Housing: What the Ministry Is Doing

Dublin: After The Bombs

The UK and Europe: Facts and Figures of Renegotiation

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Where do we go from here?



Calvin Macnee



Decline and Fall

When I first wrote this there was no guarantee that these words would go any further than the editor's desk. But even if they come a little late, something should be down on record about how Northern Ireland talked itself into its biggest crisis yet. First of all, Harold Wilson played no small part by seizing upon some doodle of an IRA doomsday plan and presenting it to all and sundry as the genuine article. A load of unadulterated — — — s, was the general opinion at the Stormont Press conference, but sub-editors in London who had probably never set foot in Ulster had made up their minds, and their headlines screamed out the enormity of it all. Meanwhile, down in Dublin, the lesser spectacled Merlyn was apparently tying up the loose ends of the Sunningdale agreement with the Dublin Government, and preparing the way for a joint declaration on extra-territorial courts. In this sort of atmosphere, the last thing the Assembly should have wanted would have been a straight vote on the Sunningdale package, but this is what they did, with results you all know about.

David Bleakley, with 15 years experience of battling against the Stormont tide, saw the way things were going, and offered the get-out of an amendment which accepted that until the South amended its constitution, a strong council was a non-starter. But although he got a good hearing, and lots of plaudits in the tearoom afterwards, the Speaker didn't put it to a vote, and the Executive's pro-Sunningdale amendment was passed. A lot of New Unionists could see the point of avoiding a straight split, and even one SDLP Executive man was with them, but in the end the sticklers for convention won the day, temporarily. They fondly imagined that a "yes" vote in the Assembly would swing opinion outside, instead of facing the reality that the Sunningdale-style Council of Ireland was a dying duck, which no kiss of life from Stormont could resurrect. Too late, too late, the Faulknerites were telling their supporters that this was the case, but by that time the strike was on, superficially over an issue which was no longer in dispute.

Up to the weekend following Tuesday's vote, there was a chance of obtaining a truce, before too much damage was done. But Merlyn is too new on the scene and too hung up on English socialist preconceptions to know how to string Ulstermen along, alternatively buttering them up and cutting them down, in Willie Whitelaw's inimitable manner. Maybe they wouldn't have responded; maybe they wanted confrontation just as much as some members of the Stormont Castle did. But we'll never know what a couple of bottles of Scotch might have achieved in the strike's first youth, for Merlyn's invitations to come up and see him were usually accompanied by pre-conditions which said you're wasting your time and mine. While he remained on his high horse, odious comparisons were being made with Labour's reactions to the miners' strike and his own parleys with O'Connell and Co. in Dublin. Closer to home, it isn't a million years since a declaration of war by the UDA against the Army in East Belfast was snuffed out in a matter of hours by a fast bit of footwork by Roy Bradford and a lightning visit by the UDA command to Stormont Castle. Perhaps it's easier for the landed gent to get the peasantry eating out of his hand, but there are officials at Stormont who long for the limp slap of a Tory government in the Northern Ireland Office, rather than stiff-necked socialist imperialism.

In such a weird situation, with the British Government defending an agreement drawn up by their predecessors and quietly abandoned by all but the more starry-eyed SDLP Assemblymen, it was obvious that Roy Bradford would soon cut and run. No one can make a better case for pursuing any given line of policy, and no one can ditch it quicker, when it runs out of popular support. In this case, he simply voiced what most of the thinking members of the new Unionist party were already muttering into their gin and tonics, that the best that could be salvaged from Sunningdale was power-sharing and a Council of Ministers, while the tricky bits would have to await an Assembly election. Meanwhile, he wasn't averse to actually talking to the Workers' Council, from the point of view that even if they weren't democratically elected, they were still costing the country £3m a day.

It should have convulsed the party, at a time when Brian was putting up a "no surrender" show with Merlyn and Rees, but of course it didn't. No one in the New Unionists says much, apart from the McLachlan, but they were glad that someone had had the guts to put a contrary point of view, which coincided more and more with the opinions of their dwindling band of supporters.

Not before time, the British may be wondering what kind of a friend they have in Brian, and what benefit there is to be had in propping him up ad infinitum. The sdlp are already wondering, but until last Monday at least, they regarded him as their best hope of retaining the strongest possible Council of Ireland. As the scales fell, and they realised that no Unionist—not even Brian—can deliver them a meaningful Council, they may begin to reconsider their position. They, too, have a veto up their sleeves, by threatening to withdraw, but they know it has been seriously devalued by the Loyalist one, and few believe that they are nearly ready to play it.

The political manoeuvring by then had reached a breakneck pace, simply to keep the Executive from its natural inclination to fall apart, but it was becoming daily more clear that it fooled no one and was getting nowhere. Whether the strikers won or lost, they had won their point, that the Executive did not have sufficient consensus to govern effectively. When your Minister of Commerce, Manpower Services and Community Relations find it impossible to comment on a general strike, in case they would make it worse, something is rotten in the State. Only fresh elections in the autumn have a chance of putting right, by introducing an injection of harsh political reality. By that time, the New Unionists would be fighting on a totally different platform, with only a skeleton of the old Sunningdale remaining, because of Dublin's inability to deliver either (a) extradition or (b) constitutional change. Who knows, under a new leader, and a new policy, some of the splits in Unionism could be patched over, for a time at least. And if that prospect doesn't excite, think of the other one, of a strong Loyalist coalition, undiluted by any liberals, trying to hammer out a formula for living together with the SDLP.

TOWARDS AN AUTONOMOUS ULSTER

The strike has not changed anything very much in Ulster. But it has made a number of things a good deal clearer. The first is that no relatively painless solution to the Northern Ireland problem can be found by playing on the Irish dimension. Ulstermen, which for this purpose means Protestant Ulstermen, are not Irish in the same sense as other (Catholic) Ulstermen. Attempts to make them so by political and economic pressures are more likely to have the effect of making them feel even less Irish. For a long time the Ulster Protestants asserted their unIrishness by saying loudly to themselves and the world at large that they were British. Now that is clearly no longer the case they are falling back on the assertion of a kind of Ulster nationalism.

The implication of this is that they should be permitted to rule themselves. The danger is that they will seek to revert to a one party state in which justice and participation is continually denied to the Catholic minority. But this need not be so. The British government still wields enough influence, if only through the purse strings, to assist in the creation of a new constitution in which the rights of the minority are fairly guaranteed through entrenched constitutional provisions, proportional representation and a Bill of Rights on the American rather than the British model. There are also strong arguments against attempting to build in a formal requirement of intercommunal power-sharing, as opposed to dynamic power-sharing in a coalition situation. This new constitution should be battled out in a constituent assembly in the autumn, when everyone has had time to cool off a little.

The alternative is for the British Government to opt for 'unilateral' withdrawal. The effects of this, as explained at greater length in the next two pages, are likely to be unpleasant for everyone, even if it did not lead to a civil war. It would also be an example to the Scots and the Welsh which the British Government may not wish to encourage. A better prospect for everyone in London, Dublin and Belfast, is to pursue the goal of setting up an autonomous British Ulster within the EEC, and gradually transferring the burden of social and economic subsidisation to the wider forum of the European common market.

Politics

MR WHITELAW'S PACKAGE

Before the Civil Rights campaign Northern Ireland was, like many other countries, an unjust but relatively stable state. The injustice was of a sectarian rather than a class nature, but for a long period it was mutually acceptable to both sides. Catholics preferred to keep themselves apart, even at the cost of fewer opportunities and less prosperity. As a result of their abstention the Unionists built a state which could continue to operate, both politically and economically, without them. The civil rights campaign was in effect a demand by the Catholics to be admitted to that state on equal terms, both politically and economically. When it was rejected, the campaign naturally turned to violence and terrorism. This development was aided and abetted by a number of serious tactical and strategic blunders by the security forces, both the RUC and the British Army, culminating in the disastrous internment operation and the Bloody Sunday shootings.

It was only at this point that the British Government really decided to take an active hand in promoting a new Ulster settlement. Until then the policy had been to play along with the Unionists, putting pressure for reforms wherever and whenever possible. Mr Heath and Mr Whitelaw, however, were determined to look for a new kind of stability in which the Irish aspirations of the Catholic minority were explicitly recognised. The Unionists were informed, not explicitly but the message was very clearly expressed between the lines, that they must accept an Irish dimension if they wished to remain British. There were two elements in this: first they must share power with the representatives of the Catholic community, and secondly they must accept a new set of institutions for co-operation with the Republic which could in time develop into a kind of Irish federalism or even unity. Initially the British probably hoped that Catholic representation could be ensured through a pro-British Alliance type party rather than an explicitly pro-Republican party, but what was seen by the minority as a promise by the British of progress towards Irish unity by consent if they repudiated the IRA ensured a massive vote for the SDLP, whose commitment to an all-Ireland solution became more and more confident as the London/Dublin accord grew in strength. The peculiar nature of the guarantee of continued membership of the United Kingdom as long as the majority wanted it, which was continually and loudly proclaimed as part of the package, was made even clearer by the obstinate refusal of the British Government, Tory and Labour alike, to contemplate either an increase in Ulster MPs at Westminster or any form of total integration of Ulster within the UK.

WHY IT FAILED

This package was not doomed to failure. It was enthusiastically adopted by many liberal Unionists, not least the Alliance Party and Roy Bradford, both of whom for a time nailed their colours to the Irish dimension. But the combined efforts of the SDLP and the Cosgrave Administration to press home their unaccustomed accord with the British Government turned the Irish dimension into something much stronger and, for the Protestant community, something to be avoided at all costs. The Sunningdale agreement was proclaimed both in the Republic

and by the SDLP as the means by which the ultimate dream of Irish unity would be peacefully achieved. And to make the point quite clear the Cosgrave government refused to make any concessions on their constitutional claim to jurisdiction over the North or, which amounted to the same thing, to agree to the extradition of terrorists—a matter which to Northern Protestants had become a symbol of the reality of Dublin's claim to have recognised the existence of the North. Firm and decisive action in Dublin by way of a constitutional referendum and an agreement to extradite terrorists might just have saved Mr. Faulkner's Executive. But Dublin, like London, reckoned that if they stood firm they could win the jackpot.

The second major reason for the failure of the package was the inability of the Faulkner/Fitt Executive to establish and exert their authority in the North. Instead of showing themselves to be a vigorous and reforming government, they spent the first months of their administration in continuous manoeuvring and debate on the implementation of the Sunningdale package. The business of administration went on much as usual—it has long been recognised that Northern Ireland can be as effectively governed on a parity basis by civil servants as by politicians—but from the point of view of the working class voter, whether Catholic or Protestant, it was clear that there were to be no substantial changes from the old regime. The only institution which promised a transfer of effective decision making to local groups, the Community Relations Commission, was to be scrapped and there was no sign of any substantial change in government attitudes to housing and redevelopment. In simple terms the new style Assembly offered no more to the vast majority of working class voters, who are the vast majority of voters, than the old Stormont system. When they got the unexpected chance in the February general election, and later in the UWC strike to overturn it, they were happy to accept it.

Finally there was the mishandling of the strike, when it eventually came. Instead of recognising it for what it was—the expression of the ultimate rejection of the basis of the Sunningdale package as a whole—the new Labour government and the Executive alike sought first to ignore it and then to suppress it by force. The Executive might possibly have been saved if the ditching of the Council of Ireland which was finally forced on the SDLP had been used as a bargaining counter with the Ulster Workers Council. Instead it was produced, like Mr Heath's new deal for the miners, as if the strike had never been heard of. Faced with a complete refusal to negotiate, the demands of the UWC were gradually increased and when it became clear that the Army was both reluctant and probably unable to run essential services, the return to direct rule was inevitable. In all this there were of course elements of bigotry and reaction to the continuing IRA campaign, but the major factor was the brute fact that the power-sharers had ceased to command the general support of the community. It is a nice irony that this precise condition had been written in to the 1973 Constitution Act to protect the principle of power-sharing.

