic bigotry and sectarian murder and no possibility of attaining their right, as part of the Irish People, to self-determination. Protestant working class people were opposed to it because they felt "power-sharing" posed a threat to the privileges they enjoyed over Catholic fellow-workers. It was for this reason that they supported the UWC stoppage — a stoppage which, in attempting to maintain the divisions between working class people, was utterly reactionary and utterly anti-working class. The final blow to Sunningdale came when the British Army refused to move against the UWC "strike", showing once again its determination to continue the war against the national aspirations of the Irish people, and confirming that this is the only role which it is prepared to play in Ireland. In this way another "solution" which Britain attempted to impose on the Irish people failed.



Soldiers of the Royal Anglian Regiment charge down William Street, Derry

7. Consequences of a British Withdrawal from Ireland

64 In Britain, following the collapse of Sunningdale, there was a rapid growth of interest in the demand for the immediate withdrawal of the British Army from Ireland. The Daily Mirror devoted the whole of its front page to an editorial arguing the case for withdrawal, and in the House of Commons a number of Labour M.P.'s began to press that point of view. Faced with this demand, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland time and again warned of the dire consequences of a British military withdrawal from Ireland. By the repeated threat of the "bloodbath" which would ensue, the Government was able to persuade many people who are opposed to internment and military repression in Ireland that on humanitarian grounds the British Army should remain in Ireland as a peacekeeping force.

65 The essence of this idea is that the Army is in Ireland to separate the Protestants and the Catholics and to prevent a massacre. It originates in the commonly held view that the Army was only sent into Ireland in 1969 to protect the

Catholic ghettos from Protestant mobs. This view is not supported, however, by the following passage from "A House Divided" by James Callaghan who as the Home Secretary ordered the troops into Ireland:

"When I got back to the Home Office I was informed that earlier in the afternoon Sir Harold Black, the Secretary to the Northern Ireland Cabinet, had telephoned to say that Anthony Peacocke, the Inspector-General, feared that the police would be unable to contain the Bogside for much longer and that if troops were not made available the police would be compelled to retreat from their position in front of the barricades to Victoria Police Station. They feared that the centre of the city would then be invaded by a riotous mob with the prospect of looting, arson, injury to persons and extensive damage to property. An hour and half later Black had telephoned again to say that the Inspector-General was at that moment formally asking for the assistance of troops, and that was the message I received in the air.

I therefore issued a statement in the following terms: 'The Government of Northern Ireland has informed the United Kingdom Government that as a result of the severe and prolonged rioting in Londonderry it has no alternative but to ask for the assistance of the troops at present stationed in Northern Ireland to prevent a breakdown of law and order.

'After three days and two nights of continuous duty the Royal Ulster Constabulary find it necessary to fall back on their police stations, thus exposing the citizens of Londonderry to the prospect of looting and a danger of life.

'The United Kingdom Government has received assessments of the situation from the Northern Ireland Government and the GOC Northern Ireland, and has agreed to this request in order to restore order in Londonderry with the greatest possible speed.'

66 It is clear, therefore, that the troops were not sent into Derry as a peacekeeping force. They were sent there in support of the Royal Ulster

Constabulary, a force which, in its brutal and unprovoked attacks on the Bogside, had once again showed its grossly sectarian bias, but which was now close to defeat. Had the rebellion in the Bogside continued after the arrival of the British Army, the Catholic population would have found themselves in immediate conflict with British troops. In fact the Army was given a cautious welcome by the people of the Catholic ghettos, precisely because its arrival signalled the defeat of the R.U.C. and the 'B' Specials.

67 The relationship between the British Army and the Catholic population deteriorated slowly through the following year, as the role of the troops in enforcing a sectarian "law and order" brought them into increasing conflict with the Catholic community. Nevertheless, in some areas local IRA leaders co-operated with the Army to ensure the policing of Catholic areas (see "Ulster" by the Sunday Times "Insight" team?). It was only when it became apparent that the Catholic ghettos were re-arming against the possibility of attacks by Protestant paramilitary groups, and under pressure from Unionist politicians that in July 1970 the Army

announced that it was at war with the IRA.

68 From this point on, British Army spokesmen no longer referred to the Army's role in Ireland as "peace-keeping". Army operations were described as "counter-insurgency", a strategy quite different from peace-keeping, as Brigadier Kitson⁸ has frequently pointed out. It became increasingly clear to those involved in the situation that the British Army was not a peacekeeping force. For more than one third of the population with Nationalist aspirations, the troops were a foreign army of occupation.

69 Since that time more than four years ago, the British Army has been at continual war with the Catholic community in the north of Ireland. Yet when Government ministers refer to the "bloodbath" which they foresee as a consequence of British withdrawal from Ireland, they have repeatedly made it clear that they are describing the possibility of an attempted pogrom by Protestants against the Catholic ghettos. The threat which they foresee comes from the Protestants, yet the British Army is prepared only to conduct a war

against the Catholics.

70 We accept that when Britain withdraws from Ireland, the hostility of the Protestant community towards the Catholics could lead to an attempted pogrom, particularly against isolated Catholic communities like those in east Belfast.⁹ There have been repeated attempts at anti-Catholic pogroms in Northern Ireland since the foundation of the state in 1920, and many Catholics have died as a result. These pogroms are a result of the sectarianism which is an inherent part of the Northern Ireland state. Without anti-Catholic sectarianism, the state could not have survived.

71 However, neither the British Government nor the Army are intent on eliminating the sectarian threat in the north of Ireland. This is because a decision to eliminate sectarianism would also be a decision to eliminate the Northern Ireland state. Rather, their strategy has been to stabilise the situation, while attempting to pursue solutions in the framework of the existing Northern Ireland state. Consequently, Army tactics have been to contain sectarianism at times, while conducting a relentless war against



Bloody Sunday — after the massacre, paratroopers round up demonstrators

the Catholic insurgency, which threatens all British solutions which do not question the existence of the Northern Ireland state.

72 It is for these reasons that, since 1969, the Army has never offered adequate protection to the Catholic ghettos. The sectarian murder campaign which Protestant paramilitary groups seem to be able to carry out at will, has cost the lives of over two hundred innocent Catholics. While the Army has only rarely conducted widespread follow-up operations in Loyalist areas after attempted pogroms — so that the aggressors have had guaranteed immunity on return to their own areas, in Catholic ghettos the Army has interned hundreds of men and women, and taken huge quantities of arms. These would evidently be vital in the event of armed attack by Protestant paramilitary groups. We believe that the purpose of this strategy is not to bring peace to the Catholics, but to make them rely on the British Army for protection, and therefore more amenable to Britain's solutions to the crisis.

73 In our view, warnings about the dire consequences of a British withdrawal are hypocritical, because they are made by a Government which is pursuing a policy that makes anti-Catholic sectarian violence a continuing possibility. It is simply the latest example of a number of such warnings which have been advanced to justify the intervention of the British Army in a colonial situation.

74 For example, at one time

it was claimed that India could not have self-government because a British withdrawal would leave the Hindus and the Moslems to massacre each other. When Britain eventually withdrew, centuries of "divide and rule" by the British, and the creation of a separate Moslem state in Pakistan did lead to violence. But few would now argue that the continuation of the British Raj would have been justified. The problem of Moslem-Hindu conflict in India today has been largely overcome, and the second Moslem President in the history of the state has just been elected.

75 As we have previously stated, we do not claim that there will be no sectarian violence in Ireland following the British withdrawal. It is our view, however, that the preconditions for the long-term disappearance of sectarian violence in Ireland can only be created by ending the British presence and by granting to the Irish people as a whole the right of self-determination. In our view, this would lead to the ending of the existence of the separate Northern Ireland state, which has fostered that sectarianism. When that happens, there will no longer be any material basis for bigotry, and as in India, sectarianism will slowly fade away.

76 As long as the British Government continue to seek solutions which maintain the existence of the Northern state, the conditions for sectarianism will remain, and the sectarian conflict will continue. There will also be no end to the war between the Catholic community and the British Army. As a result of these conflicts, thousands of families have been uprooted from their homes since 1969.¹⁰ More than one thousand people have been killed. That is the existing blood-bath which must be stopped. If the British Army remains in Ireland to ensure the continued exist-

ence of Northern Ireland, the bloodbath will continue.