THE IMPLICATIONS

The most important lesson in all this is that there can be no peaceful settlement of the Northern Ireland problem without the active, or at least passive consent of the Protestant majority. It is incredible that this simple fact was lost sight of in the skilful manoeuvring surrounding the Whitelaw constitution and the Sunningdale agreement. The state can just be run without the assent of the Catholic community, though at a heavy cost in justice and violence. Without the consent of the Protestant working class it can only grind to a halt. The fact that this is not in the best economic interests of anyone is neither here nor there. Democracy is not just a matter of occasional voting exercises. It also means consent by the people as a whole to the policies which are being pursued by the government.

On the other hand the past five years of strife have shown equally forcefully the need for consent on the part of the Catholic community as well, if Northern Ireland is to have any kind of peace and stability. The Catholic community cannot bring the economic life of the country to a halt. If they could have done so the SDLP would have had no more hesitation than the UWC in organising the operation at the time of internment. But they can make life unpleasant for everyone by affording that measure of support to the IRA which allows them to continue their operations.

Putting these two requirements together it is clear that a peaceful and stable constitution requires the assent of both communities. One way which this could be encouraged is by requiring a positive vote by referendum for any new arrangement which may emerge from the current round of talks. The use of referendums for constitutional matters is not just a political manoeuvre; it is also a means of conferring some measure of legitimacy on the new scheme. In Northern Ireland a vote of at least 75% would be needed to achieve this.

THE OPTIONS

Whether popular consent of this degree can be achieved for any of the options currently being considered is another matter. The consensus appears to be that there are five broad lines of action open:

(i) total integration with Britain;
(ii) a fairly rapid withdrawal of British troops to meet the wishes of the British electorate, leaving the locals to sort themselves out;
(iii) a repartition settlement;
(iv) a new power-sharing settlement within Northern Ireland without the disruptive Irish dimension; and
(v) British declaration of support for Irish unification.

The first and last of these options are best ruled out immediately, since neither would meet the essential requirement of consent, either in Britain for total integration or in Ulster for reunification. The effect of a British declaration for Irish unification would in effect be similar to a policy of complete withdrawal, given that the British are not in a position to put any such declaration into effect. The practical choice for Britain is thus between a phased 'unilateral' withdrawal regardless of progress towards a political settlement, and a commitment to maintain the troops in Ulster until such a settlement is agreed and implemented.

1. A 'unilateral' British withdrawal

The effects of pulling out the British Army and leaving the situation more or less as it is now cannot be accurately predicted. But it seems likely that there would be a serious escalation of violence while the two hard line factions sought to establish military superiority. The mass of the existing forces of law and order would be likely to side with the Protestant cause, with a rapid recruitment of a semi-official militia dedicated to stamping out all forms of militant republicanism. On the other side the IRA would regain much of its lost support as defenders of the Catholic enclaves. Neither of these groups would be in a position to win an immediate victory, unless as seems highly unlikely the Catholic minority were completely deserted by their Southern colleagues.

We apologise to our readers for the delay in publication of this issue, due to circumstances beyond our control.

2. Repartition

The longer term result of such a conflict would almost inevitably be a redrawing of the boundaries of the Protestant and Catholic states of Ireland, with a mass exodus of Catholics from Belfast towards Derry, Newry and the South and a less abrupt process of population movement in the rural counties until some kind of stability was reached. If the British intention is to pull out unilaterally, therefore, it would be kinder to all concerned to embark now on a process of relatively orderly population movement and resettlement, having first indicated the broad lines of the new boundaries which would be adopted. This is not an attractive policy, and is not one which would gain Britain any support in Ireland or much in the world at large. But it would at least be preferable to a unilateral withdrawal which left an unresolved power-strugggle to be fought out in the streets of Belfast. Nor would it solve the problem of the future of a truncated Protestant Ulster. Would such a state be permitted to remain in the United Kingdom, or be pushed out to fend for itself as a permanent memorial to the failure of British diplomacy in Ireland. It would also serve as an uncomfortable example of the Scots and the Welsh of what can be achieved by a determined working class.

3. Another attempt at power-sharing

This leaves only the remaining option of trying again to reach a settlement which leaves the state of Northern Ireland roughly as it is in physical terms and which seeks some measure of stability by seeking consent from the Catholic community. The policy of imposed power-sharing—under the benevolent eye of an all-powerful Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—has not itself been totally discredited, and might be put together again by a man of greater stature than Merlyn Rees or Stan Orme. William Whitelaw, or Jim Callaghan, or even Henry Kissinger might manage to bring together a new Executive within the existing Constitution Act, but the process would be hampered by the emotional objections to the Whitelaw package which the Loyalists have stirred up over the past few months. A completely fresh start following an autumn election, as the Loyalists have suggested, seems more likely to produce a satisfactory long term result.

TOWARDS AN AUTONOMOUS ULSTER

The basis of this suggestion is that following a brief period of a few months in which passions might be encouraged to subside a little, a new set of Assembly elections be held, on the existing PR voting system, to elect a new set of representatives who would then meet in a constituent assembly with a view to drawing up a new constitution for an autonomous Ulster. This draft constitution would be drawn up under a neutral (probably British) chairman, and then presented to the people for ratification, by whatever special majority—two thirds or three-quarters—was written into the draft. Then once the constitution had been settled the business of normal government could be resumed.

The term 'autonomous' for the new Ulster has been carefully chosen to reflect the spirit of Ulster nationalism which has been engendered both by the strike and the British reaction to it. It falls short of independence, but promises a greater degree of freedom of action than is envisaged for Scotland or Wales, and might mean the ending of Ulster representation at Westminster. Ulster on these terms would still be British, but only in the sense that Malta or Gibraltar or the Channel Isles are British. The ties of history and sentiment and loyalty to the Crown, such as they are, would remain but the relationship between Britain and Ulster would be one of direct negotiation rather than devolution under which the ultimate responsibility remained at Westminster.

Whether such an autonomous Ulster could survive and prosper, of course, would be dependent on satisfactory answers being found to the short term security problem, the position of the Catholic minority, and the financing of the new statelet. The first of these is perhaps the least problematical, since the British involvement in the whole operation would necessarily imply a degree of continuing Army presence until stability was attained, though with a phased handing over of control to local security forces. The other two will require more detailed negotiation.

1. The position of the minority

Continued insistence by the representatives of the minority on progress towards unification would rule out any chance of success for a new Ulster state without substantial movement of population. This is the real meaning of the slogan 'no power-sharing with republicans'. It does not follow that some accord on methods of involving the minority in government cannot be reached. The initial temptation in matters of this kind is to write a degree of formal power-sharing into the constitution as in the 1973 Act. The objection to this is that it has not worked—either here, to date, or in other countries like Cyprus. The aim should rather be to draft a constitution which leads to power sharing by its own internal dynamic. The first requisite for this is a guarantee of proportional representation, linked to entrenched articles in the constitution which cannot be altered without a two-thirds or three-quarters majority. In the Ulster situation, where the Protestant vote has rarely been solid except in times of 'national' emergency, this should ensure periods in office on a coalition basis to any progressive Catholic party. Whether this will be enough for the SDLP remains to be seen. Initially it might be possible to reach tacit agreement on a 'constitutional convention' which would ensure full Catholic participation on all official bodies, and at least an initial period in a coalition government. Holland, Belgium and Switzerland have all developed along these lines, from similar conditions of national and religious strife.

The second essential element would be agreement on an entrenched Bill of Rights, which would cover not only normal but also emergency conditions. It seems likely with almost equal distaste on either side for internment that agreement could be reached on this without too much difficulty.

2. Finance

The second major problem will be the economics of an autonomous Ulster. At present Northern Ireland is in receipt of some £250m-£300m a year from Britain, omitting the special costs of the present emergency and of compensation. Clearly is this were cut off immediately, the results could be as disruptive as a sudden withdrawal of the British troops. But a phased programme could be drawn up which might meet all the requirements. Even such enthusiastic supporters of the British subsidy as Professor Gibson of the New University have admitted that given a period of five or ten years the Ulster economy could be made self-sufficient, though doubtless at a lower level of prosperity than the rest of the UK. If an example is required, the speed with which the Republic has achieved parity or near parity with Northern Ireland is as good as any. The close tie with British economic policy may in fact on occasions have operated against the interest of Ulster. The continuation of the British subsidy over a period of years might also be used as a kind of sanction against any breaches of the terms of the new settlement by the majority at the expense of the minority.

THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

In addition it may be assumed that an autonomous Ulster would remain a member of the EEC along with Britain and Ireland. In the longer term this could mean that the present

British support for Ulster agriculture and industry could be replaced by a degree of EEC support through the regional and social funds and whatever new form of Common Agricultural Policy is worked out. The sums which Ulster could expect from Brussels would not be of the same order as Northern Ireland now receives from Britain—perhaps a maximum net profit of £50m a year on the assumption of a substantial regional fund. But the transfer of support for outlying regions from national to EEC sources is an integral part of the whole European philosophy. Explicit guarantees of this kind could serve to sugar the pill of progressive British disengagement, It could also serve to encourage greater co-operation between North and South in Ireland in pursuit of the same economic advantages. Good relations in Ireland are more likely to arise out of genuine common interests than any kind of forced integration.

EEC FINANCES

This week Mr. Callaghan puts forward his terms for renegotiation of the terms for British entry to the EEC. This Fortnight analysis of the complex system of EEC financing shows clearly the issues at stake, and how the Eurocrats may conspire with Callaghan to produce an apparent 'victory' for Britain.

It is surprising, given that renegotiation of the terms of entry to the EEC is a live political issue, how little is known about the finances of the community. Even those who should know—European correspondents and specialists—appear to be baffled by the complexities of the system and take refuge in broad generalisations. For some it is obvious that Britain is paying far too much under the terms negotiated by Mr Heath. For others the existing and likely future benefits which Britain may get through the social and regional funds are well worth the price.

The net result is that the 'great debate' on renegotiation is likely to be as much a flop as the great debate on entry, with a good deal of slogan-mongering and little hard argument. Paradoxically this may suit Mr Callaghan and the Eurocrats in Brussels. The lack of public understanding may well permit Callaghan to go into the secrecy of the late night negotiations and emerge triumphant with a 'splendid package' which no-one will understand sufficiently well to assess effectively. From the point of view of the Eurocrats there is no harm in giving Britain the appearance of a victory, since there are a number of factors which make renegotiation unavoidable in any event, notably the massive changes in world food prices since the original terms were agreed in 1971. Many of these factors are already operating in Britain's favour, so that Mr Callaghan could probably produce a 'victory' without adopting anything resembling a hard line.



An estimate of the national profits and losses within the EEC—1973

THE EEC BUDGET

The basis of EEC finances, as everyone knows, is the common agricultural policy. But few are aware quite how much this policy dominates the community budget. The latest figures (December 1973) for the community's income and expenditure for 1973 are set out in Table 1. This shows that the CAP accounted for four-fifths (81%) of the total expenditure of 5.134m units (£2,140m approx). Almost all of this (74%) was for price guarantees on farm products. The next largest item, 350m units of account or 7% of the total spending, is the CAP Guidance Fund for the implementation of what is generally known as the Mansholt Plan for the early retirement and retraining of 'uneconomic' farmers. For the rest some 534m units of account go on administration, including a refund of 260m units to member countries for the cost of collecting EEC levies, leaving only 283m (5%) for the social fund and 111m (2%) for foreign food aid. Even the projected regional fund of 500m units, which has not yet been agreed, would only have added one-tenth to the total budget, a relatively small sum compared with the CAP.