77 There can be no British military solution in Ireland. The only lasting solution to the crisis is for the British Army to withdraw immediately from the whole island, so that responsibility for the organisation of government and the maintenance of peace in Ireland can be handed back to the Irish People, to whom it belongs.

7. Ulster (Penguin Books) 1972, Chapter 9.

8. Brigadier Frank Kitson, Commandant of the British Army School of Infantry, Warminster, Wiltshire. Author of Low Intensity Operations, 1971.

9. It is worth noting, however, that the Catholic ghettos in Belfast are no longer the defenceless areas which they were in 1969 when the Falls Road district had almost no weapons with which to defend itself against armed Protestant attacks. Moreover, the failure in five years of the British Army to defeat the IRA is taken seriously on the Loyalist side. This may well explain the absence of any Protestant attacks on Catholic ghettos during the Loyalist strike.

10. The Journal of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission of August 1973 reported that since 1969 60,000 people in Belfast had been forced to move from their homes through intimidation in "the largest enforced population movement in Europe since the second World War". Over 80 per cent of the people subjected to enforced moves were Catholics; during 1971 and 1972 well over 4,000 cases of intimidation were reported to the authorities, but only 12 people were convicted of offences in connection with them — a conviction rate of about a quarter of one per cent.



8. Towards a Lasting Solution

78 With the publication of the latest White Paper — "The Northern Ireland Constitution" — in July 1974, the British Government has once more embarked on a "solution" in the framework of Northern Ireland which will only guarantee the continuation of widespread conflict in Ireland.

79 The proposal is that a Constitutional Convention "based upon the constituencies and the methods of election prescribed by the Northern



Ireland Assembly Act 1973" will be elected, after which it will consider what provisions for the government of Northern Ireland "would be likely to command the most widespread acceptance throughout the community there." The White Paper continues:

"In the event of the Convention producing recommendations which

command majority and widespread support from its members, the Government will give the most serious consideration to them".

Along with most commentators, we believe that it is certain that the Convention will be dominated by a majority of Loyalist members opposed to any form of "power-sharing" — with either the SDLP or with Republicans who might be elected. It is unlikely, therefore, to produce recommendations which will in any way be acceptable to the Catholic population of the north of Ireland, nor even to the politicians of the SDLP.

80 We think that the task of the Convention is, in any case, an impossible one: it is the sectarianism, the presence of the British Army and the lack of democracy made inevitable by the very existence of Northern Ireland, to which the Catholic population is opposed. The Convention could not make proposals which would meet the aspirations of the majority of the people of Ireland. When, therefore the Convention makes its Majority Constitutional report, the Government will be faced with the choice of capitulating to Loyalism, or once again searching for a new solution.

81 There are already signs that the Government is turning towards the first possibility: in early September the Secretary of

State for Northern Ireland gave in to strong pressure from Loyalist politicians for the re-establishment of the 'B' Specials, when he announced the formation of a new Police Reserve.

82 Such steps are an inevitable result of the search for "solutions" in the framework of Northern Ireland. The UWC strike showed once again that the balance of power in Northern Ireland is such that Civil Rights cannot be guaranteed, and democracy cannot exist while Northern Ireland continues to survive.

83 Those who subscribe to the view that the consequences of dismantling the undemocratic Northern state and giving self-determination to the whole People of Ireland would be too grave, must accept that the consequence of this view is the permanent presence of British forces in Ireland. They must also accept that their search for solutions within Northern Ireland also logically requires the repression, internment and similar measures, in order that the Loyalists can be appeased, and peace and stability return. That is what is happening in the north of Ireland today.

84 The existence of the Northern Ireland state for more than fifty-four years has, in the eyes of many people, given it a certain legitimacy. The British Empire had the same air of legitimacy until its constituent



After over five years, the Irish war is taking its toll in demoralisation and desertions from the Army

nations began to seek their independence. In our view, all that is proved by these fifty-four years is that anti-democratic measures often work. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONTINUED USE OF SUCH MEASURES IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MAJORITY RULE BASED ON IRELAND AS A WHOLE — this is the only solution which can guarantee the right of the Irish people to National self-determination.

85 This will not mean, as some fear, that Ireland will become a prison state for the Protestant people of Ireland, as Northern Ireland is for the Catholics today. The deep division between Catholic and Protestant working class people has continued to exist, as we have explained, because of the material privileges which have been granted to the Protestant working class in order to maintain their allegiance to the Unionist Party and to maintain,

thereby, the otherwise precarious existence of Northern Ireland. A similar situation will not exist in Ireland as a whole, and the divisions between working class people will eventually heal when the root cause of the divisions has been removed.

86 The British Army is the main instrument which has been used by successive Governments, for generations, to deny the Irish people the right to self-determination. Its role in Ireland today is, as we have explained, counter-insurgency as in Kenya and Aden, not peace-keeping. Consequently, its presence in Ireland is the most fundamental obstacle to progress towards a permanent solution as we have outlined. We do not believe, therefore, that a partial withdrawal of troops, or their confinement to

barracks pending eventual withdrawal represent a real step on the path to that solution. THE FIRST STEP MUST BE THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMY FROM IRELAND.

87 To paraphrase the final paragraph of the White Paper: the Troops Out Movement believes that these proposals will give the Irish People as a whole the right to contribute directly, and in their own way, to the solution of their own problems. The need is for a united, equal, peaceful and democratic society. It can only be achieved by the People of Ireland, with their awareness of the realities of the situation. As long as the British Army remains in Ireland, there will be no permanent solution.



economic appendix

The Burden of the Union

The cost to the British taxpayer of maintaining the Union in purely financial terms is a large and growing figure. Estimates are difficult, because as well as the obvious figures like the financial subvention to the Northern Ireland government, the cost of the British presence in Ireland covers a vast field, including special grants, compensation and military research, for which no reliable figures are produced.

The Northern Ireland Office's Green Paper of September 1974 shows some of the direct financial flows between Britain and the Six Counties. The following figures are given for the financial subvention – the amount necessary to fill the gap between receipts from taxation in Northern Ireland, and public expenditure by the Northern Ireland government (figures are in millions of pounds).

1966–7	52m
1967–8	63m
1968–9	74m
1969–70	74m
1970–1	88m
1971–2	126m
1972–3	181m
1973–4	313m

In 1973–4, this subvention amounted to more than £200 per head of the Northern Ireland population: a large proportion of it goes as a subsidy to industry, and thus to increase profits for a small section of the population. The grant for building and machinery costs for example is 30% in the Six Counties, compared with a maximum of 22% in Britain. The subsidy is also unevenly distributed between the two communities, because of the sectarian nature of the state, so that a more than proportionate share would go to the Loyalist sections.

It is clear from the Green Paper that these subsidies are made necessary by the stagnation of the Northern Ireland economy. The staple industries of agriculture, textiles and shipbuilding have suffered a considerable and irreversible decline. Between 1950 and 1973, employment in agriculture fell from 101,000 (approximately 20% of total employment) to 55,000 (10% of total employment); that in textiles from 65,000 to 19,000; and in shipbuilding from 24,000 to 10,000. In the same period, employment in manufacturing, an important indicator of economic progress, fell by 40,000 – or from 38% of the workforce to 30%. This last set of figures contrasts markedly with the situation in the Twenty-Six Counties, where employment in manufacturing increased from 17% to 27.6% between 1946 and 1966, and has continued to rise even faster since the boom in Southern Irish industry reached its heights in the late sixties.

The decline in these industries has brought an unemployment rate in the Six Counties which is the worst in the EEC, and with it goes a worse housing situation than anywhere else in the United Kingdom, and lower wages. This

has contributed to the high and increasing emigration rate which has kept the size of the workforce virtually stagnant over the last twenty years.

In the context of this general decline, the continuing discrimination in employment is of major importance in determining living standards. In August 1974 unemployment in Larne and Newtownards (predominately Protestant areas) was 3.3% and 3.7% respectively: while in Newry and Strabane (overwhelmingly Catholic areas) the rates were 15.5% and 17.7%.

The Development Programme of 1970–5 has, according to the Green Paper the prime task of increasing the number of jobs. Up to March 1974, £190m was paid to manufacturers in Northern Ireland by the Northern Ireland government: of this, £34m went to Harland and Wolff's, in addition to £30 million paid direct by the British government over the same period. Harland and Wolff's in common with the majority of large employers in Northern Ireland, maintains a rigidly sectarian employment policy.