WHERE THE MONEY COMES FROM

The revenue side of the account is on the surface equally simple, but conceals even greater complexities. Roughly half (49%) of the EEC income for 1973 was from direct contributions made by the member states, with the other half (51%) coming from the Community's 'own resources', as shown in the table. The direct contributions are levied on members in accordance with an agreed scale worked out on a complex formula taking into account various population and economic factors. The 'own resources' are made up from the various levies and customs duties imposed by the Commission and collected on its behalf by member states. It is for the cost of this collection that the 10% refund included in the administrative spending is made. In future years the Commission hopes to make itself increasingly independent by relying more and more on its own resources and

less and less on direct contributions. The arrangements in the Treaty of Accession for Britain, Denmark and Ireland have to be fitted into this framework, but in reality cut right across it. The percentage figure for the British contribution on the standard criteria came out at 19%, but it was agreed to cushion the burden on the British exchequer by reducing the initial contribution for 1973 to just over 8%, rising in easy stages to the full 19% in 1977. The figure for Ireland is a mere 0.27% rising to 0.6%. But the Treaty also provided for the gradual transfer to self-sufficiency for the Commission by means of a European VAT levy in addition to the existing customs and agricultural levies. It has been estimated that this will result in the actual British proportional contribution to the budget rising even beyond the 19% level, perhaps to a maximum of 26% by 1980. (The rate of increase after 1977 is also controlled by a complex formula in the Treaty of Accession.) The reason for this likely additional increase is the fact that the British economy is more dependent on imports than those of other members, so that Britain will pay a much higher proportion of customs duties. In addition the nature of VAT as a tax on **non-public** expenditure is likely to hit Britain harder than France and Germany, since in Britain the proportion of GNP attributable to public expenditure is relatively lower.

The practical effect of these structural differences between the British Isles and other European economies can be seen in the fact that even now the whole of the British and Irish contribution to EEC finances for 1973 is in the form of customs duties, with no direct contribution at all (for figures see Table II below). On the other hand the floating downwards of sterling against other European currencies has the effect of reducing the relative British and Irish contributions since the Treaty of Accession fixed the rate of exchange at 2.4 units of account to the £1. This means that each pound actually paid over to the Commission buys more units of account that it would on the open market, and conversely each German Deutschmark contributed buys rather less.

TABLE I. COMMUNITY INCOME AND EXPENDITURE FOR 1973

Income		Millions of units	Expenditure		Millions of units
Members contributions	2,486	48.4%	**Administrative costs**		
			European Parliament	26	0.5%
			Council of Ministers	34	0.7%
Own resorces			European Court	7	0.1%
(levies, etc.)	2,605	50.7%	Commission	257	5.0%
			Refunds to members		
Other	43	0.8%	for administration	260	5.1%
			Sub total	584	11.4%
			Spending programmes		
			Agricultural price guarantees	3,807	74.2%
			Agricultural guidance (Mansholt Plan)	350	6.8%
			Social Fund	283	5.5%
			Foreign Food Aid	111	2.1%
			Sub total	4,551	88.6%
	5,134	100%	**Total**	5,134	100%

TABLE II.

National contributions and receipts to and from the EEC budget in 1973 in millions of units of account

	Contributions			Receipts			
	Direct contributions	Customs	CAP levies	Social fund	Farm guidance (1972)	CAP price support	Refund of costs on levies
	m	m	m	m	m	m	m
Northern Ireland	202	137	38	9	(12)	?	17
France	799	307	90	44	(33)	?	46
Germany	711	615	157	55	(42)	?	77
Holland	136	170	182	9	(11)	?	35
Italy	608	226	146	60	(50)	?	37
Luxembourg	6	3	—	—	(1)	?	—
Denmark	25	30		5	—	?	3
Ireland	—	14		10	—	?	1
U.K.	—	431		57	—	(154)	43
	2,486	2,604		247	(149)	3,807	260

THE SHARE-OUT

A clear assessment of the relative advantages of membership for each country is difficult to make since the EEC budget reports are not prepared with the object of making such invidious comparisons. Quite apart from the fact that many of the spending programmes are operating a number of years in arrears—there are as yet no firm figures for 1973 for the farm guidance fund—no country by country breakdown is produced for the most important fund of all, the CAP price guarantee system. By studying the official reports it is possible to find out how much was budgeted for and actually spent on milk or butter or beef by way of price, support and interventions. It is not possible to find out in what country the money was spent, and thus to calculate the net advantage to various members. The necessary figures are available in each member country's own exchequer, but the EEC Commission keeps a very tight veil of secrecy on the overall position which only the Commission has ready access to.

Some general picture of the likely outcome of the 1973 year of account, however, may be constructed. National breakdowns for 1973 are available for the Social Fund and the refund of the cost of collecting EEC levies, and for 1972 for the farm guidance fund. These are set out in the following table, along with the latest estimates for the direct contributions and levies paid in by each member.

In themselves these figures will not mean much to the average reader. But if they are reduced to percentages, some rough guide to national profits and losses can be given. The contribution system is in fact based on a simple percentage allocation between the countries, so that an increase in levies and customs dues results in a corresponding decrease in the direct contribution. This explains the absence of any direct contribution from both Ireland and the U.K. To see whether a particular country is actually gaining on a particular fund it is thus necessary only to see whether its percentage of receipts is greater than its percentage contribution. The available figures for 1973 are given in Table III, along with the latest 'best estimate' from one Community source of the overall net gains and losses in £m.

Even if these figures are not wholly accurate—most experts agree that there are in fact no fully accurate answers to such questions—they do reveal some important broad tendencies. The first and most important is the large net benefit which the 'agricultural' countries of France, Holland, Denmark and Ireland obtain from the Common Agricultural Policy. Ireland stands to gain some £30m for 1973. This bears out the general feeling on this matter, but it should be noted that the rapid increases in world food prices are having a disruptive effect on the established pattern. Most of the funds for the CAP are now coming from levies on cereal and sugar exports, rather than from duties on food imports, since European intervention and support prices are now often lower than world market prices. This will clearly reduce the relative net benefit of the four 'agricultural' countries, and the corresponding balance against Britain and Germany. First figures for 1974, showing a net overall loss to Britain of only £9m for the January-March quarter, suggest that this may have a substantial effect in the long run. The table also shows that in respect of the other less substantial EEC spending programmes Britain and Ireland do relatively better. The same would apply to the proposed regional fund. Initially at least Britain and Ireland would do rather well out of this, since their contributions will not rise to their full level until 1980 or so, and since they could expect to obtain at least a 20% and 5% share of regional fund expenditure respectively. But as long as the CAP price guarantee fund dominates EEC finances to the extent which it now does, the overall effect of the social and regional funds is likely to be minimal, and as far as Britain is concerned the position will deteriorate as her percentage contribution increases up to 1980. Some observers feel that by the time Britain would be a net loser even on the regional fund, since she would be unlikely to obtain as much from it as the 25% which she should then be contributing to EEC finances.

A further complexity which has not been taken into account of in the above tables is the effect of the changes in relative exchange rates, explained above, and the fact that the administrative expenditure of the Commission itself can be regarded as a net gain to the 'host' countries of Belgium and Luxembourg. Since the vast majority of the administration is centred in Brussels and all salaries are paid in Belgian currency, amounting in all to some £100m, it is clear that Belgium should be regarded as a net gainer rather than a net contributor. And the downward float of sterling has the effect of reducing the cost of paying the British and Irish contributions compared for instance with the German contribution.

TABLE III.

Proportional contributions and receipts of individual member states on individual funds, and an estimate of overall net gains and losses for 1973 (£m)

	Contribution	Social Fund	Farm Guidance (1972)	Overall
Belgium	7.3%	4%	(8%)	—£35m
France	24.5%	18%	(22%)	+£90m
Germany	29.1%	22%	(28%)	—£180m
Italy	19.3%	24%	(34%)	—£20m
Luxembourg	0.2%	—	(1%)	—£2m
Holland	9.4%	4%	(7%)	+£80m
Denmark	1.1%	2%	—	+£110m
Ireland	0.3%	4%	—	+£30m
U. Kingdom	8.8%	23%	—	—£74m

HOW MUCH DOES BRITAIN REALLY PAY?

It will already be clear that the complexities of the system make it almost impossible even for the experts at the Commission to give a clear answer to the kind of question which ordinary people would like to ask. To make matters worse it is against EEC policy to make any direct estimate or calculation of the net benefits or losses for individual member states. The EEC Commission office in London has already been reprimanded for issuing press releases purporting to show the net British position for 1973.

Some indication of the scale of the British contribution, however, can be given by comparing the EEC budget with the internal British budget. Using the official exchange rate of 2.4 units of account to £1 the total EEC budget for 1973 came to around £2,140m, of which three-quarters or some £1,600m went on agricultural price support and guarantees. The total public expenditure for the UK for 1973-74 was some £30,000m, of which some £590m went on agricultural support. The British contribution to the EEC budget at £180m is thus a relatively small sum in relation to the total British budget, amounting in 1973 to a mere 0.6% of the total. Against this the British receipts from the EEC must be taken into account. The Treasury estimated the net contribution for 1973 at £80m, rising by 1977 to £245m, or still less than 1% of the current total budget.

The conclusion which Mr. Callaghan and his advisers may wish to draw from all this when they present their demands on June 4 is still unclear. The actual cost of staying in the Community is in fact quite small in comparison to the total UK internal budget. It might reasonably be compared with the other 'prestige' Tory projects like Maplin, Concorde and the Channel Tunnel or with the annual cost of Northern Ireland. And since some form of renegotiation is inevitable in any event, given the massive changes in world food and commodity prices, there is not a great deal of despondency in Brussels. If the Labour Government wishes to remain in the Community, there is no doubt that a suitable package could be devised which would give the appearance of being a highly successful bargain for Britain, and at the least a very [illegible] improvement on the Tory terms. Whether this would have happened anyway must [illegible] matter of opinion. [illegible] made by the

The other effect of the renegotiation (51%) coming the final destruction of the Commission's as shown in policy of trying to hide the level of national gains and losses. This could perhaps be justified if the community were already a unified political entity, on similar grounds to those which persuade the British Treasury to avoid publishing explicit figures on the extent to which England or the Southeast subsidises the Celtic fringes. But this stage has yet to be reached in Europe. Until it is, it looks as if the Commission will have to come down off its high horse and tell us all exactly how the finances of the Community operate.

may

Compiled by Vivien Magowan

CASUALTIES: NORTHERN IRELAND	RUC	RUCR	Army	UDR	Civilians	Total	Road Fatalities
From Aug. 1969 to May 31, 1974	44	8	214	44	717	1027	
From Jan 1, 1974 to May 31, 1974	6	2	10	inc. 1 woman 5	76	99	113
From May 1, '74 to May 31, 1974	2	—	—	1	22	25	19

WEDNESDAY, MAY 1st

In the Northern Ireland Assembly the Minister of Agriculture, **Mr Leslie Morell** presented the estimates for 1974-75. The total sum required was **£25,595,800** which was a net increase of **£1,151,700** on the amount granted for 1973-74. The amount was voted by acclamation.