The subsidies from Britain thus play an integral part in maintaining the Protestant Ascendancy, especially in jobs and housing.

On the other side, there is an outflow from Northern Ireland to Britain in the form of profits – only 22% of large-scale industry is owned by local people, while approximately 50% is British owned. No reliable statistics exist for the outflow of profits, but net profit on Northern Ireland industry was about £75 million in 1973–4, of which a large proportion was paid to

British shareholders.

But, whereas the subsidies are paid for by every British taxpayer, and are compulsory, the profit to which these subsidies contribute go into the pockets of the less than 5% of British people who own shares.

The other main financial burden of the British presence in Ireland is the cost of the Army. The Green Paper estimates "the cost of the Army's operations in Northern Ireland" as £33 million in 1973–4.

However, this is only the tip of a very large and very secret iceberg. The £33 million includes the direct costs of the army in Ireland – wages, cost of equipment, etc. It does not cover the cost of training and recruiting the army, or of medical care in Britain, or of compensation to soldiers or their families for injury or death. It does not include the massive cost of the secret service (reliably estimated at £100 million), the cost of research into new weapons and techniques of repression, or the subsidies paid to firms which produce them.

The official figures thus conceal a massive cost to the British tax-payer which some authoritative estimates have put as proportionately higher than that paid by the U.S. population at the height of the Vietnam war. This props up the sectarian state of Northern Ireland, enabling a continuing flow of profits to a small section of the British population, and allows the continued experimentation in repression techniques which might be used against the British working class.




Troops Out Movement

The war continues. It is five years now since Harold Wilson and the Labour Government first sent extensive reinforcements of British troops to the North of Ireland to join the garrisons which already existed there. We were informed then and many, many times since that the crisis would soon be over and that the 'Irish Problem' would at last be solved. Instead the conflict continues, with the death toll well over 1,000 and still no solution in sight.

For the army this situation is nothing new; since 1945 British soldiers have been involved in many campaigns like the present one in Ireland, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden are examples which spring readily to mind, where the British Government used the troops to try to suppress freedom movements of the peoples of British Colonies who wanted to secure the basic democratic right of ruling their countries by themselves. In all these cases, the troops were withdrawn in the end, usually leaving the people whom the army had directly opposed as the new Government of those countries.

In Ireland the Army, in futile attempts to achieve the impossible objectives they have been set, have used increasingly desperate tactics: mass arrests followed by concentration camps and the use of brutal interrogation techniques, the use of 'Special' units like the Military Reaction Force and the secret and sinister men of the SAS, even the use of special criminal agents like the Littlejohns. All these solutions have failed. Britain cannot solve the problems that exist in Ireland, only the Irish people can do that, so let us leave them in peace to do just that.

We call on the broad Labour Movement in Britain to mobilise to force the Labour Party to break from its bi-partisan role on Ireland with the Tories. Labour can solve the 'Irish Problem', but only by withdrawing British troops and allowing the Irish people to settle their own affairs.



For information, activities and speakers contact: T.O.M., 103 Hammersmith Road, West Kensington, London W.14.

Daily Mirror

EUROPE'S BIGGEST DAILY SALE
June 3, 1974

Britain must now face the most sombre option of all — to pull out the troops and abandon sovereignty

S.A.S. PERSONNEL ARE SECRETLY IN NORTH

Pressure growing to bring troops home from Ulster, minister says

Pressure is growing in Britain to pull out of Northern Ireland, Secretary of State says



Torture men get £50,000

AWARDS: installing over £50,000 were the High Court in Belfast to pay out the 12 hundred more referred to in the report

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Others have been killed in the province as an indirect activities, yet none is included in official death toll

Suicides in Ulster who died by accident

Anti-Army campaign condemned by minister

Training of British troops starts

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THE GUARDIAN

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Evening Standard

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Ulster: Back-bencher makes a startling claim

HALF LABOUR MPs 'WANT TO PULL OUT'

By ARTHUR HAWKEY
A STARTLING claim that nearly



IAN DAVIES, a Member of Parliament, agrees with the claim