Lord Feather attended the first meeting of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights in Northern Ireland as Chairman. He said in **Belfast** that it would study possible patterns of discrimination rather than complaints.

1900 cases of Bushmills whiskey were stolen when a lorry was hijacked near **Ballymena.** The load was worth about £22,000

THURSDAY, MAY 2nd

Five workmen were killed in an explosion at the **Rose and Crown** public house, on the **Ormeau Road, Belfast.** A bomb had been thrown into the lounge by men who escaped by car.

Mrs. Eva Martin, a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment was killed during an attack on **Clogher UDR** post by gunmen who fired rockets and small arms.

The report of the Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Commission was given to the Chief Minister, **Mr Brian Faulkner,** and members of the **Executive.** The British Government and the government of the Republic have been studying the report during the past week.

The hearing of alleged torture charges against the British Government by the Government of the Republic concerning treatment of prisoners in **Northern Ireland** opened in an atmosphere of strict security at **Stavanger, Norway.**

FRIDAY, MAY 3rd

Four victims of the explosion at the **Rose and Crown** public house were reported to have lost limbs and one was paralysed in addition to a further six men injured and in hospital.

Following a search of a car at a UDR checkpoint in **Co. Fermanagh** security forces found a large quantity of explosives at a farmhouse including a 600 lb car bomb.

Considerable damage was caused to the inside of the **Europa Hotel** when bombs exploded, one in a water tank on the 14th floor and the other on the ground floor. No casualties were reported, but guests were evacuated from the building.

SATURDAY, MAY 4th

Pro-Assembly Unionists held a conference at **Portstewart** and discussed policy and the **Sunningdale** proposals.

In the Republic Gardai recovered all the paintings stolen from the home of **Sir Alfred Beit** in April. A woman was taken into custody after a raid on a cottage at **Glandore, Cork,** where the paintings were discovered.

SUNDAY, MAY 5th

The Pro-Assembly Unionists announced that they had reformed their group and would in future be known as the Unionist Party. They issued a statement saying that in view of the recent policy document agreed by the DUP, Vanguard and United Ulster Unionist Council calling for a regional parliament within a Federal UK they would sever existing links with **Glengall Street.**

In **Belfast,** a bomb exploded at the home of **Mr William Craig,** leader of Vanguard. **Mr Jack Lynch,** leader of Fianna Fail, said in **Cork** that he supported the proposals of the Minister of Education at Stormont, **Mr Basil McIvor,** for integrated education.

MONDAY, MAY 6th

In **Dublin, Dr. Briget Dugdale** was remanded in custody on ten charges relating to the theft of the stolen paintings recovered on Saturday.

In **Brussels, Mr Roy Bradford,** Minister of the Environment, said he was surprised at the formation of a new Unionist party by the Pro-Assembly Unionists.

TUESDAY, MAY 7th

Mr. and Mrs. James Devlin were killed when gunmen opened fire on their car near **Coalisland, Co. Tyrone.**

Two Catholic workmen were shot dead and five injured in a machine-gun attack when gunmen entered their hut at lunchtime at **Carnmoney, Co. Antrim.**

A leader of the UDA, **Mr Samuel Tweed,** escaped from **Belfast** Magistrates Court after a hoax bomb scare. About fifty youths entered the court and helped Mr. Tweed to jump from the dock and escaped with the crowd leaving the building. Police held open the doors.

In the early hours of the morning, **Smithfield Market** in the centre of **Belfast** caught fire and was totally destroyed.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 8th

The UDA threatened to "take over" the security of **East Belfast** unless the Army offered more protection to workers at the **Sirocco** factory who, they claimed, had been attacked by the Republicans. A statement said the UDA were sick of the whole security situation in Northern Ireland and were 100% behind the UUUC and their Anti-Sunningdale policy. They would remain on a province-wide "alert".

Mr. Francis Roe, a Catholic living near **Glengormley,** was killed by gunmen who fired at him as he left his house during the evening. The RUC believe that the car used in the attack after which the gunmen escaped was stolen earlier in the day in **Mansfield Street** in the **Shankill** area of **Belfast.**

Rev William Beattie, Deputy Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, said that the killings in the **Newtownabbey** area and elsewhere in the Province must be stopped. He added that they could not afford to wait until the Dublin Government had stopped "dragging its feet". "The security forces must be properly equipped", he said "and permitted to end the terror".

THURSDAY, MAY 9th

A statement of policy was issued by the newly formed Unionist Party calling for an increased representation at **Westminster** and proposing to limit the functions of the **Council of Ireland.** It declared that the **Executive** must be made up of parties which accepted the will of the majority to remain British and which agreed to work within the Constitution Act. Later, **Mr James Stronge** and **Mr Herbert Whitten,** Assemblymen from **Armagh** constituencies, said they would continue as Official Unionists henceforth, under the leadership of **Mr Harry West** and could no longer support **Mr Brian Faulkner's** party. They added that **Mr William Morgan,** Assemblyman **North Belfast,** was also backing their decision not to support **Mr Faulkner.**

The British Government was reported to have discouraged members of a Council of Europe study group from undertaking a planned visit to **Northern Ireland.** The group has already visited **London** and **Dublin.** At present, 17 members of a Regional Policy and Transport Committee of the European Parliament are in **Northern Ireland** on a 3-day fact-finding tour.

In **Omagh** a car bomb wrecked the Army recruiting office, injuring four people. The Minister of Commerce, **Mr John Hume,** announced that he had been informed by the Army authorities that they would shortly be leaving two factories in Bligh's Lane in the **Bogside** area of **Derry.**

FRIDAY, MAY 10th

Two members of the RUC were shot dead while on patrol at **Finaghy, Belfast.** Armed men later escaped by car after the shooting. The car had earlier been hijacked in **Andersonstown.**

During the day police raided a house in **Myrtlefield Park** in the **Malone** area of **Belfast.** They arrested **Mr Brendan Hughes,** a leading member of the Provisional IRA who was posing as a stockbroker, and **Mr Denis Loughlan,** his second-in-command. Later explosives, ammunition, weapons and maps were removed and other

searches in the **Malone** area carried out with further finds of explosives and ammunition.

During discussions at **Stormont** between the Secretary of State, **Mr Rees** accompanied by **Mr Sam Silkin**, Attorney-General and the **Executive**, the basis for ratification of the **Sunningdale** agreement was understood to have been discussed.

SATURDAY, MAY 11th

Mr Francis Brennan, manager of the **Rose and Crown** public house, died in hospital from injuries received in the recent explosion.

Nineteen people were injured in a series of firebomb attacks in **Larne, Co. Antrim** and in **Newtownstewart, Co. Tyrone.**

Loyalists carried out road blocks in **Northern Ireland** to protest against new regulations for visiting at the **Maze** prison, **Long Kesh.** Traffic was halted on many roads for an hour.

SUNDAY, MAY 12

Lord Brookeborough, Pro-Assembly Unionist, **North Down**, said that he felt that the federal solution proposed by the UUUC would lead to the disintegration of the United Kingdom. He said **Mr Enoch Powell** had realised this and had described it as "unworkable and unrealistic".

MONDAY, MAY 13th

Two men died in an explosion at a garage near **Dungannon.** They were thought to have been carrying a bomb which exploded.

In **Belfast** two women were injured by bullets in crossfire in the **Lower Falls** area.

The security forces stated that two tons of explosives and 35 weapons were seized during the past week. 46 people were charged with terrorist offences during the same period.

Mr Merlyn Rees had talks in **Dublin** with **Dr Garret Fitzgerald**, Foreign Minister of the Republic. A statement said they discussed the report of the Law Enforcement Commission and that **Mr Declan Costello**, Attorney-General of the Republic, was present.

The Prime Minister, **Mr Harold Wilson** disclosed details to the House of Commons at **Westminster** of plans seized by police from the IRA headquarters at **Myrtlefield Park, Belfast** on Friday. The plans indicated a battle scheme to occupy parts of **Belfast.**

TUESDAY, MAY 14th

The **Ulster Workers Council** announced in an advertisement that if "**Brian Faulkner** and his colleagues vote in the Assembly on Tuesday 14th to support **Sunningdale** then "there will be a general stoppage".

The Assembly met at **Stormont** and debated the motion put forward by **Mr Brian Faulkner's** party to support the **Sunningdale** agreement. Members of the SDLP, the Alliance Party voted for the motion, which was carried by 44 votes to 28. **Mr David Bleakley**, NILP abstained.

Mr James Wellbeloved, Labour MP at **Westminster**, said he would be launching a petition to demand the withdrawal of British troops from **Northern Ireland.**

Two men were shot dead by troops at a farm near **Newry.** They were later claimed by the Official IRA to have been volunteers engaged in preparing a landmine for British forces.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 15th

Four-hourly power cuts were imposed on Northern Ireland electricity users because of withdrawal of labour by workers at power stations in support of the **UWC** strike call. Loyalist leaders and some members of the **Ulster Workers Council** including **Mr Ken Gibson** and **Mr Thomas Lyttle** had talks at **Stormont** with **Mr Stanley Orme**, Minister of State. **Mr Orme** was to meet **Mr Merlyn Rees** later in **London** to discuss the situation. At **Larne**, men armed with cudgels took charge of traffic arrangements and cross-channel ferry services were stopped. Shops were ordered to close and hijacked vehicles blocked roads. Several buses were hijacked in **Belfast.** Many factories closed due to power cuts and workers were sent home. The public was advised to save water where possible as pumping stations could be affected. The **UWC** pledged that **essential services** would be maintained.

THURSDAY, MAY 16

The **UWC** listed **essential services** and advised anyone considering themselves engaged on "essential" work to telephone **Belfast 651131. Belfast** city buses were taken out of service because of hijacking. The **UWC** ordered public houses to close. The Secretary of State **Mr Merlyn Rees** met Loyalist leaders at **Stormont** and said he would not negotiate with representatives of the **UWC. Mr Craig** said it would be the fault of **Mr Rees** if all essential services would collapse, as he thought they were about to, and he warned that troops would be unable to maintain power at the stations without the assistance of workers. Foodstuffs were unable to reach shops owing to the strike and a quarter million gallons of milk was poured away because of the impossibility of processing it or collecting it.

During the evening **Mrs Maureen Moore** was shot dead as she stood at the door of a house in the **New Lodge Road, Belfast.** Gardai in the Republic issued a nationwide warning of a new bombing campaign in **Eire.** They warned shopkeepers to check their premises carefully.

FRIDAY, MAY 17



Car bombs exploded in **Dublin** and in **Monaghan** town without warning during the evening rush hour. First reports indicated that 27 people had been killed and over 100 were injured, many severely. Five were killed in **Monaghan** and the other 22 in **Dublin** where three blasts occurred. The Minister for Justice, **Mr Cooney** met the Garda Commissioner **Mr Patrick Malone** and an emergency session of Government ministers met to hear a report. **Mr Cooney** said that two of the cars used in the bombing had been hijacked earlier in the day in **Belfast.** The Taoiseach **Mr Liam Cosgrave** said later that he wanted to express "the revulsion and condemnation felt by every decent person in this island at their unforgiveable acts". He said it would help to "bring home to us here what the people in Northern Ireland have been suffering for five long years".

In **Belfast** the UDA denied responsibility for the explosions.

The UVF also denied responsibility for the blasts and the Provisional IRA called the explosions "vile murder". **Mr Brian Faulkner** sent a message to **Mr Cosgrave** expressing "deepest regret" from himself and his colleagues.

Petrol supplies in **Northern Ireland** ran short owing to non-delivery of stocks and many garages closed. Postal services were at a standstill as many postmen were intimidated by gangs of youths and could not carry out duties. A Government spokesman gave the number of people not attending work as 30,000. Power workers in **Belfast's** two generating stations decided to remain at work and to maintain existing though short supplies of electricity.

SATURDAY, MAY 18th

A man was shot dead in a bar in **North Queen Street, Belfast** during the evening by armed men who later escaped in a car.

A policeman was seriously injured in a post box explosion at **Lisburn** and a young boy was also badly hurt. 20 people were slightly hurt. The UWC called for an all-out stoppage from midnight on **Sunday** because **Mr Merlyn Rees** had not had talks with their representatives and would only offer new elections in four years time. They called his offer "contemptuous".

SUNDAY, MAY 19th

A 100lb car bomb exploded in a multi-storey car park at **London** Airport with much damage but caused no casualties.

The Secretary of State **Mr Merlyn Rees** announced a State of Emergency to give the necessary powers to the Government to deal with the power crisis and it was reported that several hundred skilled troops were on stand-by to help maintain essential services. The UWC withdrew its threat to call a total stoppage just before midnight. **Mr Harry West** urged **Mr Rees** to come down "off his high horse" and talk to the UWC.

Shops reported panic buying of food supplies and many shops were short of goods. After a request from the UWC foodshops and chemists shops opened from 2-6 pm only. Other shops were mainly closed. Milk deliveries continued to operate regularly. A man was found shot dead near **Shaw's Bridge, Belfast.**

MONDAY, MAY 20th

Five hundred additional troops were flown to **Northern Ireland.** Over 16,000 troops were now in the Province. Barricades were set up on many roads by supporters of the UWC. About one-third of normal power supplies was being generated. The **Post Office** urged people to use the telephone only in an emergency.

TUESDAY, MAY 21st

A "back-to-work" march led by the General Secretary of the TUC **Mr Len Murray** and supported by leading Trade Union officials in the Province including **Mr Andrew Barr,** President of the Federation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Workers, attempted to conduct a number of workers to the **Belfast** shipyard and to a factory at **Castlereagh.** Although troops and the RUC were present to protect marchers, only about 200 people took part and were jeered by a hostile crowd. **Mr Barr** was struck several times by angry men and women. **Mr David Bleakley,** NILP said the march, though small, was a symbolic gesture. He took part in it, as did **Mr Robin Glendinning** of the Alliance Party.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 22nd

A statement was issued from the **Northern Ireland Office** following a report from **Mr Merlyn Rees** to the Prime Minister In **London.** It reaffirmed that the Government would not be intimidated or blackmailed into departing from the present constitutional arrangements for **Northern Ireland.** It would preserve life and would help to maintain essential services in the Province, and would not negotiate with the **Ulster Workers Council.**



The **Executive** decided to postpone parts of the **Sunningdale** agreement until after **Assembly** elections in **1977-78.** Meanwhile it recommended that the **Council of Ireland** should be composed of a Council of seven ministers from each part of Ireland instead of the full Council as proposed at **Sunningdale.**

Mr Harry West rejected the new proposal as a "phasing-in" operation and the UWC said they were against the **Sunningdale** settlement whatever modifications it might assume.

THURSDAY, MAY 23rd

Security forces helped to remove barricades and to keep roads clear. An RUC spokesman described the situation as "very fluid" and indicated that some barricades kept reappearing. In **Derry** Loyalists in support of the strike prevented workers from going to **Maydown Industrial Estate.** Certain GCE examinations were postponed due to the crisis. The UWC had previously advised parents to keep children at home for safety. Many children however, continued to attend school and many teachers were still able to get to work.

Mr Gerry Fitt, SDLP leader and Deputy Chief Minister urged the use of troops to go immediately into the power stations and to the oil refineries.

FRIDAY, MAY 24th

Mr Brian Faulkner, Mr Gerry Fitt and **Mr Oliver Napier** flew to **London** for urgent discussions with the Prime Minister **Mr Harold Wilson.** A statement issued later said there could be no question of negotiation of constitutional or political matters with anyone seeking to operate outside the established constitutional framework.

In **Belfast** eight additional sub-offices of the Ministry of Health and Social Services were opened to deal with the large numbers who queued for benefits due to the strike. Up to 5,000 people were waiting outside offices for payments.

The British Government turned down an offer by **Sir Frederick Catherwood** to act as mediator in the strike.

Two brothers, **Mr Sean Byrne** and **Mr Brendan Byrne** were shot dead by armed men who raided their public house at **Tannaghmore, Co. Antrim.**

SATURDAY, MAY 25th

The Prime Minister, **Mr Harold Wilson** broadcast to the nation during the evening and called the strike organisers "thugs and bullies". He called for an extension of the patience of the citizens and taxpayers who saw arrogant undemocratic behaviour after years of "pouring out over £300m a year into Northern Ireland". Those who now "viciously defy Westminster" **Mr Wilson** said, were "sponging" on **Westminster** and British democracy.

SUNDAY, MAY 26th

Troops took more than 30 men into custody in dawn raids on Protestant districts of **Belfast** and suburbs. Eighteen were held in custody by evening. The raids took place in the "Tiger Bay" area of **Belfast,** the **Shankill Road, Rathcoole** and **Carrickfergus.**

Mr Harry Patterson, a member of the executive of the UWC, said the strike was actually gaining support each day. Farmers were backing it. Petrol supplies were maintained to "essential services" by means of permits obtained from the UWC and shown to pickets at service stations approved by the Council to remain open.

MONDAY, MAY 27th

Gas supplies in **Belfast, Bangor, Carrickfergus** and other districts could no longer be maintained as normal pressure was not possible; an announcement urged consumers to turn off gas at the main.

The Army were ordered to "take over" 21 petrol stations throughout **Northern Ireland** and to undertake the control of supply of petrol to certain essential users granted permits by the **Ministry of Commerce.** The UWC called a press conference and announced that the Army could now undertake **all** essential deliveries of supplies such as milk and bread and animal feeding stuffs. All workers would cease to assist from midnight and **Ballylumford** power station would close down.

Trains between **Dublin** and **Belfast** ran only as far as **Dundalk** and only buses in the **Falls** area of **Belfast** were operating. The strike had left the city without public transport for 13 days.

TUESDAY, MAY 28th

After a meeting of the **Executive, Mr Brian Faulkner** advised **Mr Merlyn Rees** to open talks with the UWC. Following the secretary of State's refusal **Mr Faulkner** resigned as Chief Minister and his Unionist colleagues also resigned. SDLP and Alliance ministers did not resign but **Mr Gerry Fitt** described the collapse of the **Executive** as the "saddest event in the political history of Northern Ireland".

Farmers drove tractors to **Stormont** and lined the main avenue to demonstrate in favour of the UWC.

Mr Rees flew to **London** for talks with **Mr Wilson.**

In the **Dail, Mr Liam Cosgrave** appealed for calm following the collapse of the **Executive** and said that the IRA's campaign had provoked a "massive sectarian backlash".

The death toll from the car bombs in the **Republic** rose to 32.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 29th

The Secretary of State **Mr Merlyn Rees** announced that **Her Majesty** had made an Order in Council to prorogue the **Northern Ireland Assembly** for four months. During this time the Assembly would remain in existence but would not be able to exercise its functions. Legislation would have to be enacted at **Westminster. Mr Rees** stated that he had invited leaders of **Northern Ireland** parties to meet him separately on **Thursday.**

THURSDAY, MAY 30th

The UWC issued a statement saying that the strike had ended and that a "phased return" to work had begun. Troops withdrew from petrol stations. At **Stormont, Rev Ian Paisley, Mr William Craig** and **Mr Harry West** saw **Mr Rees** and demanded fresh elections.

In **Derry** a soldier was seriously wounded in an attack in the **Creggan** area.

FRIDAY, MAY 31st

The Secretary of State announced that he would shortly appoint new additional Ministers and would allocate Departments to them. He would retain personal charge of law and order and security matters. There would be no change in the position of the **Northern Ireland Civil Service.**

Mr. Rees told newsmen at a press conference at **Stormont** that the "rise of **Ulster** nationalism" was a major force which the **British** Government now had to take into account in determining the future of the Province.

Mr. Alfred Shotter was killed in an explosion caused by a booby-trap bomb in **Derry.**

casualties

Between May 1st and May 31st 25 people died through violence.

Mrs. Eva Martin, UDR. Shot. **Clogher UDR post** — May 2
James Doherty. Explosion. **Rose and Crown, Ormeau Rd., Belfast** — May 2
Thomas Ferguson. Explosion. **Rose and Crown** — May 2
John Gallagher. Explosion. **Rose and Crown** — May 2
William Kelly. Explosion. **Rose and Crown** — May 2
Thomas Morrissey. Explosion. **Rose and Crown** — May 2
James Devlin
Mrs. James Devlin. Shot near **Coalisland, Co. Tyrone**
Patrick Jago. Shot. **Cammoney, Co. Antrim.** — May 7
Frederick Leonard. Shot. **Cammoney, Co. Antrim** — May 7
Frank Roe. Shot. Near **Ballyclare, Co. Antrim** — May 8
Constable Ross, RUC. Shot. **Finaghy, Belfast** — May 10
Constable Bell, RUC. Shot. **Finaghy, Belfast** — May 10
Francis Brennan. Died of injuries received in **Rose & Crown** — May 11
Owen James Martin. Explosion of bomb in transit — May 13
Sean Kearney. Explosion of bomb in transit. Near **Dungannon** — May 13
Colman Rowntree. Shot by Army, Near **Newry** — May 15
Martin McAlinden. Shot by Army, Near **Newry** — May 15
(Official IRA claimed they were volunteers preparing a landmine)
Mrs. Maureen Moore. Shot. **New Lodge Rd. Belfast** — May 16
Joseph Shaw. Shot. **North Star Bar, Belfast** — May 18
Joseph Shaw. Shot. Near **Shaw's Bridge, Belfast** — May 20
Michael J. Mallon. Shot. Near **Shaw's Bridge, Belfast** — May 20
Sean Byrne. Shot. **Tannaghmore, Ballymena** — May 24
Brendan Byrne. Shot. **Tannaghmore, Ballymena** — May 24
Alfred Stilges. Died from severe head injuries. **Forth River Road, Belfast** — May 25
Alfred Shotter. Explosion. Booby trap bomb. **Derry** — May 31

attacks

Attacks during **May** by **Bombs, Rockets, Landmines** or **Incendiary Devices.**

May 1 **Crossmaglen RUC** station — Rockets and gunfire
May 1. **Derry.** Troops attacked. — Petrol bombs and gunfire
May 1. **Derry.** Troops attacked. — Acid bombs
May 1. **Strabane.** Property damaged. — Parcel bomb
May 1. **Armagh.** Detonated by troops — Mine
May 2. **Belfast. Ormeau Rd.** Casualties. Damage. — Bomb
May 2. **Belfast. Gt. Victoria St.** Detonated by troops. — Car bomb
May 2. **Belfast.** Shops damaged — Incendiaries
May 3. **Belfast. Europa Hotel** damaged. — Two bombs
May 3. **Armagh.** Property damaged. — Incendiaries
May 4. **Belfast. Europa Hotel.** Defused by Army. — Bomb
May 5. **Belfast. Gt. Victoria St.** Damage. — Car bomb
May 5. **Belfast. College Sq. East.** Damage. — Car bomb
May 5. **Belfast.** Home of **Mr. William Craig.** — Bomb
May 5. **Ardglass.** Detonated by troops. — Car bomb
May 5. **Warrenpoint.** Property damaged. — Car bomb
May 5. **Belfast. Joy Street.** Damage. — Car bomb
May 5. **Belfast. Spruce St.** Community Centre. Damage. — Bomb
May 5. **Cookstown.** Property damaged. — Bomb
May 5. **Derry.** Troops attacked. — Petrol bombs
May 5. **Newry.** Troops attacked. — Petrol bombs
May 6. **Derry.** Mail bags damaged. — Incendiaries
May 6. **Belfast.** Mail bags damaged. — Incendiaries
May 7. **Belfast. Smithfield Market** destroyed. — Fire
May 7. **Castlewellan.** Damage — Car bomb
May 7. **Belfast.** Dampened by "Foaming Pig". — Car bomb
May 7. **Belfast.** Shops damaged. — Incendiaries
May 8. **Crossmaglen.** — Claymore mine
May 8. **Belfast. Ligoniel.** Shop damaged. — Bomb
May 9. **Derry.** Detonated by troops. — Car bomb
May 9. **Omagh.** Damage to Army Recruiting Centre. — Car bomb
May 10. **Newcastle.** Hotel damaged. — Bomb
May 10. **Belfast. Ormeau ave.** Dampened, Foaming Pig. — Car bomb
May 10. **Belfast. Parador Hotel, Ormeau Rd.** Damage. — Nail bomb
May 10. **Carnlough, Co. Antrim.** Sewerage works damaged. — Bomb
May 11. **Larne.** Shops damaged. — Incendiaries
May 11. **Newtownstewart, Tyrone.** Shops damaged. — Incendiaries
May 13. **Newry. RUC** station and premises damaged. — Van bomb
May 13. **Belfast. Donegall Rd.** Premises damaged. — Incendiaries
May 18. **Lisburn.** Injuries. Property damaged. — Pillar box bombs
May 18. **Belfast. Antrim Rd.** Property damaged. — Bomb
May 18. **Lurgan.** Property damaged. — Bomb
May 19. **Derry.** Damage to Customs posts. — Bomb
May 20. **Bangor.** Property damaged. — Bomb
May 20. **Newtownabbey.** Property damaged. — Bomb
May 20. **Castlederg.** Property damaged. — Suitcase bomb
May 21. **Belfast. Turf Lodge.** Damage. — Landmine
May 24. **Portrush.** Damage to hotels. — Incendiaries
May 29. **Strabane.** Injury and damage. — Blast bomb
May 29. **Belfast. Sandhurst Bar, Sandy Row.** — Fire
May 30. **Derry.** Casualty. Damage. — Booby trap bomb

finds

Reported Arms, ammunition and explosives finds by Army in May

May 3. 200 lbs explosives, 600 lb. car bomb, revolvers, ammunition — **Letterbailey, Co. Fermanagh**
May 3. 20lb suitcase bomb — **East Belfast**
May 3. 72 rounds ammunition. — **Doagh, Co. Antrim**
May 4. Bomb in **Europa Hotel.** Defused. — **Belfast**
May 5. Incendiary bombs in car. — **Rostrevor, Co. Down**
May 7. Bomb making equipment. — **Derry**
May 9. Sub-machine gun, 48 rounds ammunition. — **Lower Falls area, Belfast**
May 9. Cylinder bomb. — **Holywood, Co. Down**
May 9. 200 lb. landmine. — **Newtownhamilton, Co. Armagh**
May 10. Rifles, revolvers, explosives, ammunition. — **Malone Road area, Belfast**
May 14. Mortar making equipment. — **Cushendall, Co. Antrim**
May 18. Rifle, carbine, shot-gun, ammunition. — **Twinbrook, Belfast**
May 20. Eight explosive devices. 100 lbs explosives. — **Crossmaglen**
May 26. Bomb-making equipment, gas cylinders, incendiaries, pistols and ammunition. — **Killeen**, near **Newry**
May 29. 160 rounds ammunition, pistol. — **Derry**

Number of incidents May 1-May 29 320
Number of explosions May 1-May 29 62

Figures from Army Press Office.

figures

Since **1969**, 20 barmen have been killed through violence; 287 public houses destroyed by bombs or fires; 47 off-licences destroyed by bombs or fires; 29 hotels destroyed by bombs or fires.

In **1969**, 46 public houses destroyed; 23 off-licences.
In **1970**, 11 public houses destroyed; 3 off-licences.
In **1971**, 38 public houses destroyed, 3 off-licences.
In **1972**, 54 public houses destroyed, 11 off-licences, 11 hotels.
In **1973**, 107 public houses destroyed, 7 off-licences, 17 hotels.
In **1974**, 31 public houses destroyed, 1 hotel — to **April 30**.

Figures given by deputation from members of ATGWU to **Mr. Stanley Orme.**

Since **1969**, claims amounting to a total of **£10,500,000** for damage to property throughout **Northern Ireland** had so far been received.

Figures given by **Mr. Stanley Orme.** up to April 30, 1974.

The Secretary of State, **Mr. Merlyn Rees**, stated that 604 men and 26 women were at present detained in Northern Ireland under Emergency Provisions Act. A total of 508 men and 9 women had been detained for three months or longer.

386 men and 8 women were detained by order of a Commissioner.

218 men and 18 women were held under Interim Custody Orders.

Since the General Election (Feb. 28) 60 detainees had been released. 21 by Commissioners on first hearing; 37 on review; two by Secretary of State. Written reply given in House of Commons, May 24.

Border. And the NCCL have recently stated their intention once again of forming a branch in Northern Ireland. At the moment these groups do sometimes assist each other in gathering information or in publicising what they consider abuses of human rights, but the ideological differences between ICRA and NICRA make proper unity an impossibility. Ciaran Mac an Aili crops up again in the formation of ICRA and was its first chairman.

In Northern Ireland we obtained many safeguards for citizens which have been written into legislation probably through the actions and propaganda of the early civil rightists. There has been a desire to put right some of the more blatant abuses of power, yet we are now worse off than we were five years ago. Internment is still going at full blast, the denial of the right of public procession is still being denied on a one-sided basis, there is an over-exceeding of power by sections of the security forces, the right to political expression is not being observed, the Special Powers Acts have been swapped for the Emergency laws including some of the most draconian aspects of the former, and the Tribunal at Long Kesh or Maze Prison is no substitute for a proper judicial proceeding. Although the Northern Ireland situation is, to put it mildly, abnormal—that is no justification for all that takes place in the name of law and order. Justice must not only be done, but seen to be done.

The populace, especially in Belfast, has edged itself into stronger and more defensive ghettos and it will take years to break down this housing pattern. Many of our business firms are trying to integrate their work forces but this too will take time. There is now a strong call for peace with justice and I believe should be the cry of all. We owe it, not only to ourselves and to our children, but to each other. **(Concluded)**

Dublin Letter

Shellshock

Dennis Kennedy



A week after the Dublin bombings an American travel agent phoned Bord Failte's Fifth Avenue office in New York cancelling a block booking that would have brought 600 American tourists to Ireland this summer. On an enlarged scale, it was the sort of thing the Irish tourist industry, and to a lesser extent those involved in attracting industrial investment, have become used to over the past five years.

Counteracting it over recent months has been the degree of optimism made possible by political progress, despite the continued violence and threatened sabotage of the Sunningdale agreement. A month ago Dr. Garret FitzGerald on a brief visit to the United States, was still resolutely hoping for the best, and predicting ratification of Sunningdale within weeks. Even more recently official spokesmen in Dublin were swearing, in private, that the package would go through.

The loyalist strike and the downfall of the Executive have left the Government, and the public too, here in something approaching a state of shock. Certainly there is no evidence as yet of a fall-back plan, or of any sort of initiative from Dublin. The ominous talk of British withdrawal is producing a near panic, and any Northerners deeply concerned about the impact of a recall of British troops can rely on sturdy support from Mr. Cosgrave in efforts to keep them in the North.

In this the Government is clearly at variance with the opposition. Mr Lynch has called for "positive encouragement" from Britain for the idea of Irish unity, presumably along the lines of a declaration of intent that was once much in fashion when Harold Wilson was leader of the opposition at Westminster. It is in some ways strange to have this call revived just now, as it was originally based on the naive view that the Northern Protestants would, when faced with the reality of British withdrawal, act like the sensible people they are and reach an accommodation with Dublin.

If anything the Loyalist strike and the destruction of the Executive have shown that the basic common sense of the Northern Protestant is a sandy foundation for any speculation on future events in the North. A British declaration of intent, to withdraw, would, in the Government view here, encourage the Ulster nationalism that Mr Rees has just discovered, and do little to promote power-sharing, which Mr Cosgrave identified as the great step forward of the past six months.

Fear of Fianna Fail back-sliding into traditional anti-partitionist attitudes on the North, abandoning in the process the bipartisan policy, exercises a strong influence on Government thinking. Rightly or wrongly, and it is possible that they are wrong on this, most Government supporters feel that a Fine Gael-Labour coalition is not well placed to depart from the national mythology that has surrounded all approaches to the Northern crisis.

To do so, the feel, would be to invite a Fianna Fail onslaught in a highly emotional atmosphere, when the whole weight of mationalist sentiment in Ireland could be stirred up to destroy the coalition. Whatever the validity of this view as regards the general public, it is almost certainly true that some back-benchers in both Fine Gael and Labour would find such pressure irresistible.

This is the background to Mr Cosgrave's failure so far to throw a Southern initiative into the ring—a new Constitution, for example, which would exclude any territorial claim over the North and which might make extradition to the North a simpler matter than it now appears. In addition to getting such a constitutional amendment through both Dail and referendum, he would have to sell it first to some of his own Cabinet colleagues—including some reputed "liberals"—and to the SDLP.

Some such initiative may have to come, if power-sharing is to be tried again in the North. None of the other proposals now current—an independent Ulster, a re-partitioned Ireland, prolonged direct rule, offers a chance of quick and real improvement in the Northern situation, which is what is needed to protect the vital interests of the Southern economy, and to make sure no more citizens are bombed to death in their own streets.

One interesting, and rather depressing sidelight on Southern reaction to the Loyalist strike and the resignation of Mr Faulkner has been the quick conclusion that all Northerners—meaning Northern Protestants—are at heart the same. Thus unionist equals Unionist, equals Loyalist equals bully boy, thug, bigot or fascist. In this there is a

refusal to see that Northern Protestants respond to different leaders according to different circumstances, and the man who today follows Paisley because he feels he is being sold down the Republican river and the democratic process is denied him, may, yesterday or tomorrow, follow Faulkner because he does not feel so threatened. The parallel with the hard-line Protestant view of Catholics—Catholic equals Republican equals IRA equals terrorist—is unmistakable. The very people who have so consistently denounced this political shorthand now indulge in the converse.

++++++

One unfortunate result of it all has been the withdrawal of Irish troops from the UN peace-keeping force in the Middle East. First in the Congo, and continuously in Cyprus and now the Middle East for a decade, Ireland has made its one really distinctive and worthwhile contribution to international affairs through its army. Officers and men have built up a body of expertise and experience of great value to such operations. They will be missed just now when they would have been most needed—as an acceptable contingent to both sides on the Golan Heights. The pity is that it could be argued that they were brought home as a gesture to reassure public opinion, not as an absolutely essential strengthening of security here.

The Wrassler

Part 1: Sticky Spittoon

Michael Foley



Spittoon is a little village on the western seaboard of Ireland, surrounded on three sides by the rocky townland of Shaggan and on the fourth by the bleak and stormy Atlantic from which the ceaseless rainclouds roll, releasing their contents on the unfortunate village. It is nearly always wet in Spittoon. Wet and windy and deserted—just the opposite of the coast and the proper place for a tired private dick at the end of a bad year. I was tired of air that smelled as if someone had been wearing it to work for a week and I needed a rest from two-bit grifters and hard-faced blondes of nineteen going on fifty.

I found the rest the way I made my first million.

First my hire car broke down ten miles out and I had to complete the journey by tractor and van, ending up late at night on the wrong side of the village. It was raining. I collected my bags and started to walk, passing Connor Breslin, Draper, a Connor Breslin Supermarket, Connor Breslin's Bar-B-Q, arriving finally at the Shaggan Hotel, proptr. Connor Breslin. I thought I might remember the name.

By this time I was fairly wet, which seemed to amuse the desk clerk. I set down the bags and shook rain off my coat.

'I had a breakdown', I told him. His amusement changed to a worldly leer.

'Man was made tae mourn', he said.

I let that ride out on the tide.

'Did ye want a room?'

'Does a bear shit in the woods?'

He rang for a boy who turned out to be over seventy. The 'boy' preceded me upstairs muttering to himself, half turning now and then, obviously interested in asking me something. I didn't encourage him.

In the morning the 'boy' served breakfast, hanging around a lot, shooting me nervous glances.

'Anything wrong?'

'No! No! Ah . . . Ah was just wondering are ye . . .are ye a Yank?'

'That's right'. He shuffled around a bit more.

'Ah have a brother out there.'

'Oh'.

'Aye. In . . . Cheechago. He lives in Cheechago and he was home last year and do ye know what he was telling me, he was telling me ye can buy rubber weemen out there, big full size rubber weemen.

'Is that right?' All his nervousness disappeared and he stared eagerly into my face.

'Well, yes, I suppose so. I suppose that's right'.

He scampered off towards the kitchen and, not feeling hungry, I went back upstairs. I was planning a general survey, perhaps a little fishing. My leisurely preparations were interrupted by a light knock. It was a chambermaid—but she entered with a swiftness and excitement that suggested something else. I wondered if she'd heard about the rubber weemen.

'I need your help'.

'Oh?'

'You're a private investigator'.

'No'.

'I saw your passport'.

'Still no. In the first place I don't like the work and in the second place I'm on vacation and in the third place I don't like it in the first place'.

'But my boyfriend's in danger. **I'm** in danger'.

'Get out of here'. I helped her towards the door.

'We were supposed to be getting married this week'. I tried to close the door. 'I've me going away outfit bought and everything'.

I got the door closed and went back to my fishing tackle. After half an hour I had almost regained my good humour. It had even stopped raining. I put some stuff in a bag and went out. From somewhere down the corridor came the sound of raised voices, first a woman's, then a man's, then the sound of a slap and finally a sharp cry. A marriage like many another, I thought.

But there came a second cry and something made me go towards it. Turning the corner I saw the chambermaid shrinking from a giant with a huge coarse face and wild hair. As I turned he hit her again, his face was twisted and ugly.

'Take it easy', I said. He swung towards me, pleased at the interruption.

'Ah don't like Yanks'.

'Well, I said, 'you're no day at the beach'.

'Ah don't think yese are smart an' Ah don't think yese are tough. Yese couldn't bate snow off a rope'.

While I was thinking of a snappy comeback he caught me with a quick right. His weight wasn't behind it but I had trouble staying up. I hoped he was soft in the gut and hit him there. He wasn't soft in the gut. I moved back but he caught me again. I tried a couple of shots to the head—with no effect. It was a swell bag of nails. He clobbered me again and I went down on one knee. He was big and strong and mean and he didn't like me. I hit him low—where a man should never be hurt. For the first time I got an effect. I did it again and he went down.

The maid didn't seem too pleased.
'That was dirty'.
'I took straight As in college—but it was a long time ago.
Now what is this all about?'
There was a soft tread on the carpet. I turned just in time to see the desk clerk.
'Man was made tae mourn', he said, swinging the sap.

(To be continued)

theatre

The Delphic Players
The Bars
(Dept. of Extra-Mural Studies, QUB)

Finn Carling's **The Bars** bears as much resemblance to classical theatre as three-dimensional tic-tac-toe does to the original—altogether more fluid, more ephemeral, with the light spaciousness of a gridded superstructure before slabs close in the compartments. Partly this effect is due to the play's verbal dexterity, handled brilliantly by a Delphic Players cast who need no other justification for their theatrical existence than these inspired characterisations. The drama's crackling changes of mood make Carling's work as homely, yet mysterious, as a familiar landscape on a cloud-scudded summer's day.

Yet there is another source of subtle felicy—Carling's consummate skill in telling and retelling freshly a tale laden with the awesome inevitability of Greek tragedy. The playwright combines theatrical sleight of hand narration—so that you're never sure under which cup is the pea or whether, even if you guess right, it will be the same pea at all—with the "onion" method—peeling back layers of consciousness and morality to revel more complexity, mixed motives, baseness and beauty, until the rich biblical vein is criss-crossed with so many traces and tracks that we lose ourselves in the matrix.

And for me this is the source of the play's charm and exhilaration. At the outset, we are presented with five Biblical superstars—Abraham, his sons (half-brothers) Isaac and Ismael, Isaac's adulterous wife Rebecca, and their daughter Sarah. The "historical" event has already occurred—in this version Abraham actually kills Isaac—and four of the characters are now animals in a zoo, lovingly cared for by the victim. In the evening, after the zoo is closed, the predators relinquish their cages for the larger enclosure of their own and the world's society. They play their games of love and recrimination, hate and forgiveness, possession and dispossession with a fervour and abandon that dispels our initial predisposition to observe rather than participate.

For most of us theatre is either a slice of history or a slice of life. It can be, of course, much more—an instrument that causes us to question fundamental assumptions about reality and the quality of the relations in which we are involved—productive and non-productive. When such self-analysis and criticisms are provoked by drama, it is very often done through theatrical assault on our intellect, threatening us with the absurd, or the dogmatic, forcing us to THINK. The total effect can be an abstract, arid glass bead game, pursuable only by the select few qualified by specialised education and clinical temperament. Carling's "The Bars" is a lucid demonstration that audiences can be made to think and enjoy simultaneously.

As the programme notes suggest, "The Bars" is a play not a puzzle, a statement effectively ratified by the audience involvement patently present. It is an assault on our preconceptions—about sainted Biblical characters, about the family, about taboos, about civilisation—but an assault so subtle that analysis is a natural product, not a hothouse plant, and all the more resilient for so being. The play's symbolism never oppresses because the playwright dethrones it before it becomes too entrenched. Emotions too are dismantled and reassembled before our eyes—we become credulous and cynical by turns, innocence reborn with every dramatic shift, enjoyment heightened with every theatrical device. In the end, we are at one with the actors in their vices and virtues, loose in the playwright's arbitrary world, feeling no more constrained than we do in our own "real" arbitrary world. The only "unreal" characters are the two lovers who stroll in and out of the zoo, never touched by the life seething within.

It would be appropriate, for the record, to list the play's motifs, but it would be a dull, sterile exercise, akin to the obscenity of pinning butterflies to boards. More in keeping with the play's spirit would be to write our praises in the sky, to emblazon the firmament with thanks to Louis Muinzer, who directed and translated, and to his perfect cast—with special recognition to Kate Parker and Elizabeth McMurray.

Lyric Theatre
Schweyk in the Second World War

"If anyone asked me to pick three literary works of this century which in my opinion will become part of world literature, then I would say that one of

Ulster Orchestra

6 June	**DUNADRY**
7 June	**BALMORAL**
8 June	**LONDONDERRY**
Conductor	Alun Francis
Soloist	Anthony Goldstone
Rossini	Overture: The Barber of Seville
Beethoven	Piano Concerto No. 4
Scelsi	Chukrum
Mozart	Symphony No. 6 'Linz'

FORTNIGHT

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THE STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND plans to appoint a second secretary to the Irish region. This secretary, to be based in Belfast, will be expected to develop the life of the SCM amongst third level students. The Student Christian Movement is concerned with the formation of a radical Christian response to contemporary issues in theology, politics, the community, education and personal relationships. The person appointed should be capable of initiating activities/events to help those in the movement, and others, develop their understanding and commitment in these areas, with particular concern for the present situation in Ireland. The basic salary is on a parity scale with graded dependants' allowances, and free accommodation and travel. Applications (before mid-June) by letter, giving details of experience and curriculum vitae to SCM House, 14 Prince Arthur Terrace, Rathmines, Dublin 6 (Telephone 01-977336).

them was Hasek's **Adventures of the Good Soldier Schweik".**

So spoke Bertolt Brecht in admiration of one of the world's great satires on war. His connection dates from an adaptation of Hasek's masterpiece for the 1927-28 season of Piscator's Political Theatre. At that time, it consisted of what Brecht called "a pure piece of montage from the novel" and it was only much later—after his exile from Germany during the war—that he returned to this rich seam of characterisation and concept.

The new product was **Schweyk in the Second World War**, and comprises much more than a mere up-dating of the good soldier's adventures. Hasek's hero—an amiable dog-breeder who blandly and unassumingly nudges his bit of the First World War into the kind of anarchy only a run-amok bureaucracy could rise to—is invested by Brecht with a cutting-edge, an incisive bitterness that subtly transforms comedy into classic.

Written between 1941-43, Schweyk is reminiscent of two earlier Brecht commentaries on war and Nazism. First, it revives a theme from 'Mother Courage' emphasising the gulf between the two levels at which war is waged—the monumental, where it is a clash between nations, monarchs, dynasties and the personal, where we see the deprivations and suffering of the "little people" who actually do the fighting and dying. Second, its production techniques utilize some of the delightfully corrosive images of Hitler devised for 'The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui.' Once again we find Der Fuhrer—knees bent, hands clasped protectively over groin, nose pinched, eyes wide and moustache rampant in comprehensive disapproval of all that is un-Adolphian in a stinking world—in touching quest for popularity and the regard of common man.

In the Lyric Hellzapoppin production, Hitler's generals provide him with reassurance—and it is a mark of the man's mania that a chorus line of jack-booted, Folies-skirted, can-canning SS men satisfies him. Meanwhile, back at the Dog and Goblet, the ordinary people of Prague blithely carry on their subtle subversion of the Nazi cause. In eight glorious scenes—plus interludes, prologue and epilogue—the common man leads astray these worst-laid plans of the supermen. At the end Schweyk—forger of dog pedigrees turned unwilling recruit—meets Hitler—house painter turned dictator—on the Russian steppes and the former leads the latter ever so gently up the garden path . . . to Stalingrad. How satisfying it all is.

And how delicious the production. In spanking black and white, every detail is the product of inspired conception and crisp execution—wonderfully clever costumes, circus/pantomime make-up that heightens rather than diminishes reality, adroit choreographing of scenes and scene-shifting, a silent movie knockabout that flickers into incandescent comic beauty—all marvellous.

And if the production steals the spotlight from the actors, that is not to say that they pale into insignificance. On the contrary, the shimmer well enough in their own reflected glory—J. J. Murphy, Ulster-perfect as Schweyk; Louis Rolston, making up in eyebrows what he lacks in Baloun's bulk; John Foley, suitably bottled up as Hitler and even better as the dog-fancying, people hating SS officer, complete with Dr. Strangelove black glove—his agony when provoked into a straight-armed Heil is exquisite; John Hewitt, all trenchcoat and sibilance as the muddling meddling Gestapo agent; Debbie Blackett, Linda Wray and Millie Guilfoyle neatly rendering Eisler's clean, rather difficult music; and Pat Brannigan, revealing a notable comic gift as a short-sighted malingerer.

Michael Poynor has brought off a triumph. How could you fail to enjoy an evening that gives you such conversation-stoppers as "sweaty feet seldom come singly" and "I got into this by accident—like the way Pontious Pilate got into the Creed". Ribald, funny, sad, immensely entertaining—you won't be quite the same after seeing **Schweyk in the Second World War.**

Kathleen Boehringer

letters

THE CRC

Dear Sir,

In your article on the demise of the Commission you infer that the Chairman and myself were guilty of some fifth column activity in the take over of the Commission and you produce as evidence the fact that since the decision of the Minister was announced, the Commission has co-operated with the Department of Community Relations.

Perhaps you would allow me to refute these charges. In all our meetings with the Minister prior to his decision the Commission consistently pressed the case for an increase in its resources, an enlargement of its function, a greater financial independence together with a basic restructuring of its organisation. All the members of the Commission can testify to this.

Members of the Commission learned of the Minister's decision at the same time that it was announced to the Assembly. In the light of the fact that his proposals to wind up the Commission had the full support of the Executive, the Commission had no alternative but to face the fact that whether it liked it or not its existence would be terminated. In these circumstances it decided that it had three priorities: 1) to maintain, as far as possible, its services to the community, 2) to endeavour to see that all its staff were made appropriate and suitable offers of continuing employment, 3) to ensure that functions which could be directly transferred, for example, grant-aid, were handed over in such a way that the Department could honour the Commission's commitments and carry on its policies without interruption.

In the case of community development work the Commission was very doubtful if this could be undertaken successfully by a central government agency but reserved its final judgement until the Minister revealed his proposals in detail, which are still awaited. In the case of the research and publications work, the Commission has already put alternative proposals to the Minister for its continuance elsewhere than in the Department. It could be argued that by co-operating with the Department in this way the Commission is protecting it from some of the consequences of its folly. Be that as it may it is surely the duty of the Commission to try to seee that as many of its services to the community as possible continue to be available in an acceptable form after its final interment.

Yours etc.

David Rowlands

Director

Community Relations Commission.

THE PAPER WAR

Dear Sir,

Though I finished my series of articles on "The Paper War" some time ago, I should like to thank all the people who wrote to me or sent me publications. I never expected to hear from so many people. Fortnight readers must be very responsive, or perhaps I touched the right nerve.

All contributions will still be very gratefully received. My thanks to the senders.

Yours, etc.

Paula Howard

Linen Hall Library

Belfast 1.

sidelines

If that nice young man, Mr Barr is looking in I would like to say how much I enjoyed his strike, sorry, disturbance. Not being blessed with mains water, mains sewerage or an over zealous appetite I suffered none of the problems of Belfast dwellers. Mind you my neighbours did have to pour a couple of days milk production down the drain and, cursing, go the UDA and ask for oil and feed. Not all the North Down farmers were as solidly behind the strike as the newspapers suggested. I told one that farmers were blocking the roads round Carryduff. 'If they are farmers,' he said, 'they should have better things to do'.

If you are wondering what the strike achieved then perhaps a few words of wisdom given me by another loyal citizen might help clarify things.

"Well", he said, "we won the war".

"You won the battle", said I, "I'm not sure you could ever win the war".

"You see", he said, "that yon Wilson knows nothing . . . we've shown him a thing or two".

"He knows nothing", I said, "and he cares nothing. I should think his food was all the tastier and his baths all the hotter knowing that the good folk of Ulster were cooking over open fires and becoming more odious by the minute and doing it all by themselves".

"Ah well, what he doesn't realise is that he needs us more than we need him".

"How do you make that out, its costing him a fortune to leave his troops here for target practice, not to mention the subsidy".

"Yes but you see if he gets out then anyone could come and take over".

"Like who?"

"Well the minute the British pull out the Germans will be in here to use Northern Ireland as a base for the invasion of England".

I bowed out gracefully at that point. Our conversations have a somewhat disjointed feel about them as neither of us understand what the other is talking about but it is an interesting insight into what Ulster has to offer if that is all he

can come up with. I think I did suggest to him that the Russians might be interested in N.I. as a base but he didn't take the suggestion too kindly.

★★★

Another nice one about the strike—from the Shankill this time. Apparently Ian Paisley was summoned up—or at least arrived—to show he was really behind the stoppage. Last Monday it was, when things were hotting up. He dutifully shouted his support and then came the time for the customary musical climax to the proceedings. Big Ian called for the National Anthem and this everyone loudly applauded. But it soon became painfully obvious, as the platform party stood to attention for the Queen, that the audience was of another mind altogether, calling for the Ulster Anthem no less. The music-makers were completely flummoxed, not knowing what they should be playing. In the end they settled for The Queen. But the singing from the assembled people left a good deal to be desired, I'm told. It just shows how far out of touch even the Great Doctor himself has been getting in these trying times.

★★★

I am waiting for the local press to take up the story of the wise old men of Queen's University and the alleged discrimination over appointments. As Fortnight contributors are involved in the case it would be unfair of me to give an opinion on the matter other than to say that there seems to be a lot of dirt being neatly swept under the carpet. Since you may not have the slightest clue what I am talking about but may be interested I will not elaborate at this date. You should refer your enquiries to the Belfast Telegraph, the Sunday News, the News Letter, the Irish News, the Irish Times and the Education Times, all of whom are fully conversant with the facts and all, as I write this, have not printed one word of the story. The Times Educational Supplement and the Times Higher Educational Supplement have been less timid, however, which is as good a case for the continuing link with Britain as I have heard. Further details in this space in future weeks as the scandal unfolds.

★★★

The takeover of the petrol and oil depot by troops showed clearly how ill prepared and incapable the Army were to deal with the situation. Horrified workers had to ask officers to tell the soldiers to stop smoking, stop wearing metal tipped boots or walk around with loaded rifles as the slightest spark could have caused the biggest bomb blast Belfast has known.

★★★

The furore over Army intervention in the strike—will they, won't they, will they . . —has detracted attention somewhat from the equally interesting question of the RUC's attitude. In theory it is their job to ensure that law abiding citizens can go about their business, just as much as to supervise the orderly conduct of the citizen's right to picket and demonstrate in an orderly fashion. From all accounts it seems that the RUC was spending more time on the right to picket than the right to work. But the degree of tacit support for the strike—or the degree of acceptance of mob rule if you prefer—is borne out by the fact that the Police Authority has to date received no complaints either of a specific or general nature on the police reaction to the strike. Or so they say. If you know of any specific incidents both they and we will be interested to hear of them. After all the strike was the first real test of whether the RUC had changed its spots beneath those old bottle black uniforms.

Not so in Rathcoole, apparently. You remember the complaints made in the Community Relations Commission's report on intimidation —about the lack of action at the local cop shop when initial pleas for protection were made by those who felt themselves under threat. Well a report on the allegations was finally received by the Police Authority last week which said, as might be expected, that there was no evidence of lack of action, and that the complainants had failed to press their cases and so on and on and on. But this time the Police Authority Complaints Committee has shown itself to be of sterner stuff—perhaps in response to the widespread complaints about its own lack of action. The RUC report on the allegations was referred back for further investigation. Apparently there are at least four or five cases in which there is evidence that the RUC at first denied that anyone had been intimidated and later changed their minds and issued formal letters stating that the families in question had been intimidated. Curious to say the least. I await further developments with interest.

Especially since the problem is still with us, though admittedly on a smaller scale than in 1972. There are not many left in Rathcoole itself to be intimidated, of course. But there are signs that the fear of sectarian attacks is now moving up the social scale, with a number of fairly prosperous families having moved away from the Greenisland area, and from parts of East Belfast during the strike. So it is not just a question of the RUC clearing themselves of past errors. They have still to show the will and the means to protect the minority's rights as effectively as they have the majority's. Not an easy job. But one that they will have increasingly to take on, as the Brits begin to disengage.

★★★

The latest report on the fowl pest in Donegall Street suggests that things are getting worse and there is no sign of medical aid on the way. As the only newspaper to support the Loyalist strike the News Letter may have suffered for its principles. Its reporters were given a blanket pass by the UWC. But notwithstanding the staff was put on a three day week and half pay. At least one senior journalist took the chance to flee the country announcing that he wasn't coming back. Capt. Henderson, now reunited with Glengall Street Unionism after a casual affair with the Faulknerites stayed on to hold the fort, but he must be worried that the additional support the paper may get from the working class Loyalists will be far outweighed by the loss of advertising from the Unionist business men of Belfast opposed to the strike. The cheapest way of winding down the operation might be to take a leaf out of the pages of the Northern Whig—create a fight with the unions, cause a stoppage and then close the paper down. We will have to wait and see how long it will be before the Irish News is Belfast's only morning faily . . . until the Fortnight Ulster Herald Express News Tribune gets off the ground, that is.

★★★

Fortnight got some free publicity from two completely different sources a couple of weeks ago. The UVF magazine Combat objected to me calling Bishop Philbin a 'Christian bigot'. Combat kindly pointed out that Mr Philbin is not a Christian at all, merely a Papist! In the same week the Andersonstown News felt it necessary to criticise Fred Heatley's series of articles on the Civil Rights Movement. They said it was full of errors (which it isn't) and that we were a 'Malone Road magazine'. Malone Road! As if we would be associated with an area of the city famous only as the location of the headquarters of the Provisional IRA.

CROSSWORD

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

ACROSS:

1. Hardy—such a writer makes a deep impression (2)
3. Whereby the left hand says it doesn't know what the right one is doing (3)
6. Reserve thanks (2)
8. Written by one who has proved to be right (3)
9. Where success is achieved by degrees (3)
10. It reverses the reason for its existence! (3)
11. State of agricultural increase? (2)
13. What contains extreme elements of crowds? (2)
15. Boxing promoters in capital? (3)
17. Unopposed propagandist (3)
18. But it's not only Wilson who's heard on it . . . (2)
20. . . . on the contrary, another politician appears (2)
21. Father's an eminent scientist (3)
23. Request to reveal something? Just the reverse (3)
26. Financial body—one involved in oil company's reverse (3)
28. Argument against one who has finished his terms (2)
29. Letter from abroad saying when one will reach one's destination (3)
30. Volume of notes (2)

DOWN:

1. Command post in capital parts (2)
2. Their business is travel—in the Caribbean? (3)
3. Local government body involved in fraud case (3)
4. Police officer upsets an old copper (2)
5. Cleverness of walter's statement? (2)
6. Workers said to require tea, you see (3)
7. Cabin inmate (2)
10. Grave message to bring a tear (3)
11. It involves a sample from the nation, opinion-wise (3)
12. One who judges the rightness of the part, we hear (2)
14. Either way, it may have disastrous implications (3)
16. Heath leaves America no longer P.M. (2)
19. Vessel—consumption follows start of meal (3)
21. They may help people to avoid an issue (3)
22. Coppers no longer in circulation here (3)
23. Means of transferring money found between banks (2)
24. Sort of print left by a type of sheepdog? (2)
25. Not a spiritual race? (2)
27. Very old part of Canada? (2)

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CROSSWORD WINNERS The winners of the Crossword in Issue 83 (£1 each) were P. O'Hare, Belfast 9, and Miss Naylor, Shimna Road, Newcastle.

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